The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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The Review of Metaphysics

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ON SUBSTANCE

We have today the advantage of the advancing knowledge of empirical situations as revealed by investigations in physics, but we have also the disadvantage of having to keep our suppositions within the limits allowed by that knowledge. At the present time, physics seems able to get along without the convenience of a notion of substance; and scientific structures are of such a nature that what they do not need they ought not to have. However, there are difficulties which confront the principle of economy in this case. There is chance to be accounted for, as the high relevancy of statistical probability to quantum mechanics ably argues, and there is real irrationality, too, with the same supporting evidence. The name which can cover both, for our purposes at least, is accident.

If, then, we wish to reintroduce the category of substance into the set of those categories which can be justified in terms of modern knowledge, we shall have to treat it in connection with chance and irrationality, or accident. Real, objective chance means the fortuitous occurrence of just this predicate or property here and now rather than any other out of a whole host of possibles. This blue wall—why is it blue? And if we are told it had been painted we could still ask why it had been painted blue. And driving back the series of causes conceals the fortuitous element, putting the selection on some antecedent cause which in turn has an antecedent chance element, and so on in an accidental series.

The category of substance, then, has to be constructed in some way to account for accident but not only for accident. There are always mass and energy. Here is the very stuff of substance, and if we are to give the name of substance to the element that does not change amid the changing phenomena, we shall never encounter it pure but always in the state of matter

(mass) or energy. Their interconvertibility, moreover, in accordance with the Einstein formula, requires that we postulate a common substrate, and substance performs this task adequately. Substance in relation to mass and energy is the tertium quid by means of which the conversion can take place. In mass and energy we have relative rest and motion (though not potency and act, for the mass is active and the energy might be constant, which is a kind of rest).

The current scientific inclination is to substitute energy for matter in order to bring speculation into accord with modern physics. But current interpretations neglect the static phase of matter as much as the slavish imitators of Aristotle neglected energy. Were there no persistence amid change, we could not talk about change, and the portmanteau phrase, "substantial activity," 'hardly solves the problem. To allow substance identity with change is to obliterate the distinction between substance and some particular set of attributes. What is static and quasi-permanent then? Substance if it does anything must "stand under," that is, persist through change, though it may be that element as it exists within and amid change. We shall of course need a certain kind of permanence to dwell in this manner.

We come now to the proposal of an adequate theory of substance. The key to substance is the analysis of particulars, the attempt to resolve the paradox of the absolute uniqueness of particulars which are made up of unchanging elements. Substance rests on this, does it not, that if we posit a common ground for matter and events we have explained how the predicates are held firmly and also how they change? The transformation from one state to the other requires a cause in each instance; and in this way the static and dynamic opposites are reconciled in particulars. We are required by the phenomena to suppose a common denominator for the uniqueness, and this is substance. We have only to take a certain reading of the Aristotelian primary substance in order to arrive at the definition we require.

We shall understand by substance the irrational ground of individual reaction. In our scheme there will be no secondary

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 238.

substances, the species and genera being considered structurally as forms and so not as inherent. Indeed, substance is required to prevent existence from collapsing into essence. The rationality of essence requires the irrationality of existence if the two are to remain mutually independent. Substance is necessarily contradictory. The substance itself is particular, while its attributes are universal, and how can the universal be in the particular in any cemented sense? Put otherwise, existence is irrational in that it contains limits, conflicts, errors, etc., while serving at the same time as the ground for reasons, relations and structures. Substance, then, is both universal in being everywhere the same and particular in being separate in each individual actual thing. If substance were not irrational, it would have form; and if it had form it would not be capable of receiving form, since that is not the function nor the capacity of form. For obviously if substance had form it could not receive the form which was the opposite of its form, as Plato said of his receptacle.2

The predicates of substance are borrowed and not owned. It is to be numbered among the accidents of existence that substance makes connections with recurrent elements, such as qualities and relations. Thus we find necessity lodged temporarily among mass and energy manifestations, as for instance in the natural laws which science seeks and often discovers. The properties of substance are temporary attachments, not permanent possessions. The delicacy of holding on and letting go is a nice one. Substance is, so to speak, a place for predicates; in this framework, "X is brown and could be black or blue, and so on" defines X. There is no reduction of the predicates, only an exchange; what is constant is that they are manifest, and this capacity to serve as an enabling invariant is what we call substance.

The meaning of substance advanced here can be explicated in several ways. We can relate it to the subject and to existence with some effect. For this purpose we are going to suppose that the theory of real and independent universals is correct. The subject is also a substance, only now the predicate contains attributes which are free in the sense that they are allowed entry

³ Timaeus, 50 E.

into and exit from existence. In existence they are together, otherwise the subject contracts into a neutral substance and the attributes retreat into pure possibilities of relations and qualities. To explain substance, we need logic, just as we need possibility to account for existence; logic is the name for the way in which possibility works, and substance is the name for the way in which existence works.

We cannot bring logic and substance together, however, without admitting that substance is irrational, or (since it is self-consistent) that it is the ground for irrationality. The evidence for this lies in the interchange of opposites, that what is black now could be white at some other time and in the same substance. Substance is the way in which we seek to find a place for the irrationalism which undoubtedly exists in the world. For either we assign it to the world, in which case there is an argument to be made out for the prospects of human reasoning, or we assign it to the mind, in which case there is an argument to be made out for the complete rationality of the world. There is, fortunately, a third alternative, which is to suppose that the mind and the world contain elements of irrationality: that the mind can err and that the world contains irreducible elements.

Reason governs the universe of essence, wherefore there are no irrational universals or values. Irrationality is the inalienable property of substance. When qualities and relations occur they bring with them a reason and consistency, but their very occurrence involves them in the unreason and inconsistency which substance provides in providing an occurrence. Hence everything in existence is involved with a certain amount of conflict. The enabling invariant, which we have named substance and described as an irrational ground of individual reaction, makes provisions for essences which can at best be temporary. But the substance itself remains in virtue of the intermittent visitations of essences, a paradox which yet makes possible the independence of substance from essence so that the former does not collapse into the latter, which is so often the case with idealistic metaphysical systems.

We have no experience of substance, only of the qualities and relations which attach to it. Even here men like Bradley have professed to find irrationality, and they have leaned the most upon ON SUBSTANCE 377

reason. It may be asked whether they have ever faced up bravely to this paradox. Reason is not reason when it leaves out of account whatever is to be accounted for, and there is the irrational which must be accounted for in some way by reason. The fact is that the irrational exists. It is a requisite part of rationality to recognize in the world those elements which are inherently irrational. The world being what it is, it is not rational to insist that everything be rational, for this would move against the facts, facts with which reason must deal since it cannot change them.

That we have no experience of substance puts us back upon Plato's question of how we know substance. We know it by some bastard form of inference, according to Plato; today we should say, rather, that it is established as an axiom required to account for the behavior of appearances exhibited by particular instances of qualities and relations occurring as individuals in conflict. Substance is not a name for space, as Plato thought, but a name for the fact that space is occupied. There would be nothing except empty space were it not for substance. Or rather, one might argue, if substance means no more than space, then there would be no difference between empty space and occupied space. But of course there is a difference and it is precisely this difference that we indicate by the use of the term "substance." We account for the consistency of what occupies space in other ways, namely, by positing a universe of logic containing the possibilities of universals and values, and persistent elements of existence; there remains only to account for the stubbornness of reaction with its inconsistency. Here we are obliged to suppose an element which belongs in its own universe, the very ground of contradiction, since it cannot be reduced to persistent elements yet requires them.

There appears to be no valid objection to a reconciliation of Plato's and Aristotle's main points, that is, to a combination of the Aristotelian substance with the Platonic Ideas. Each of these philosophers seem to have neglected the ontological world which the other stressed, for Plato's actual world collapses into universals, while Aristotle's universals get lost in the actual world where they burrow unseen and wait patiently in a state of potency. The compromise—which is no mere compromise but another concep-

tion—is one that neither thinker would have accepted; it was explicitly rejected by Aristotle, for instance. Yet our problem is not one of history. We go to history only for hints as to what the truth about the nature of things might be, and we search in the end for the doctrine which is best suited to the facts. If the situation as it exists is best described by a combination of elements which involves another conception of substance, then we should attend to it. For it is the knowledge of how things are and not merely what men have thought about them that remains our chief concern.

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ARISTOTLE AS A MATHEMATICIAN

ROBERT BRUMBAUGH

Recent studies clarifying Aristotle's knowledge and use of mathematics also make it clear that an appraisal and transposition into modern terms of the nature and value of Aristotle's work in this area is a complex problem.¹ In basic features, the problem is typical of those that Aristotle poses to twentieth-century philosophers and scientists.

This paper is an application of a more general formula of transformation which seems to sharpen the issues and explain the opposed reactions involved in treating Aristotle as a contemporary philosopher. In my discussion, I intend to show that Aristotle can be read as a Pythagorean scientist if we concentrate on his applications of mathematics; that he must be read as an anti-Platonic intuitionist if we concentrate on his account of the nature and foundations of mathematics; that the way in which he conceives his theory and practice to be related exactly reverses our contemporary idea of what constitutes explanation and what constitutes pre-demonstrative inquiry.

Although it has never been hard to find a Platonic element in the other dimensions of Aristotle's philosophy, my first point represents a sharp break with past consensus where mathematics is concerned. Again, while the stress on construction in Aristotle's view of mathematics has been repeatedly noted, this has not been properly connected with his restrictions on the law of excluded middle. Finally, though contemporary reaction illus-

¹ The view that Aristotle was not a mathematician, as stated by A. E. Taylor (Plato: the Man and His Work, pp. 506-07), cannot be easily reconciled with Sir Thomas Heath's study, Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford, 1949) and Hippocrates Apostle, Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago, 1952). Aristotle seems to have been both well-grounded in pure mathematics, and interested in the foundations of mathematics and its application. Still, Taylor's point holds that Aristotle does reject concepts fundamental to our contemporary science of mathematics (cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, p. lvi, where this same point is noted).

trates three very different appraisals of Aristotle—that he is wrong at almost every point, that he has brilliant insights but develops them to anticlimaxes, and that he is using an idiom that is wholly unfamiliar—I do not know of any general theory of the interaction of systems which shows how a single system can produce all three of these reactions.

These three points I take to be related in such a way that the first does not presuppose the second, nor the first and second the third. The reader is therefore asked to judge the case for the interpretation of Aristotelian mathematics in its own terms, apart from his reaction to the concluding suggestions about Aristotle and metaphysics in general.

I

Aristotle is so outspoken in his criticisms of the use of mathematics by Pythagoreans and Platonists that it seems pointless to read him as a later Pythagorean.² Despite his strictures in theory, however, he seems in his practice to be carrying on the techniques of the *Timaeus* throughout his whole system.³

The most strikingly Pythagorean feature of Plato's *Timaeus* is its assumption that certain basic mathematical formulae will provide the key to all kinds of phenomena. For example, any problem of structure or interaction should be analyzable into three parts, with the quantitative relation a:b::b:c, where a and c are extremes, "harmonized" by the mean. Or, again, the analogy of periodic cycles is carried into cosmology in the same way: even down to the motions within the individual animal brain imitating those of the cosmos. These basic patterns provide a

² Particularly Metaphysics M and N.

³ I was first struck by this in connection with the use of matrices and diagrams as educational devices: although this pedagogical tradition was Pythagorean, Aristotle followed it extensively. If our editions of Aristotle were equipped with reconstructions of all the figures he alludes to, the point would be quite clear.

⁴ Timaeus, 35, where the construction of the world-soul by proportions can be taken as giving an algebraic pattern of analysis used throughout the first part of the cosmology (to 47).

guide to inquiry: we are to look in any range of subject-matter, for the linking mean term and the proper cyclic periodicity. This seems to be the kind of inquiry that Aristotle rejects as a mere "collection of analogies" in *Metaphysics* N.

However, if we assemble Aristotle's own uses of the "mean" as a key concept, the result is surprising. In the logic, it is the "middle term" which connects the extremes in an inference." In the De Partibus Animalium, the several organs which are each more near an extreme than the animal as a whole, are harmonized and the mean between them is the functioning of an organism. In the Physics, we find Aristotle insisting that physics requires three principles, because pairs of opposites cannot interact except through some third mean.* The outermost heaven, which by its motion keeps the processes of nature in regular continuation, as described in *Physics* viii, is a mean between the eternal impassivity of the unmoved mover and the diverse processes of generation within the heavens; one of the arguments for its eternity is that it has this mediating place, and a mean must have some factor in common with each extreme. Plato's "measure" from the Philebus reappears in an Aristotelian counterpart in the mean position of moral virtue in Ethics ii, and in Ethics v "justice" is defined by analogies to kinds of ratio. (Plato used a somewhat similar device in Republic x to schematize the structure of "cosmic justice," though Aristotle goes back closer to the Pythagorean aphorism that justice is a square number.) 10 In De Generatione et Corruptione, the presence or absence of a mean accounts for different velocities of the six basic chemical reactions. In the Meteorologica (in the final book, which is sometimes thought not genuine), and

⁵ Jan van der Meulen, Aristoteles: Die Mitte in seinem Denken, (Meisenheim/Glan, 1951), traces this concept, but treats the "mean" in question as in the category of substance rather than of quantity. The result is a bridging of Aristotle's sharp ontological distinctions which is philosophically interesting, but not convincing Aristotelianism.

⁶ Prior Analytics.

⁷ De Part. Anim., 656a ff., where the heart and brain are harmonized in the organism as a mean.

^{*} Physics ii,iii.

^{*} Physics, 259a20.

¹⁰ Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a10, 1131a10 ff.

¹¹ De Gen. et Corr., 337b-338; also De Caelo, 304b-307b.

also in De Gen. et Corr., compounds are the mean which is the resultant of opposing vectors of natural motion, and this gives them their stability. (The echo of Plato's image of God using violence to join the components of matter, because they were fissionable, is faintly audible in this idea.)¹² It is recognition of the appropriate similarity as a mean which makes us understand metaphor in poetry; since this is a transference of names on the basis of some common similarity.¹³ Psychologically, genius in poetry is sensitivity to such means, just as in science it is ability to see middle terms of demonstration.¹⁴ The phenomena of the psychophysical level of a life-cycle, in the Parva Naturalia, are analyzed in a way which will justify the usual Aristotelian location of closest approach to a final cause at the mean point of the cycle, not at either end.¹⁵ And so on.

Among other cases of the omnipresent "mean" covered by my "and so on" is that of motion in a trajectory, which is a mean between and resultant of circular and linear motion. This leads to Aristotle's use of the mathematical notion of proportionately related cycles as the a priori form in which to treat periodicity within cosmology, if one is to follow the Pythagorean treatment. As a matter of fact, both the analysis of efficient causality and the account of induction in Aristotle displays this schematism of cycles. Circularity appears in the rotation of the outer heavens and this, with variations in solar energy that accompany it, is the source of seasonal cycles, and the basic cycle of transmutation of elements.16 The sub-cycles of reciprocal change of place among bodies with rectilinear motion, and the lives of individual organisms, are connected by links of efficient causality to these other cosmic processes. Life-cycles, for example, occur because in our part of the world coming-to-be never ceases to be, yet the organs of an animal are made of compounds not in their proper relative

13 Poetics, 1457b ff.

14 Ibid.; Posterior Analytics, 89b10-20.

¹⁴ De Caelo, 310a-311a; De Gen. et Corr., 335a-327b.

¹² Meteorologica iv: compare the passages cited in n. 10. The Platonic analogue is found in *Timaeus*, 32-35, where God plans and compounds the three-part mixture of the world-soul.

¹⁸ Parva Naturalia, 464b-467b (On Length and Shortness of Life);
Ibid., 467b-470b (On Youth and Old Age; On Life and Death).

places, and they deteriorate with time. If the De Motu Animalium is Aristotelian, the stimulus-organic response mechanism it describes is basically cyclical; if it is not, its doctrine seems needed to complete the physiology." In science, since a consequent can never be inferred with certainty from its antecedent, dependable induction is limited to those cases of cyclic change in which the same term becomes consequent and antecedent in turn: the inference of antecedent from consequent does provide certainty."

A reader of the *Timaeus* can hardly fail to be struck by the apparently Platonic frame of mind these repeated metaphors show, when they are assembled from Aristotle's various writings. As a third case in point, Aristotle cites a Pythagorean "Table of Opposites" in *Metaphysics* A.¹⁹ This table seems a device for contextual definition of key terms: by arranging a set of terms in two columns, their spatial relations are made analogous to their similarity or opposition in meaning. Such a "verbal matrix" was presumably an extension of similar diagrams used in computation, study of proportions, or genetic theory where combinations were listed.²⁰ In any case, the "semantic field" of meaning it seems to

¹⁷ De Motu Animalium, 703a ff.

¹⁸ De Gen. et Corr., 337b-338b; Post. Anal., 95a25-96a25.

¹º Metaphysics, 986a23.

²⁰ For Platonic uses of this "matrix" device, see Sophist, 266A; also my "Note on Plato, Republic ix, 587D," Classical Philology XLIV (1949), pp. 197-99, and my notes on teaching Republic viii and ix, Classical Journal, XLVI (1951), pp. 343-48; in these, matrices are shown to be involved in Phaedrus, 249, Republic, 546, and Republic, 587. For the basic notion of "verbal matrices," see Scott Buchanan, Symbolic Distance (London, 1932), and Leonard Bloomfield, Linguistic Aspects of Science (Chicago, 1939), "Matrices." In the Platonic tradition, the device remains a standard one; cf. the scholia to Republic, 511 and 534 in W. C. Greene, Scholia Platonica (Haverford, 1938), pp. 246, 252-53. The computational use of such a device would be the multiplication table up to ten (kephalismos) referred to by Aristotle, Topics, 163b17 ff. (see Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 93, for translation and comment on the passage); the table seems to fit Aristotle's comment better if it is set up with the Athenian ("Herodianic") notation (Heath, Greek Mathematics, I, pp. 30-31). Again, an abacus provides a model for this use of spatial relations in a matrix; see Heath, Greek Mathematics, I, pp. 46-52, and compare Plato's reference, Euthyphro, 12, and his assimilation of mathematics to checkers and dice, Phaedrus, 274C. Other antecedents are suggested by some of the theorems in Euclid,

imply is very Pythagorean, and reminds us of Aristotle's deprecation of their "collections of analogies." Yet Aristotle makes five subsequent references in the *Metaphysics* to a *systoichia*, clearly a verbal matrix, and uses this diagram as the starting-point of inferences, especially in M and N.²² Whether the intended diagram is Aristotle's own, or is, as some scholars have thought, the Pythagorean table itself, does not change the point at issue.²³

It might be urged, however, that Aristotle's "mean," "cycle," and so on, are not meant as quantitative properties, so that their trans-generic application is not a mathematical analogy. Since, however, in the syllogism it is extension of terms in question (originally with diagrams where segments represented relative breadth of extension); in the physiology, measurable qualitative intensity; in the chemistry, reaction time; in the treatment of compounds, proportion of components; throughout the references to cycle, measurable temporal periodicity, etc., this attempted interpretation cannot be convincing. The second convincing and the s

However, if we extend the concept analogically, the prime mover, the twofold potentiality and causal nature of art and science, and the active mind give us the two extremes and the mean most basic in Aristotle's ontology.

I submit, that if we had only these doctrines preserved as the teaching of Aristotle, we would not hesitate to identify him, along with Speusippus, as a thinker typical of the Pythagorean phase of the Academy.

This catalogue of items is meant only to point out that Aristotle does use applied mathematics in the whole range of his inquiries, so that his practice seems at odds with his theoretical position. What it does not show, but what seems to be true, is

Elements, V, and the genetic theories of Empedocles and the Hippocratic school.

²¹ Metaphysics, 1093a26.

²² Metaphysics, 986a23, 1004b27, 1054b35, 1058a13, 1072a31-35, 1093b12.

²³ See the notes to these passages in Ross, op. cit.

²⁴ This is the way I believe van der Meulen would interpret these ideas; see above, n. 5.

²⁵ To determine this, one need only study the passages cited above, notes 6-19, in their contexts.

that Aristotle uses the method well. (D'Arcy W. Thompson regarded his extraordinarily Platonic chapter on "Transformation" in On Growth and Form as a development of an insight in the Historia Animalium.) This squares very well with the evidence that Aristotle was wholly competent in pure mathematics and interested in the Academy's newer theories of astronomy.²⁴ As will be suggested below, Aristotle's mathematical talent was considerable; when we have a history of set theory in the Greek period, this will become clearer.²⁷

Consequently, if Aristotle rejects a "mathematical" approach to science, we cannot explain this by assuming him ignorant of what he was rejecting. Either the rejection constitutes an unconscious inconsistency between his theory and practice, or it represents a judgment based on extensive first-hand experience in this type of thinking.

II

Though Aristotle's practice coincides with that of the Platonic tradition, he builds mathematics on different foundations, and rejects the Platonic theory as to the nature of mathematics and the conception of mathematical entities.²⁴ His criticism is very hard to understand unless one recognizes two things about mathematics: first, that alternative accounts of its foundations are possible, second, that one of these is the "intuitionist" view of mathematical thinking as construction.²⁹ Since pure mathematics itself has been dominated by the Platonic tradition ever since Euclid, the

²⁷ See the discussion, below, of Aristotle's treatment of transfinite numbers and sets.

²⁸ Physics iii (where Aristotle tries to assure the "mathematicians" that he is not depriving them of something by his denial of any actual infinity), Metaphysics A, M, N. See also Apostle, op. cit., Chap. I.

²⁶ Heath and Apostle demonstrate Aristotle's basic competence; Metaphysics, 1073a-1074b shows Aristotle's interest in the astronomical research of the Academy.

^{**} Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins, What is Mathematics? (Oxford, 1941) is an illuminating discussion of the present relation of "formalism" and "intuitionism" in mathematics. See also W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, pp. 207, 226, 248-50.

periodic suggestions that it is not really concerned with discovering properties of entities, as the Platonists say, have made little impression within the field proper. This tends to create the presumption, unless one is aware of the philosophically possible alternatives, that a discussion is either Platonic and right, or is not mathematics or wrong. That a constructional interpretation could be consistently maintained was defended theoretically by Kant, but seems not to have made much impression on historians of philosophy and mathematics until the present century.

If we now study Aristotle with contemporary discussion in mind, many of the problems that seemed most hard to nineteenthcentury philologists are clarified and can be resolved in the light of recent speculation.

The passages on mathematics in which its constructional character is most clear are 1) those dealing with the infinite and infinitesimal in the works on nature, and 2) those identifying the causes of mathematics in the Metaphysics. The former set of passages argues against attributing actual existence to entities which cannot be actually exhibited or constructed.31 The latter set includes an identification of the efficient cause of mathematical knowledge as the idea of a constructible diagram in the mind of the mathematician, and of its formal cause with the quantitative properties of actual substances (properties treated as separate by the mathematician, though in fact they are posterior to substances which underlie them).32 The axioms and postulates of a mathematical system are not formal, but material, causes, and result in actual mathematical knowledge only through specific construction. Existence assertions in the postulates are justified insofar as it is intuitively evident that the defined entities have existence as attributes of real substances, but

³⁰ The reader is invited to verify the fact that neither Protagoras, Berkeley, nor Hume is treated seriously as a mathematician, and Kant is usually dismissed rather abruptly. The great mathematicians are the Platonists: Eudoxus, Euclid, Descartes, Leibniz, et al.

³¹ Physics iii, 204a-208a. See especially 208a20-25: "To rely on mere thinking is absurd, for then the excess or defect is not in the thing, but in the thought" (Oxford translation).

³² Ibid.; Also Metaphysics, 1051a-1052a (Θ, ix), 1076b-1078b.

in the absence of this intuitive certainty, we would not have a demonstrative science."

This all sounds very like contemporary "intuitionist" discussion, and the criticisms of Plato come close to duplicating current criticism by intuitionists of formalists, at least where infinities are concerned. But this attempt to identify Aristotle with Kant and Brouwer probably will not convince the reader who remembers that Aristotle makes the law of excluded middle a metaphysical principle and a logical one, while the "intuitionists" of the present day deny it.³⁴

It is therefore worth noting that Aristotle also denies this law when we are reasoning about possibilities. If "All P is possibly Q" be true, then "All P is possibly non-Q" follows by immediate inference in Aristotle's logic." Future situations, such as the outcome of a construction not yet made actual, are assimilated to this rule in the following way: a disjunction, p or ~ p, is as a whole true of a future event; but at present, neither p nor ~ p is as yet true of it." This offends the sensibilities of formal logicians, and yet is a necessary formal device in any logic which can treat contingency: certainly, it will either rain or not rain tomorrow, yet at the present time the state of tomorrow's weather may be indeterminate. The question of whether contingent situations exist is metaphysical, not logical; but Aristotle's assertion that they do exist requires the present restriction in his logic.

In addition to the rules of modality cited, the distinction of immediate inference between contradictories and contraries restricts the possibility of "existence proof" in Aristotelian logic. While "Socrates is either well or non-well" is true, and while "every

³³ In its context, I take this to be the meaning of *Metaphysics*, 1087a20: "For if the principles must be universal, what is derived from them must also be universal, as in demonstrations; and if this is so, there will be nothing capable of separate existence—i.e., no substance" (Oxford translation). *Posterior Analytics*, 71b10 f., 93a20-29.

³⁴ See for example, the summary in Courant and Robbins, op. cit., pp. 86-88.

De Interpretatione, 21b11-15, with the qualification of 22b30-23a25.
 De Interpretatione, 18a28-19b5. The example of the sea-fight at 19a30 is an illustration.

man who is not well is ill" is also true, the inference from "Socrates is not well" to "Socrates is ill" is invalid if Socrates does not exist. 37 Consequently, an argument that "every number is either odd or even" and "the number equal to the square root of zero is not odd, hence this number is even" is invalid without the added proof that "there exists a number equal to the square root of zero." (Since "number" is abstracted from sets of substances, and arithmetic deals with constructions, with the "units" that result from this abstraction, this "number" does not exist; but the critical point is the inconclusiveness of "proofs" of the type cited.)

This set of methodological restrictions entails a non-Platonic conception of the foundations of mathematics, and a consequent change in the meaning of "existence" or of an "existential operator" in mathematical science.38 It explains the repeated stress on the non-constructibility of the "inaddible numbers" and "number-forms" of Platonic ontology, since it restricts Aristotle's own presentation of arithmetic to set-theory, without transfinite sets.39

This transmutation also provides the clue to the otherwise unintelligible assertion of Aristotle that for Plato "the forms are numbers." 40 What Plato actually says, in the later dialogues, is that in practice the presence and construction of forms is a question of "measure." " What Aristotle is arguing, in the

³⁸ See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, p. lvi, and A. E. Taylor,

loc. cit., for criticisms of Aristotle's mathematics on this point.

4º The classic study remains L. Robin, Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote (Paris, 1908). But the notion that this is a literal quotation of a Platonic "esoteric doctrine" becomes almost impossible to defend satisfactorily in the light of Harold F. Cherniss, The Riddle of the

Early Academy (Berkeley, 1945).

³⁷ Categories, 13b20-35. The distinction of "definite" and "indefinite" subjects and predicates in respect to their existential import, in De Interpretatione, 16a30-35, 16b11-20, corrects the erroneous modern notion that the A and I proposition always have existential import in Aristotle's logic.

³⁹ Aristotle seems to be avoiding both the theory of types and the set-theory paradox of self-including sets by sticking to the notion that a set is a collection of units, and a number the multiplicity of a given set. (For a simple statement of these paradoxes, see Quine, op. cit., pp. 248-52.) But if the elements of a set are actually units, and only potentially subsets, this represents a considerable restriction of mathematics in its present scope.

⁴¹ Statesman, 284C ff.; Philebus, 65-67 are the clearest examples.

context of the Metaphysics as a whole, is that the Pythagorean-Platonic position is right in one sense, but is not an adequate anticipation of Aristotle's own concept of formal causality. 42 An Aristotelian "formal cause" becomes actual only when it appears in the space-time realm of efficient and final causality.43 Consequently, it is the Platonic forms at their point of fusion with concrete process which will be closest to "forms" in Aristotle's sense, and at this point of fusion, Platonists identify the operative form with "measure." 44 If, as their uses of mathematical techniques suggest, they mean "measure" in a quantitative sense, then, since for Aristotle the measure of something is a set of homogeneous units, which are counted and represented by a number, this is equivalent to identification of "numbers" and ingressive forms.45 Therefore, Aristotle seems to be substituting for the Platonic doctrine a statement equivalent to it in Aristotelian terms. The point of this substitution is to see whether Aristotle himself must concede the existence of forms or numbers as separate substances and causes within the framework of his own analysis of substance and causality.46 Naturally enough, therefore, he translates the position into a paraphrase embodying some of the equivalences and distinctions of his own system. If science is a search for causes, if formal causes are actual only when concrete, if measures are sets of homogeneous units, if Platonic forms when they approach concrete realization

⁴² This statement of the case in A (Metaphysics, 988a23-993a27) sets the tone for the problems in B and the whole subsequent discussion.

⁴³ Metaphysics, 1038b1-1039b20; Ibid., 1071a18-24.

[&]quot;This "fusion" is the point of identity between potentiality and actuality, Metaphysics, 1045a20-b25.

⁴⁵ For Aristotle's notion of measure, see *Metaphysics*, 1052a1-1053b6. Platonic measure at least is often expressed in quantitative terms, as in the *Timaeus* and *Laws*; presumably its normative aspect would seem to Aristotle irrelevant to his criticism in this context.

in Metaphysics B, 1. These problems are the final "knots" to be untied, presumably because their loosening requires untying the others first. The translation of Richard Hope, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Postscript to Natural Science (New York, 1952), follows Aristotle's use of connectives in its paragraphing more closely than other translations, and the result is a much tighter set of coordinate problems. (Aristotle uses men and de to indicate coordination throughout this chapter of B.)

are transmuted to measures, Aristotle's paraphrase follows. The subsequent criticism centering on the "units" of these sets shows the impossibility of an Aristotelian acceptance of this doctrine. It is beside the point to show that this is not what Platonic mathematicians meant, and that the objections are therefore irrelevant: for Aristotle has already indicated that they run into difficulties if they mean something else by "forms." "measures," or "causes," and the adequacy of this "refutation" must be measured by noticing the prior elimination of alternatives throughout the *Metaphysics*."

More generally, Aristotle's position seems to lead to the rejection of passage from values as one approaches a limit to values at the limit if the approach can never be completed." Presumably this would rule out Pythagorean "points," Platonic "minimal planes of contact," Anaxagorean infinitesimals, Leibnizian monads, and Whiteheadian minimal slices of space at a moment (with which he replaces Leibniz' interpretation of delta x). "His reasoning on this point is most clearly shown in his rejection of Plato's Timaeus as physical science. Plato, in analyzing the world into minimal triangles, then describing it by integrations of these, has committed a typical mathematician's fallacy: not noticing that the existence of these minima is dependent on and posterior to the existence of actual substances in which they are present. Plato's initial act of abstraction has left out something crucial which can never be restored by multiplying mere mathematical triangles.50 In a similar way, causality in nature is effective between substances, and to ascribe causal efficacy to quantities is to accept an erroneous ontology.51

The purpose of these comments is to indicate that Aristotle's mathematics proper reflects a non-Platonic concept of the nature

⁴⁷ Metaphysics Z. I. A. particularly.

[&]quot; De Interpretatione, 23a20-25, and Ross, note ad loc.

⁴⁹ Cartesian points and moments could be added; note that this list of rejected concepts traces the main stream of our standard mathematical tradition.

⁵⁰ E.g., De Caelo, 308a21-310a10. My summary in the text of what Plato had done follows Aristotle: but one could equally well interpret the "triangles" as sound anticipations of modern calculus (*Timaeus*, 51 ff.).

⁶¹ Metaphysics, 1092b20-25; 1093b8-12.

and foundation of mathematical science, not mere ignorance or misunderstanding nor lack of any appreciation for the work of the Academy.⁵² The position Aristotle takes is a very interesting one, in that he seems to be deliberately avoiding the paradoxes that beset Platonic formal logic and semi-Platonic set-theory. Ultimately, he restricts ontology by limiting postulates which commit existence to abstractions from actuality: this provides intuitive clarity and guarantees consistency and interpretability. But that guarantee will not extend to abstractions from possibility.

III

The combination of the first two points of the present discussion is an apparent antinomy. If the account of the nature of mathematics is right, numbers are neither substances nor causes, and applied mathematics seems irrelevant to scientific demonstration in physics, ethics, or any other science except the limited category of composite mathematical studies, such as optics, harmonics, and the theory of the rainbow. An Aristotelian scientist might well refer to the De Anima and explain this fact by showing that the natures of things are recognized by intuition, a faculty which presupposes the abstraction of mathematical thinking, but supersedes or supplements it.53. Whitehead has pointed out that stress on classification, not on measure, characterized science in the Aristotelian tradition; of course, this is not literally true, but it does underscore a lesser emphasis on mathematics than the Platonic-Augustinian tradition showed. Yet Aristotle uses mathematics in every aspect of his philosophic work: mathematical formulae and analogies appear to be expected a priori by him, and looked for, in everything from physiology to formal logic and ethics.

⁵³ I have summarized this briefly in "An Aristotelian Defense of 'Non-Aristotelian' Logics," Journal of Philosophy, XLIX (1952), 582-85.

⁵² As a matter of fact, Aristotle's description of the properties which transfinite sets would have anticipates our modern notions, and shows mathematical talent of a high order. He is analogous in the history of set theory to Saccheri in that of geometry.

The resolution of this apparent break between theory and practice is given by Aristotle in the final chapters of the *Metaphysics*. The Pythagoreans, like his other predecessors, were too wise to be wrong altogether, and, while the shift in his conception of the foundations of mathematics leads Aristotle to an extensive criticism, he ends, as is his habit, in accepting part of the position as a valid contribution to his own philosophy.⁵⁴

In solving his final problem, of the status of numbers as causes, Aristotle follows his usual balanced approach. It has seemed to many of his readers, particularly those with strong Platonic sympathies, that his books M and N do involve a wholesale rejection of the causal efficacy of number. But, without the key to Aristotle's paraphrase given by recognizing his shift in the concept of foundations of mathematics, the Platonic reader tends to want a sharp logical opposition between this criticism and the original, so that he can reject Aristotle.

It is true, Aristotle concludes, that the cross-generic analogies of mathematics show something.⁵⁵ What they show is, as we can gather from the diagram (this is the *systoichia* referred to above), that there is a natural appropriateness or likeness between things that are in different genera, insofar as beauty and existence are tightly related.⁵⁶ In a universe where final causality is constitutive of every substance (though only analogically) certain mathematical properties which are the constituents of beauty will accompany operative causality.⁵⁷

Consequently, there is not a total irrelevance between the fanciful Pythagorean collection of aesthetic similarities and the truths of scientific demonstration. On the contrary, in trying to identify the causes in a given subject-matter, looking for math-

⁵⁴ The dialectic of A is typical of the *Metaphysics*, and appears in the resolution of the final problem of the list in B 1 at the end of N. See below.

⁵⁵ Metaphysics, 1093b12-22.

¹⁶ Ibid. See Metaphysics, 986a23 for the systoichia. If the reader will re-read the last chapter of N with the Pythagorean diagram before him, I believe his impression of Aristotle's attitude will be different from that given by the mere text without the figure it refers to—which is certainly very like, if not identical with the Pythagorean table.

⁴⁷ Metaphysics, 1078a32-b6; see also 1075a25-39.

ematical regularity—for symmetry, order, and measure—is a very scientific preliminary stage of inquiry; for these properties will indicate that a final cause is present, and where it is to be sought. But, for Aristotle, this is not yet an explanation until the indication revealed by mathematical properties is followed and clarified, so that we discover what a substance is by the further intellectual operation of rational insight into its purposive structure, which enables us to recognize its proper causes. It is these causes which are responsible for the quantitative characteristics, not vice-versa, so that, with some special exceptions (such as optics) mathematical terms can never serve as middles in precise scientific demonstration. Precise scientific demonstration.

In this way, Aristotle can justify his practice as an appropriate use of mathematics as a technique of inquiry, yet reject the position that it provides explanations of causes suitable for scientific demonstration. This relation of inquiry to proof seems to the modern reader to be exactly the reverse of our own convictions: Aristotelian classification is for us often a useful preliminary technique of inquiry, when we are deciding what to measure, but we use mathematics for our final demonstration. I propose to suggest some of the consequences of this reversal at some later time.

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Posterior Analytics, 75a36-b20.

⁵⁵ The briefest summary here is the treatment of modality of judgments in De Interpretatione, 23a; Metaphysics, 1071a ff. and Categories, 2a10 ff. make the same point.

TIME AND CONTINGENCY IN ST. AUGUSTINE

ROBERT JORDAN

As a text for my remarks 'I shall choose the following lines, which are found not in the famous eleventh Book of the Confessions but in the twelfth Book of the De civitate Dei: "For since God is the supreme existence, that is to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like Himself. To some He communicated a more ample, to others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks." This passage fails to mention time, let alone tell us what it is, but, when its implications are drawn, it tells us something much more important, namely, why the whole question of time is worth considering at all. The question "What?" is undoubtedly important but undoubtedly less important (if we had to make a choice, which, of course, we do not) than the question "What of it?"

St. Augustine's understanding of time is such that it makes time a problem not of physics nor of cosmology, although there are cosmological implications too, but of moral philosophy. And since moral philosophy, for Augustine, is inseparable from the problem of the ultimate destiny of the soul, his conception of time is a part of his conception of the religious life of man. Accordingly, I propose to summarize Augustine's theory of the nature of time in the first part of the paper, treating it, so far as possible, as a separate topic of a theoretical nature. However, since the whole problem is a practical one in the Platonic sense, I propose, in the second part of the paper, to interpret this theory in Augustinian terms in an effort to show the significance of

¹ This paper was presented before the Southern Society for Philosophy of Religion on March 4, 1954.

² De civ. Dei, XII, 2 (Translations, unless otherwise indicated, will be those of Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. by Whitney J. Oates, 2 vols., New York, 1948).

the whole question of time and eternity and limited being for Augustine's theory of man. This is an immense subject. Consequently, in order to impose some boundary upon it, I have restricted myself to the contrast of "the Unlimited" and "the Limited," "the Unchangeable" and "the Changeable" as a means of giving the interpretation a single accent.

Augustine's investigation of time is a study in contingency, finiteness, creatureliness, dependency, incompleteness, imperfection—a study of the limitation of being that characterizes any finite entity, that entity which is, but which is not He Who Is. Time exists because there are existent things in the universe which are just so much reality, but no more. The existence of only one of these things is of genuinely intimate concern to man-himself. And, of course, this suggests subjectivity. Augustine's view of time is habitually described as a subjective view or a psychological view. The designation is misleading and the language unfortunate. I shall try to suggest why the subjectivism, if it does exist, is innocuous. In one sense, the obvious one, time could not fail to be a subjective matter since the poignancy of temporality is primarily a human concern, and the moral and spiritual life of man is the immediate context of that concern. But this does not mean, as Mr. Russell, for example, seems to think, that time is necessarily unreal. Russell says, "St. Augustine, whose absorption in the sense of sin led him to excessive subjectivity, was content to substitute subjective time for the time of history and physics. Memory, perception, and expectation, according to him, made up all that there is of time. But obviously, this won't do. All his memories and all his expectations occurred at about the time of the fall of Rome, whereas mine occur at about the time of the fall of industrial civilization, which formed no part of the Bishop of Hippo's expectations. Subjective time might suffice for a solipsist of the moment, but not for a man who believes in a real past and future, even if only his own." This quotation would provide a sufficient excuse for the second part of this paper. For, apart from the quite staggering irrelevance in the quotation,

³ Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York, 1948), p. 212.

Russell seems to think that what makes time important is the fact that in it we confirm or disconfirm a scientific or an historical theory. Augustine, on the other hand, thinks that time is important for quite another reason—it is in time that a soul is saved or lost.

Indeed, it is with this theme that the eleventh Book of the Confessions opens. The first six chapters proclaim the creation of the world and the radical difference between the creator and the created, the eternal and the temporal. And we are told what the temporal is, "Behold the heaven and earth are; they proclaim that they were made, for they are changed and varied." More specifically, the creature is a thing of time and change "since in proportion as anything is not what it was, and is what it was not, in that proportion does it die and arise."

Chapters 8 and 9 reaffirm the contrast of the finite with the immutable standard against which the finite is measured, and Chapter 10 contrasts the will of God with that of the creature on the basis of the necessity of recognizing two distinct orders. The distinction is required, for example, by the question: If it was the will of God that the creature should exist, why did the creature not exist from eternity? The answer is elaborated in the next chapters in terms of the non-temporal as contrasted with the temporal, the ever-presentness of God's eternity as against the "times which never stand" because "no time is wholly present." The whole section is climaxed in Chapter 13 by the statement that time did not exist before the creation, since that would involve the Creator Himself in time, thus contradicting His ever-presentness and eternal unchangeableness. God made time along with creation.' All this is by way of prologue.

In Chapter 14, Augustine turns to the question of time itself, but the context from which this problem has emerged has been clearly revealed and it should not be forgotten. It is a moral-religious one. Augustine's perplexity is born of wonder, not of peeping curiosity. We have been given the broad significance of

⁴ Conf., XI, 4.

⁵ Conf., XI, 7. ⁶ Conf., XI, 11. Cf. De Trin., I, 1.

Conf., XI, 13. Cf. De civ. Dei, XI, 6.

temporality and now we have the question itself: "For what is time?" Yet the question is never divorced from its original context. For time is immediately coupled with non-being or the tendency not to be. "... we cannot truly say that time is, unless because it tends not to be." This absolute contingency is a constant theme of Augustine's writings and surely it is the principal statement of the whole time motif in the Confessions, the central notion around which all of his remarks are centered. It is the tendency toward non-being that distinguishes the temporal from the eternal because "should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, truly it could not be time. but eternity."

In Chapter 15, Augustine shifts from time itself to the experience of time and it is worth noticing that his account of the consciousness of time is a generalized one. He does not discuss his private expectations. Consequently, we may say that his point of departure is certain spiritual facts rather than physical facts and that this is all there is to the subjectivism of his method. His analysis turns up a paradox, the resolution of which is said to constitute Augustine's contribution to the nature of time. The matter may be condensed into something like the following: We speak of long and short times but only in terms of the past or the future. But neither the past nor the future exists. A thing exists only in the present, existence being used here in the fullbodied sense of actuality. Now, the present cannot be long. It is not spatial and cannot be divided, despite our apparently ineradicable tendency to spatialize and divide it. Any selected unit, such as a day or an hour, is subject to continuous abridgment. Hence the present cannot really be long or short. It just is.

Our experience, then, would seem to be impossible, which is itself another impossibility. For we certainly do make comparative judgments (Chapter 16). The problem becomes, then: How can we arrive at measures of time, a problem of terrifying propor-

^{*} Conf., XI, 14 ". . . non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse."

^{&#}x27;Ibid. Cf. De beata vita, 4, 30 and De civ. Dei, XIII, 11, "... the present occupies no space, but is only the transition of time from the future to the past."

tions because it would seem that we must be measuring the nonexistent, which would be absurd. We cannot measure what does not exist. All the same, we do measure; that much is a plain fact.

Augustine proceeds, in Chapters 16 through 19, to argue that times or intervals of time are measured only when they are passing. But it is plain that in order to measure we must perceive (sentire) and, again, perception is only of things present. Therefore, it would seem, further, that we make true statements about the past and the future only by means of memory, or by premeditation or anticipation, both based on what now exists in the present. The important consequence of these facts is stated in Chapter 20. It is that our customary language, like so much of our familiar usage in practical discourse, is quite improper in so far as it refers to three times—past, present, and future. It serves the purpose of ordinary communication but it is inexact. There are not three times, strictly speaking, but three modes of present time-a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future, each with its corresponding act of the mind memory, sight (contuitus), and expectation, of and each, we must suppose, though Augustine does not say so directly, with its reference to a past, a present, and a future state of affairs. The presence referred to here is presence before the mind. can hold before it as present what is really not present in the strict sense.11 The passage certainly demands epistemological justification, a service which might have mitigated the subjectivity of the whole account. However, no such justification is offered and no adequate description is given here of how the mind performs this trick.12

But perplexity is only beginning, because our measures of time are spatial. If we examine our activity we see that we measure spaces of time while they are passing. Yet the present, we noticed previously, has no space,—which leaves us with the immodest contention that we measure what is coming from the non-existent and is going into what does not exist as yet, by what

10 Conf., XI, 20.

11 See De quant. an., 33, 71 and De Trin., XV, 7.

¹³ The mind is illuminated by the apprehension of the form. See De Trin., XV, 15.

is now but is spaceless and, therefore, not measurable. At this point Augustine asks for Divine illumination, an altogether understandable petition.

Chapter 23 introduces the old notion that time is the motion of the heavenly bodies only to reject the idea on the ground that any motion would do as well. Even more important than that, Augustine here indicates his interest in time as it is in itself. "I desire to know the power and nature (vim naturamque) of time, by which we measure the motions of bodies ... not ... what that is which is called a day, but what time is..." "His previous references to comparative judgments all indicate that time is relational. This reference to "time itself" is not, I think, a repudiation of the relational view, though it does emphasize Augustine's disinterest in the physical approach to time. The section concludes with the initial, rather provisional, statement of the famous Augustinian definition, "I see that time, then, is a certain extension" (distention, stretching, distentio). "And he adds, "But do I see it, or do I seem to see it?"

Perhaps, after all (Chapter 24), time might better be defined in terms of the motion of a body. Yet, it cannot be that, because a body stands still in time as clearly as it moves in time. Besides, there is a perfectly clear distinction between the motion of a body and that by which we measure the length of that motion, the latter alone deserving to be called time. Recalling the psychic fact of measurement by time, Augustine now reaffirms it in the form, "I measure the motion of a body by time." Now this would be impossible unless it was also possible to measure the time itself in which the body moved. Hence, the question is "How do we measure time itself"?

Augustine had previously suggested that we measure the long by the short, thus arriving at comparative judgments in terms, for example, of "double" or "half." But there is no way of getting any certain measure of time with this method. Indeed, Augustine has crossed this ground before without success. Such units are spatial, not temporal, and any selected unit of passing

¹⁸ Conf., XI, 23.

¹⁴ Ibid.

time such as the short syllable which Augustine uses as an illustration, can easily be reduced in length or drawn out, thus destroying the usefulness of the unit and leaving the old question: What is the measure of time? The only positive result so far is that time is some kind of extension. In fact, it is, as he says, probably an extension of the mind itself. It is not immediately clear why this must be the answer. There simply seems to be no other alternative, since it has already been shown that when a comparative judgment such as "This is double that" is made, it cannot be either the past or the future that is measured because they do not exist; nor can it be the present because the present is not stretched or extended.

However, Augustine has already made another suggestion which he takes up again, namely, that we measure "times passing"—which might answer the question: What do we measure when we measure time? But this will not do either, because we cannot measure a thing unless it has a beginning and an end, and these limits cannot be assigned until the thing to be measured has ended. But when it has ended it has ceased to exist and, by the same token, has ceased to be measurable. The difficulty seems to be that only what is fixed can be measured.

So, Augustine argues (Chapter 27), that if neither past, present, future, nor even passing times can be measured, we simply do not measure times themselves "but something in the memory, which remains fixed. In thee, O my mind, I measure times." The impression (affectionem) which things make on the mind and which remains present in the mind even when the things are gone, is what we measure. For this three operations of the mind are required, (1) expectation, (2) consideration (the act of marking attentively), and (3) memory. By a mental act, then, I can relate myself to the past and the future holding them, as it were, in the present and thus measuring them. And this capacity encompasses not merely the act of reciting a psalm (as in Augustine's illustration) but "holds in the longer action, of which that psalm is perchance a portion; the same holds [he goes

¹⁸ Conf., XI, 26.

¹⁶ Conf., XI, 27. Cf. De musica, VI, 8, 21.

on] in the whole life of man, of which all the actions of man are parts; the same holds in the whole age of the sons of men, of which all the lives of men are parts." 17

And then there follows hard upon this sentence-which is really the conclusion of Augustine's discussion in the eleventh Book—the rushing and wonderful passage in Chapter 29. For Augustine ignores the obvious difficulties and perplexities which, I think it must be said, still remain, and carries his reader breathlessly to the true goal of his endeavors, sweeping away times and changes and pressing on to the eternal. It is as though Augustine were saying, "See what this means; see how it works when we have come this far." And the word "distention" is now made to carry the burden of "distraction,"-"... behold my life is but a distraction"—but no longer, for he is to put away distraction, "... forgetting the things that are past; and not distracted, but drawn on (non distentus sed extentus), not to those things which shall be and shall pass away, but to those things which are before, not distractedly but intently (non secundum distentionem sed secundum intentionem), I follow on for the prize of my heavenly calling, ... But I have been divided amid the times, the order of which I know not; and my thoughts, even in the inmost bowels of my soul, are mangled with tumultuous varieties, until I flow together unto Thee, purged and molten in the fire of Thy love." 18

Turning to the difficulties of which I have just spoken, three, at least, seem to be peculiarly formidable. In the first place, Augustine has not, I think, told us at all clearly what time is in itself, and this, after all, was his announced intention." The reason for this is complex and will be discussed later. In the second place, it would appear that what he has arrived at in Chapter 29 is more correctly designated as "eternity" than as "time." For if we turn back to Chapter 14, we shall recognize this passage, "But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, truly it would not be time but eternity." ** Now, in Chapter 29, the goal we are seeking is

¹⁷ Conf., XI, 28.

¹⁸ Conf., XI, 29.

¹⁹ Conf., XI, 23.

²⁰ Conf., XI, 14.

clearly one in which we are to enjoy a kind of ever-presentness whose virtue is that it frees us from distraction. It is to this that we are to "extend" ourselves, this to which we are to be attracted.21 Two things can be said of it, however, which distinguish it from eternity, so that Augustine may be said to have provided, in advance, something of an answer to the present difficulty. First, he has already said (Chapter 14) that we cannot maintain that time is, unless it tends not to be. That is, unless it tends to flow on into the past. And the presentness before the mind made possible by the mind's "distentio" is, presumably, of this flowing kind, though the notion requires further elaboration. In the second place, Augustine explicitly says in the last two Chapters of Book XI that no times are co-eternal with the Creator, "... no times are co-eternal with Thee, nor any creature, even if there be any creature beyond all times." 22 Further, in Chapter 31, he re-states the distinction between the two orders, Divine and human, in such a way as to make it impossible legitimately to claim for man the possession of knowledge in the mode of the unchangeably eternal. Nevertheless, the following passage suggests that the "presentness" which is the goal of human striving is an analogue of the Divine presentness: "Surely, if there be a mind, so greatly abounding in knowledge and foreknowledge, to which all things past and future are so known as one psalm is well known to me, that mind is exceedingly wonderful and very astonishing; because whatever is so past, and whatever is so to come of after ages, is no more concealed from Him than was it hidden from me when singing that psalm, what and how much of it had been sung from the beginning, what and how much remained unto the end." 23 Of course, while it is quite true that, for Augustine, the most important thing we can do with time is transcend it, we still want to know what it is that we have transcended.

Finally, there is a third difficulty which might be stated as follows: Augustine has suggested, in his definition of time, a relational conception of time. At least, such is my understanding

²¹ Conf., XI, 30; XII, 12.

²⁹ Conf., XI, 30.

²³ Conf., XI, 31.

of him. But a relation must have a foundation, and we are not told in the eleventh Book of the Confessions what this foundation could be. It will be my contention in what follows that Augustine does tell us what the foundation is, over and over again, in everything that he writes concerning this question, including the Confessions and especially the twelfth Book. But before going on to that question I should like to insist again that it is unrewarding to interpret the eleventh Book as introspective psychology. When classical realism has made an honest woman of phenomenology we shall be able to use that term, and I even hazard its use now. It may be difficult for a modern mentality to acknowledge that Augustine's discussion of time could be objective and yet an interlude within a prayer. But Augustine finds it altogether natural to treat spiritual or psychic facts as falling within the sphere of the natural intentionality of the mind.24 In this, he was less, not more, subjective than we are, with our easy but usually unexamined assumption that prayer is distinctively and essentially subjective and private. I admit that the bulk of Augustine's evidence is draw from the examination of consciousness, but I also venture to say that he discusses what is given to that consciousness and that it can, therefore, qualify as objective evidence. More than that, the eleventh Book, in point of fact, neither begins nor ends with the self. It begins, as it ends, with God. It is worth remembering that even consciousness of self, in Augustine, leads to God. Consciousness of self in subjectivism leads to precisely nothing except the act of "cogito."

The twelfth Book of the Confessions is a commentary, primarily, on the first Chapter of Genesis. Many of its pages are multiply significant, bearing as they do upon Augustine's theory of creation and on his metaphysics in general. One theme is especially relevant to this discussion and has to do with the his-

There are many passages in Augustine on revelation as a "drawing" and on the way in which the will and the reason are "drawn" to act, e.g., De lib. arb., III, 25: "He who wills, wills something (objective), which, unless it is suggested from without by the senses of the body, or, in ways within unknown, comes into the mind, one cannot will" (tr. Tourscher, New York, 1937, p. 417). Compare the famous ascent of the soul in De quant. an., 33, 70-76 and In Joan. evang., XXVI, 2-5.

tory of Augustine's ideas about matter and form. He explains that he had the greatest difficulty attaching any meaning to the term "matter," being disposed always to think of it not as unformed—for what could exist between what is really formed and what is nothing at all—but rather, he says, as defective in beauty, that is, comparatively formless. This difficulty led him, he says, to look more deeply into mutability, into that in bodies "by which they cease to be what they had been, and begin to be what they were not; and this same transit (shifting, transitum) from form to form I have looked upon to be through some formless condition, not through a very nothing; ... For the mutability of mutable things is itself capable of all those forms into which mutable things are changed." ²³

He concludes that such processes involve some sort of continuity, a formless matter which is not nothing but almost nothing (prope nihil).26 There is considerable debate as to whether this substratum is Aristotle's prime matter since Augustine seems to have another version of "matter" in the De Genesi ad litteram according to which matter is not pure potency but is in some sense actual in itself.27 At any rate, the latter position is not held in the Confessions, although the concluding lines of Book XIII, Chapter 7 might be taken to support it. The debate may be ignored except in one respect. This unformed matter is not in time and is not subject to time. It was created by God out of nothing, of course, but it does not possess the conditions of mutability and, by the same token, it does not possess temporality either. Here is one passage from Chapter 8: "But the earth itself which Thou hadst made was formless matter, because it was invisible and without form, and darkness was upon the deep. Of which invisible and formless earth, of which formlessness, of which almost nothing. Thou mightest make all these things of which this changeable world consists, and yet consisteth not;

26 Conf., XII, 6; XII, 8.

²⁵ Conf., XII, 6.

²⁷ See C. J. O'Toole, The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine (Washington, 1944), p. 27 f. St. Thomas interprets Augustine according to Aristotle and, therefore, maintains that Augustine's materia informis is the same as prime matter.

whose very changeableness appears in this, that times can be observed and numbered in it. Because times are made by the changes of things, while the shapes, whose matter is the invisible earth aforesaid, are varied and turned." 25

In point of fact, there are two things which are not in time or regulated according to time, unformed matter and the Heaven of Heavens, an "intellectual creature" not co-eternal with God any more than matter is, but a partaker of eternity which "surpasses all the rolling changes of time." ²³ The Heaven of Heavens is, in itself, changeable, but is said to "restrain its own mutability" by a perfect contemplation of the unchangeableness of the Creator. ³⁰ I shall return to this question later. Matter, on the other hand, is, in itself, incapable of temporality since "it had not that by which it could be changed from one form into another, either of motion or of repose, whereby it might be subject unto time." ³¹

In making these distinctions, Augustine refers repeatedly though often indirectly to time. However, his conception of time here is, clearly, quite different from the conception of Book XI, at least at first sight. Of course, he is not talking about the soul in these passages but about mutability in the broadest sense and. in particular, about two non-changing or non-temporal things. But we learn, by contrast, what the temporal is. "For where there is no shape nor order, nothing either cometh or goeth; and where this is not, there certainly are no days, nor any vicissitudes of spaces of time." 22 Again: "Who would tell me... if the formlessness only remain, through which the thing was changed and was turned from one figure (species) into another, that that can exhibit the changes of times? For surely it could not be, because without the change of motions times are not, and there is no change where there is no figure." sa And vet again, speaking of the visible earth, Augustine says that successive changes of times

²⁸ Conf., XII, 8.

²⁹ Conf., XII, 9.

³⁰ Conf., XII, 9; XII, 12.

⁸¹ Conf., XII, 12.

⁵² Conf., XII, 9. See also De musica, VI, 10, 27.

³³ Conf., XII, 11.

may take place in this world "on account of the appointed changes of motions and of forms." 34

On further consideration, however, it is more nearly correct to say that these passages present not a different version of time but the that-without-which there could be no time. Or, in other words, they reveal the foundation in reality of what is described in the eleventh Book in psychological or spiritual terms. This is the sense in which Augustine's theory of time may be said to have physical implications. It seems, indeed, much like Aristotle's version simplified, and it seems to me not unfair to say that the two theories are complementary. Augustine does not define time as Aristotle does, because his cosmological interest is indirect. Aristotle brushes the Augustinian problem in passing that does not dwell on it for reasons comparable to those that lead Augustine to treat the physics of time as a subordinate issue, namely, that it is subordinate to his main interest.

Before turning to the implications of the passages I have quoted, it should be noticed that not two but three elements, of course, figure in the whole time problem—the temporal, the eternal, and what St. Thomas later called the mean between them, the Augustinian term for which is also the *aevum*. All three figure in Augustine's conception of the significance of the temporal because all three must be considered if we are to understand how Augustine elaborates his concept of the real foundation of temporality and what this means for human existence and human destiny. Time is founded on a mode of being. So is eternity. So is aeviternity. These are diverse modes of existence

24 Conf., XII, 12.

34 Physics, IV, 14, 223a, 16-29.

²⁵ See De civ. Dei, XII, 15 "For where there is no creature whose changing movements admits of succession, there cannot be time at all"; and, speaking of the angels, he says "... still their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past and therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in whose movements we cannot say that there has been that which now is not, or shall be that which is not yet." See also De civ. Dei, XI, 6 "... time does not exist without some movement and transition..."

De ordine, II, 16. Cf. Summa theol., I, q. 10, art. 5.

and there is, consequently, a metaphysical problem which, as Gilson insists, conditions the solution of the problem of time.³⁸

Turning now to the question of the unchangeable with which I began, I should like to draw upon a passage from Dom Butler's Western Mysticism in which he expresses this great Augustinian theme of the search for the immutable by combining several texts into a single statement. Besides, mysticism is an altogether appropriate context for Augustine's teaching on time. "The intellectual or philosophical conception by which Augustine predominantly thinks of God is as the Being that is not subject to change: 'He truly Is, because He is unchangeable' (De nat, boni, 19). It was mainly the intellectual necessity he felt for Something Unchangeable as the basis and background of things changeable, that led him more than anything else, out of Manichaeism into Christianity, and in his search for God he usually represents his mind as passing ever upwards through the grades of things subject to change, till it arrives at that Being 'in Whom there is no variation.' And so his mystical experiences are often expressed in terms of this idea; e.g., as a perception of something unchangeable (Enar. in Psalm. XLI, 10); a beholding with the mind's eve something unchangeable (ibid.); a learning something divine and unchangeable (C. Faust., XXII, 54). The same fundamental idea runs through the following descriptions of the act of contemplation, as the perception of unchangeable Good (ibid., XXII, 53); as some vision of unchangeable Truth (De cons. evang., I, 8); as the search for some unchangeable Truth (Enar. in Psalm. XLI, 7). Or again, the Light unchangeable; as where he says he 'saw with the eve of his soul, above his mind, the Light unchangeable' (Conf., VII, 16); or 'arrived by some kind of spiritual contact at the Light unchangeable' (Sermon, LII, 16). These partly neo-Platonic, partly Joannine conceptions of Truth and Light are favourite ideas with Augustine when speaking of contemplation and mystic experience." 39

Against this is measured the being that tends to non-being,

³⁸ E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin (Paris, 1949) pp. 249, 255.

²⁸ Dom Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism, 2nd ed. (London, 1951), p. 35. References are as cited in Butler's notes.

the being that changes. What does it mean to be a creature? It means to be, and it means to have received being, but it means also, and for that very reason, to partake of a double tension—the tendency to be and the tendency not to be. These are correlative terms. For the tendency not to be, which Augustine associates so pointedly with temporality, would, in itself, be meaningless. The tendency toward non-being per se would be the tendency toward nothing at all, which is a contradiction." A tendency is a tendency toward something. All tendencies are intentional. The tendency to be is prior, ontologically, and the tendency not to be derives from it and has meaning only in relation to it. So Sertillanges says, "The tendency of every creature to persevere in being is a reality, but this tendency does not come from its own power, it comes from the cause from which it derives its being; as, on the other hand, if we say that it tends to non-being, this is not because of its nature but because of its deficiency... creatures, as soon as they exist, tend to exist and not to collapse. But first of all they must exist. Now they do not exist of themselves. And thus the power that they need is not one which would prevent them from collapsing when they existed, but one which makes them exist." 41 Mascall puts it this way: "And these two factsthe fact of the distinction and the fact of the relation—are only two aspects of the one fundamental cosmological truth, the truth of finite being, as genuinely existing and yet existing with an existence that is altogether derived." 42

"Not because of its nature but because of its deficiency." This is the challenge of time for Augustine and without its threatening contingency and overtones of hesitant commitment our response might appropriately be the unruffled Aristotelian one, uninhibited by feelings of awe and directed to settling a piece of business.⁴³ The difference is one of awareness, an awareness

4" Ep. XI, 3 (CSEL 34, II, 27).

43 E. L. Mascall, op. cit., p. 148.

⁴¹ A. D. Sertillanges, Saint Thomas d'Aquin, p. 68. Quoted in E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London, 1949), p. 147. See also Augustine, Solil., I, 1, 4; De beata vita, 4, 33; De civ. Dei, XIII, 17 and 23.

⁴³ On the Aristotelian attitude to the problem of time see H. A. Wolfson, Cresca's Critique' of Aristotle (Cambridge, 1929), p. 94.

of spiritual dimensions, and it brings with it a hazard. Aristotle can ask himself what we usually mean when we speak of time, noting that since we must speak of it there is really nothing to be gained by speculating about its existence, and can proceed to his definition with the psychological security of the perfectly adjusted philosopher. Of course, he cannot be the philosopher of Augustine's definition—amator Dei—but then, he didn't mean to be. But anyone who chooses the Augustinian way will find that it leads through tortuous spiritual thickets in which lurk such threats as the possible conclusion that time is, on the one hand, just one damned thing after another, or perhaps, after all, just some kind of everlasting tea party.

Contingency in the sense of radical dependence in being cannot, therefore, be divorced from the necessary and immutable. and so time cannot be discussed intelligibly or, at any rate, cannot be discussed fruitfully, apart from the eternal. To do so would mean that escape from the mere flux of time would have to be conceived negatively. Yet, this is never the way we intend to speak of such deliverance, as a mere dissolution into emptiness. And it is not, of course, the way Augustine speaks of it. His doctrine of illumination in particular, but almost everything he utters on creation and the created, attest to his passionate repudiation of two not unfamiliar views: the modern version of time which, in Brunner's language, is the clock-watching version of the contemporary man who is obsessed with time and yet is so busy that he never has time for anything," and the more ancient spiritualistic view of the man who always has time but for whom time is mere appearance and not reality so that, unhappily, the time he has does not exist.45

Now, all writers who discuss the Christian conception of time naturally appeal to Augustine for his matchless contributions to the content of the phrase "fulness of time." The reason, apart from the richness of his language, is that Augustine neither trivializes time by reducing it to the number of motion nor de-

⁴¹ See De civ. Dei, XIII, 23.

⁴⁵ See Emil Brunner, "The Christian Sense of Time," Cross Currents, I (1950), 29-30.

existentializes it by reducing it to mere appearance. Time is always a question of spiritual life and death. The creature is an existence tragically menaced by the threat of futility at best and by non-existence at worst. The problem of time is to give to creatures an anchorage in reality and a place in history, to give to the whole sensible world meaning and significant being rather than an absurd existence that gives rise only to nausea. So, in a sense, Augustine uses this very threat of non-existence to mediate between the creature and the genuine fulness of being, making the most of the limit to reach the Unlimited, turning the greatest and most pervasive of all threats, non-existence or bare formless existence, into a way of salvation. For whatever the significance of the fulness of time may be, it is not an encounter with Nothingness but an encounter with Being.

The only way in which victory can be claimed for the temporal nature of man is by affirming that while man is not everything he is at least something in a positive way " and that, further, as something, he is in relation to the Unlimited which exists as the measure of the limited. If one rejects Pantheism, as Augustine does, there seems to be only one way of conceiving such a notion, namely, an analogical way. If this is the case in Augustine's doctrine, we should expect him to argue that man's escape from temporality or his victory over it is possible because he is capable of entering into a relation with the eternal which results in something that is, in one sense, the same as and, in another sense, different from the eternal, since analogy is the relational similarity of different things, a likeness of unlike things. And this, I suggest, is what Augustine does."

⁴⁴ De Trin. II. 9.

⁴⁷ See the illuminating comments of R. C. Taliafero in his translation of the *De musica*, *Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 4, pp. 375-76, note 21, and his remarks on memory as the mediator between time and eternity, pp. 163-64.

⁴⁸ De cons. evang., I, 35, 53.

De lib. arb., III, vii, 21.
 De lib. arb., III, xxv, 76 (CSEL, 43, III, 58-60).

⁵¹ See Lewis M. Hammond, "Theology as Theoretical and Practical Knowledge," in *Christianity and Reason*, ed. by Edward D. Myers (New York, 1951), esp. pp. 91 and 93.

The unlikeness is stated unequivocally, in the passages of the Confessions already cited and in many others. The created, even if it were created from eternity, is not co-eternal with the Creator." God is He Who Is. In God there is nothing past. nothing future. Whatever is there, simply is.53 "... for anything, whatever in short be its excellence, if it is changeable, does not truly exist; for there is no true existence wherever non-existence has also a place... Sift the mutations of things, thou wilt find WAS and WILL BE: think on God, thou wilt find the IS, where WAS and WILL BE cannot exist." 54 So much for the distinction. But the relation, the likeness, is equally clear. Man shall enjoy eternal life which he shall possess at the end of time for ever and ever. 53 He shall be like God; he shall see God face to face. 54 Man frees himself from the subjection of temporality and partakes of eternal life. Yet he does not cease to be limited being: he does not cease to be mutable. "For in himself man is not, for he is changed and altered if he participate not in Him Who is the same. He is when he seeth God: he is when he seeth Him Who Is: and by seeing Him Who Is he also according to his measure beginneth to be... The fulness of delight and the sufficiency of riches is God Himself, Himself the same. . ." 57 Furthermore, man, in attaining the object of his love, will "stand fast" and will overcome non-being, even while remaining a limited being.58

This attainment is fulness of being and fulness of time so far as the limited being is concerned.⁵⁰ But, even allowing for

⁵² De civ. Dei, XII, 15, 16; Cf. XI, 6; X, 31; IV, 12. See also De Gen. ad litt., V, 16 (CSEL 28, I, 159-60) and VIII, 26 (CSEL 28, I, 265); De Trin., I, 1.

⁵³ In Ps. CII, 27-31, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series (New York, 1888), Vol. VIII, pp. 501-02. Cf. De nat. boni, XXXIX; De Trin., IV, 18 and XV, 5.

⁵⁴ In Joan. evang., XXXVIII, 10, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series (New York, 1888), Vol. VII, p. 220; cf. De Trin., IV, 18 and XV, 26.

⁸⁵ Ep. CXCIV, v, 19 (CSEL 57, 4, 190-91).

⁵⁶ In Ps. CV, 3.

⁵⁷ In Ps. CXXI, 5, 6, 8, 12. See also and esp. De Trin., IV, 18.

⁵⁵ De lib. arb., III, 7, 21. Cf. De Trin., I, 6 and De ordine, II, 2, 7, II, 2, 8; De civ. Dei, XII, 8.

⁵⁹ De natura et gratia, LXXXIV; De spiritu et littera, LIX.

the confirming evidence of revelation, there is the additional difficulty of determining whether such fulness of time is merely "more of the same," a kind of endless time or whether it is a participation in the eternal. It is difficult to make any sense of Augustine's position except as reaching the latter of these two conclusions. In the contemplation of God the creature attains a mode of existence which is the perfection of his own limited being but, beyond that, the experience is one which, because of the object that terminates it, is qualitatively different from the experience of the mutable."

There is danger in all of this of reading into Augustine the terminology and meaning of later Thomistic thinking on analogy. All the same, I want to use a suggestion of James Anderson, who seems even more willing to take this risk than I am. Professor Anderson says, "Now when St. Augustine declares: "Just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the blessed life of man" (De civ. Dei, XXI, 26), he is not speaking metaphorically; he is propounding a strict and proper analogy. Indeed, since God is the beatifying principle of the soul, which is itself the principle of life, God is, exactly, the life of our life. Vita vitae meae, Augustine exclaims, (Conf., VII, 1, 2; Conf., X, 6, 10)," 41 and Anderson goes on to argue that the great Augustinian saving that God is, in a sense, nearer to us than we are to ourselves, can be given "a purely metaphysical interpretation and extension... universalized and seen to be true for every being as such." 62 The likeness that obtains between God and the creature is a likeness in the order of existence, in the act whereby they exist, "precisely inasmuch as they both exist, in a mode proportionate to their natures," " but unlike each other in that God is pure act without composition or mutability, whereas the creature is a "mixed"

^{**} See John Marsh, The Fulness of Time (London, 1952), passim, but esp. p. 181. Marsh's conclusions coincide generally with the Platonic-Augustinian view of time and eternity and contrast very sharply with the influential interpretation of Oscar Cullman set forth in his Christ and Time (Philadelphia, 1950), esp. pp. 45 and 46.

⁴¹ James F. Anderson, *The Cause of Being* (St. Louis, 1952), p. 147. (References as cited by Anderson).

⁸³ Ibid., p. 148.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 159.

being which exists at all only in so far as it participates in the act whereby God exists. Thus in this likeness in unlikeness to the Creator lies the opportunity of time, an opportunity, as Coomaraswamy reminds us, which must be seized, for if we do not participate in eternity now, the opportunity may be forever lost. The coordinate is a series of the coordinate in eternity now, the opportunity may be forever lost.

Yet it is not more than a participation, though Augustine would prefer, no doubt, to say that it is not less. At the same time, because time has a foundation in reality, this participation is not merely a negative, subjective reaction of withdrawal. And it is because the finite is ontologically ordered to the Creator that Augustine's view provides for the qualitative differences that distinguish the creature's temporality from the same creature's "fulness" of time. The soul is perfected by its object and it is by changing the object of our attention that we overcome the flux of time. The creature cannot, because of ontological dependence, become immutable. But he can, by knowing the object which is unchangeable, "restrain" his own mutability.

Turning back to the three difficulties I mentioned earlier, something may be said, in conclusion, for each of them in the light of these Augustinian analogies. First of all, the reason that Augustine does not say clearly what time in itself is, is simply that there is no time in itself in an absolute sense. Time, in answer to the third objection that a relation must have a foundation, is a relational entity with a foundation in the limited and mutable being. If we persist in asking the question: What is time as time? or What is time in itself?—really an improper question—

conf., VII, 11: "And I viewed the other things below Thee, and perceived that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not. They are, indeed, because they are from Thee; but are not, because they are not what Thou art. For that truly is which remains immutably. It is good, then, for me to cleave unto God, for if I remain not in Him, neither shall I in myself; but He, remaining in Himself, reneweth all things. And Thou art the Lord my God, since Thou standest not in need of my goodness." See also Conf., XI, 4, and De Trin., IV, 2: "... He made us partakers of His divinity."

⁴⁵ See A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Time and Eternity*. Artibus Asiae (Ascona, Switzerland, 1947), esp. pp. 78 and 130 ff., where this aspect of the problem is effectively developed in connection with both Eastern and Western theories of time and its relation to eternity.

the best answer is that it consists in measureable successiveness. In short, Augustine's meaning is quite consonant, it seems to me, with the later Thomistic definition and with the distinction between the material and formal factors in time, the material factor being actual successiveness outside the mind, the formal factor being the "measurement" which is supplied by the intellect. Combining the teaching of the eleventh Book of the Confessions with the analogical passages of the twelfth Book and other passages I have cited on successiveness and mutability, the following definition, entirely Augustinian I think, would result: Time is a relation, with a foundation in successive states of finite or limited being, whose measurement is a cognitive act terminating in the "distentio" of the mind.

Does time exist without man's measuring glance? Certainly Augustine maintains that the foundation continues to exist. And it might be argued, on his terms, that God's knowledge embraces the whole time span in any case, and is the absolute measure of all times, however variable they may be—for the quite simple reason that God is the absolute measure of everything there is. But the qualitative differences that make time spiritually significant cannot exist, obviously, except through the experience of the limited being for whom they are significant. And in this limited sense, every creature might be said to have its own time, although this exclusiveness, not being of the physical order, is not incompatible with a common clock-time. So, while it is true that, as Mascall observes, "St. Augustine tends to look upon time as an impression made by a changing thing upon the mind of an observer, and St. Thomas as a measure inherent in the changing

^{**} See James F. Anderson, op. cit., p. 53.

ary De Trin., VI, 10 seems to argue against this idea: "nothing passes away or succeeds to the knowledge of God." But compare De civ. Dei, XI, 10 where Augustine says that the world "could not have existed unless it had been known to God." Both passages seem to be ambiguous because they employ analogous concepts. But on the basis of De Trin., I, 1 God should be able to know succession without suffering succession since God fashions the changeable without being changeable in Himself. On the whole question of God's creativity and knowledge, see the remarkable article by Josef Pieper, "On the 'Negative' Element in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," in Cross Currents, IV (1953), 46-56.

thing itself," ** I should insist that nothing but confusion results from taking these differences as signifying incompatibility. One stresses the formal, the other the material factor, but the *relational structure*, in each case, is identical.

The remaining objection—that Augustine's analysis seems to culminate in the ever-presentness which is the final goal of spiritual striving rather than an awareness of the true nature of temporality-I have already considered. It should be remembered that Augustine seems to have a poignant realization of the inadequacy of language for the description of man's mutable ever-presentness. The creature, being variable and mutable in its very nature, cannot attain to true eternity. True eternity can only be Divine eternity. Yet the term "everlastingness" fails by defect as much as the term "eternity" fails by excess. Accordingly, I have tried to emphasize the objectivity of Augustine's view, particularly his insistence on the fact that the creature is perfected by the object of its contemplation and knowledge. Augustine combines the philosophic conception of participation with the linguistic description of mysticism. The difference between divine eternity and human participation in eternity is that while God lacks nothing, either in being or in essence, man can be said to lack nothing only in a limited sense. even when he attains complete self-realization. Fulness of being. for the creature, is fulness only according to the measure of the creature, and is bounded by a no-moreness of being which the creature cannot overcome. But perfection in kind is real perfection. " To say what participation in eternity "feels like," so to speak, would seem to require participation in it and, since most of us are disqualified for this task, it would seem proper to pay attention to the deliverances of the mystic on this point, if on no other.

⁴ E. L. Mascall, He Who Is (London, 1945), p. 100, note 4.

^{**} De lib. arb., III, 15, "In those things therefore which fail or are deficient because they have been given limited being only, so that all in proper order may complete integral time, no one finds fault or blames defect or failure. Because no one can say (reasonably):—It ought to remain,—while, in fact, it can not pass the proper limits given to it." (tr. Tourscher, New York, 1937, p. 343).

By interpreting Augustine in this way, I have tried to suggest his affinity with the other great writers on time in the classical tradition. In his study of Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, Leonard Callahan reaches what seems to me an unnecessarily negative conclusion. He says, "It seems fairly clear that the problem of time is an entirely different problem for each of the four ancient philosophers whom we have been discussing (i.e., Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine). The differences in the nature of the problem arise first of all from the fact that each philosopher is looking for a different kind of being, a kind of being that is in accordance with his view of reality as a whole." 79 But it seems doubtful whether each of these philosophers is looking for a different kind of being. The object of the quest in each case is the Unchangeable. And that time is an entirely different problem for each of them is even more doubtful. Only Aristotle's treatment is markedly different from the others, for reasons traceable to the context of his inquiry—time being, primarily, a problem of physics for Aristotle.

Plato's "moving image of eternity" lacks the dimension of lived experience that we should now look for, I suppose, in any adequate treatment of time. But this abstractness is surely mitigated if one reads the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* along with the *Timaeus*. Both Plotinus and Augustine object to the Aristotelian treatment of the question because it tends to limit itself to what is for both of them an accidental attribute of time, leaving us to wonder what time is in its essence, and because it fails completely to do justice to the spiritual significance of time for the life and destiny of the human soul.

Nevertheless, in each case, the relational structure which these philosophers are considering, is the same. Therefore, it would seem more just to say that they concentrate their attention on different aspects of the problem of time. Indeed, it is as a consequence of this diverse treatment that the relational nature of time is exhibited. And until time is seen to involve a relational structure there might well be no end to the fruitless search for

^{**} Leonard Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge, 1948), p. 188.

the essence of time-in-itself. But because time is relational, we are prepared to acknowledge not only the measuring instrument, but the reality it measures, and to give to each of them an appropriate recognition in accordance with the motive and end of any given inquiry about time,

I take it that this is the moral of Augustine's teaching on this subject. Limited being is, from one point of view, of course, a problem of physics, the science that treats of being qua changeable. But among these limited beings, arranged in ranks, is man, who is not only changeable, but restless; who not only moves toward an end, but moves toward an end which he can understand. To such a being, time defined as the measure of motion is a truth of limited usefulness and, being isolated from value, is of no spiritual significance at all. It is a mere invitation to engage in calculation. But, for Augustine, time is an invitation to participate in eternity.

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PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MERLEAU-PONTY

JOHN F. BANNAN

Merleau-Ponty' states his philosophical aim at the beginning of his first work: "Our purpose is to understand the relations of consciousness and of nature." His attempt to understand takes the form of a phenomenology of perception, the philosophical primacy of which is the keynote of his thought. As a phenomenology, his work is situated in a newly established philosophical tradition which attempts to surpass Idealism and Intellectualism on the one hand, and Empiricism on the other, attitudes which accord primacy to either consciousness or nature.³ Phenomenology came to be when Husserl found these doctrines intolerably disordered and obscure: it was his effort to make philosophy a rigorous science. Its basic movement "back to the things themselves" was implemented in the intentional theory of consciousness and the descriptive method which have become its trademarks. The intentional consciousness is intuitive and dependent upon what appears to it. This should have provided a guarantee against the intrusion into phenomenology of the constitutive con-

^{&#}x27;Late in 1952 Maurice Merleau-Ponty was named professor in the Collège de France where he gave his initial lecture in January 1953. Previously he was professor of psychology at the Sorbonne and had become a ranking figure in the post-war French Existentialist movement. He is co-editor with Sartre of the periodical Les Temps Modernes.

² Merleau-Ponty, M., La Structure du Comportement, 2d ed. (Paris, 1949), p. 1. This work will be cited hereafter as "S.C." The same remark is repeated, as if in retrospect, near the end of Merleau-Ponty's second and most important work *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, 6th ed. (Paris, 1945), p. 489. This work will be cited as "P.P."

³ By nature Merleau-Ponty means "a multiplicity of events, exterior to each other, and linked by causal relations." (S.C. 1). This notion, against which he reacts, is that of Intellectualism, which he charges with dividing reality into opposing realms of pure consciousness and monad-like objects. Cf. P.P. 49.

sciousness of traditional German Idealism. Yet Husserl's operation of the reduction, the effort to describe the "things themselves" in their most fundamental sense, tended to undo the guarantee. To his mind (in the early part of his philosophical career still that of the mathematician) the rigorous science of things toward which the reduction aimed could only mean complete certitude about them based on the total clarification of their condition. What he described was not the thing itself, but its essence, "that permanent group of essential predicates which belong necessarily to it." ⁴ But the complete description of these predicates ⁵ did not include existence: a thing need not be in order to appear and to be described. ⁶ Ultimately Husserl finds them to be only relative to an absolute and transcendental consciousness ⁷ which constitutes them. ⁸

Merleau-Ponty would avoid this consequence. For him, the intuitive character of consciousness defines it and determines the limits of the descriptive method. Consciousness is direct presence to a world, and perception, the consciousness-world union, is the fundamental fact of reality. It is anterior to every distinction—including that of consciousness and nature—and serves as their basis. In perception, Merleau-Ponty finds a dimension of reality other than consciousness and nature taken separately and offering a new perspective on both.

This shift of emphasis is quite radical, but not completely foreign to the thought of the founder of phenomenology. Rather, it prolongs a tendency which reveals itself in Husserl's thought in periods later than that of the *Ideen I* to which we referred above: the tendency to place increasing importance on the description of the world as it is lived. Heidegger's philosophy prolongs the same phenomenological theme. It is not essence, but experience in its fullest sense which Merleau-Ponty describes. He takes great care to maintain its richness against any reflective analysis which

^{&#}x27; Husserl, E., Idées Directrices pour une Phénoménologie, tr. Paul Ricœur (Paris, 1950), pp. 17-18. This work will be cited as "Ideen I."

⁵ Husserl believes such a description to be possible. Cf. Ideen I, 224.

⁶ Cf. Ideen 1, 25.

⁷ Cf. Ideen I, 161.

⁶ Cf. Ideen I, 183.

might impoverish it, and accepts the accompanying risk of impoverishing reflection and the categorical structure of things. The following pages are devoted to a description of this philosophy and to a reflection which attempts to project its movements beyond its present state.

Merleau-Ponty's reduction is a description of the appearing of things in all their fullness and immediacy. Thus I perceive an object, a tree or a desk. Nothing about it suggests that it came into existence at the moment when I first became aware of it. Rather, it presents itself as already there 'before I perceived it: it is given to perception. And it resists any attempt of my perceiving to seize it entirely. It is directly present to me, but by means of only one profile at any given moment so that some of it always remains hidden. I see a desk, for example, by at most three of its sides at a time. If I move around it, its profiles succeed one another, but the object as a whole, which is the source of every profile, always remains beyond my grasp. The further exploration which each profile solicits serves only to yield other profiles. "It is essential," says Merleau-Ponty, "[for things in perception] to offer themselves without medium interposed, but only to be revealed little by little, and never completely." 10 The resistance of the appearing object, then, is based on its perspectivism which "does not appear to be a subjective deformation of the thing perceived but one of its properties, perhaps its most essential property." 11 paradox of immanence and transcendence is at play in every perception: "... immanence since what is perceived cannot be foreign to the perceiver; transcendence, since it always involves something beyond what is actually given." 12 The characters of given-ness and resistance mark what is perceived, and in their ensemble con-

[°] Cf. P.P. 457 and P.P. Avant-Propos, IV.

¹⁰ S.C. 202.

¹¹ S.C. 201.

¹² Merleau-Ponty, M., "Le Primat de la Perception et ses Conséquences Philosophiques," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie (Oct.-Dec. 1947), p. 123. This work will be cited as "P.P.C.P."

stitute the condition termed facticity 13 which guarantees the object's otherness with respect to consciousness.

Yet, immediately implied in the appearing of any object is the presence of a being whose nature is such that things can appear to it. Merleau-Ponty treats being in itself, the *en-soi*, as a plenitude into which a space must be introduced in order that it be able to manifest itself. There would be no phenomena unless "a subjectivity came to break the plenitude of being in itself, to design there a perspective, to introduce non-being." "Thanks to consciousness, then, things can appear. Each profile is a profile for me. This fact reveals that my presence to what appears is a bodily presence, that is, one situated in time and space. To each profile of the object there corresponds a location for the perceiving consciousness. Furthermore, my exploration of the object from every side is possible because of my bodily mobility which it reveals.

Thus consciousness reveals itself by means of what appears: only when given an object which transcends each of its profiles does consciousness exist as located. And the object manifests itself by means of consciousness: only as an appeal to a located consciousness does the object exist as phenomena of immanence and transcendence. There is a mutual revelation of consciousness and object in the exchange between them. In view of this dependence upon one another, the exchange cannot be considered an exterior causality exercised by one complete being upon another. The relation between the two is interior, each entering so profoundly into the meaning of the other that neither can be understood without the other. Each in its incompleteness is considered as opening on the other, and consciousness for its part is considered access to what is.18 Even more than 'opening' however, consciousness must be considered as movement toward its object. Despite the interiority of its relation to consciousness, the thing appearing is other than consciousness which must be

¹⁸ Anglicized form of the French term "facticité."

¹⁴ P.P. 481.

¹⁸ Cf. P.P. Avant-Propos, xi.

conceived as transcending its own limits in the exchange. It is "a mute ecstasy (ekstase) in an individual thing," "in which it loses itself in its object. Each profile is a profile of what appears and invites a movement by means of itself toward the object which is its source and of which it is a sign. Object seems to absorb consciousness and to "phenomenalize" in the process. And the phenomenalizing of the object is that expression by consciousness in which consciousness recovers itself and is itself. This expression terminates and its movement is to some extent stabilized in the verbal expression, the formulation of which is the recognition of the thing."

Now any object presenting itself to consciousness appears among other objects which fade to form its background when perception centers on it. "What is perceived is always among other things, always part of a field." 18 The figure-background structure is constant in perception as is the profile-object structure, and it is another example of the immanence-transcendence phenomenon. Background always forms a context directly present in the meaning of what appears. "This concrete red stands out against a background of generality . . . It is a particular variation of a world of color." 18 The presence of this generality in what appears introduces a note of anonymity which tends to diffuse the consciousness of the individual thing. In its fullest sense this context present in the object, and of which the object is a sign, embraces everything which I might possibly perceive. It is the world, "the ensemble of things emerging from the unformed in proposing itself to our bodies as "to touch," "to take . . . " 20 This ensemble, as a totality, enjoys a priority over the particular object which Merleau-Ponty conveys by applying to it the notion of form. Form, for him, signifies a field of forces which is a whole having priority over the parts within it, and which assigns to each of these its properties, "but in a dynamic manner, so that they will

¹⁶ P.P. 424.

[&]quot;The denomination of objects does not follow recognition, it is recognition." P.P. 207.

¹⁸ P.P. 10.

¹⁹ P.P. 514.

²⁰ P.P. 369-70.

never be the absolute properties of this part." ²¹ Thus the world serves as a source of what appears, "an inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn." ²² The effect of my expression of the object is to "crystallize" it out of this reservoir. "For prescientific thought, to name the object is to make it exist or to modify it." ²³ It remains bound to this context, however, by an indefinite number of links such that the seizure of the entire meaning of a particular object would require that every tie be rendered explicit, which is to say, would require complete perceptive consciousness of the world. This is obviously impossible, and the object, because of its ties to the world, resists consciousness by dispersing it into its context, a condition which is part of its facticity. But the fact that I do express the thing in perception indicates some measure of triumph on the part of the verbal expression over this resistance.

There is an unformulated consciousness of the totality which is the world, a consciousness which Merleau-Ponty simply identifies with the body. The body is not simply the correlate of this or that thing viewed in a particular profile; it is the correlate as well of the entire field of possible perceptions, the world. It renders me co-extensive with the world, marking off a field at the interior of which each specific perception takes place. "The presence or absence of exterior objects are only variations at the interior of a field of primordial presence, a perceptive domain over which my body has power." 24 The non-reflective consciousness into which the body is transformed is "a global and inarticulate seizure of the world [which] awaits being conquered, fixed and rendered explicit by perceptive exploration and the word." 25 Particular attitudes—admiration before a work of art, for example, or inquiry before a scientific problem—always presuppose this primordial presence, and are founded upon it. "Scientific views," says Merleau-Ponty ". . . are always naive and hypocritical because they assume without mentioning it that other view, that of the

³¹ S.C. 148.

²² P.P. 396.

²³ P.P. 207.

²⁴ P.P. 108.

²³ P.P. 463.

consciousness by which, first of all, a world is disposed around me and begins to exist before me." 24 Because it is assumed without question in every behavior, this basic view of the world is regarded as an act of "faith" or "opinion." 27 It is "an opinion which is not a provisionary form of knowledge to be replaced later by an absolute knowledge . . . It is that which makes something in general appear before us." 24 But though it be termed faith, the adhesion of consciousness to world in general is the only certitude. "There is absolute certitude of the world in general, but of nothing in particular." 29

The reduction which we have followed is a description which reveals the engagement of consciousness in the world as the primitive fact. It terminates in an attitude of "astonishment before the world." 30 But the consciousness which is astonished before the world is not one which can be understood purely and simply as engagement in the world. Nor can the movement of reduction which terminates in this attitude be regarded only as movement toward the object; "it steps back to watch the transcendences stand out; it distends the intentional links which connect us to the world in order to make them appear . . ." 31 To seize the real meaning of the world "it is necessary to rupture our familiarity with it." 32 The reduction, in short, is a reflective effort. Like every reflective effort it demands a certain detachment of consciousness from its object so that it be able to survey the latter, and an accompanying intensification of the presence of consciousness to itself as it thinks what appears. Merleau-Ponty has been criticized on the grounds that his emphasis upon consciousness as presence to a world and as engagement in other than itself results in the undervaluing of the presence of consciousness to

²⁶ P.P. Avant-Propos, m.

³⁷ P.P. 395.

²⁸ P.P. 454.

²⁹ P.P. 344.

³⁰ M.P. proposes this formula of Fink as best for the reduction. P.P. Avant-Propos, viii.

⁸¹ P.P. Avant-Propos, VIII.

³² P.P. Avant-Propos, viii.

itself and makes impossible the detachment from object and world necessary for the very description which he attempts.32

The fact of the presence of consciousness to itself occupies a crucial position in Merleau-Ponty's thought as it does in most French Existentialist philosophies. It is this which defines the subject, the pour-soi. He remarks that "if we know any exterior reality it is on condition of seizing in ourselves that act of knowledge." 34 But in his work the seizure of self is kept subordinate to the seizure of the object: his treatment of reflection is geared to the purpose of preventing consciousness from either absorbing reality or retreating completely from it and accomplishing in either case a total presence to itself. Perception is not followed by a total reflection which completely reveals the object perceived. Such a reflection, characteristic of the Intellectualist notion of consciousness, would absorb its own basis in perception, which is to say, would destroy the intentional character by which consciousness is defined.35 Presence to self is something accomplished by means of an object whose facticity prevents this presence from ever becoming complete, and reflection depends upon perception with a dependence which it never overcomes:

The relation of reason and fact, of eternity and time, like that of reflection and the non-reflective, thought and language or of thought and perception, is that double relation which phenomenology has called Fundierung. The founding term,—time, the non-reflective, the fact, language and perception—is first in the sense that what is founded is given as a determination or rendering explicit of the founding term, a fact which prevents it from ever absorbing the latter.³⁴

Yet reflection is a fact, and consciousness does turn on itself

³³ In the concluding chapter of his work on Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, M. De Waehlens remarks that there exists a particularly grave objection which "contests the possibility of defining perception as does Merleau-Ponty and at the same time writing a phenomenology of it." The writing of a phenomenology of perception requires "a certain detachment as regards perception, a capacity to survey it." De Waehlens, A., Une Philosophie de l'Ambiguïté: l'Existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Louvain, 1951), pp. 399-400.

³⁴ Merleau-Ponty, M., Sens et Non-Sens, 4th ed. (Paris, 1948), p. 159. This work will be cited as "S.N.S." Cf. P.P. 426.

³⁵ Cf. P.P. 53.

³⁴ P.P. 451.

and think its object. Nor has this fact simply the status of epiphenomenon, for Merleau-Ponty adds to the remark quoted above: "However, the founding term is not first in the Empiricist sense and what is founded is not simply derived, since it is by means of what is founded that the founding term manifests itself." 37 The word reveals or manifests what is given to a reflecting consciousness and is reflection's means of detachment from the object. It, rather than any pure idea, is reflection's thought of what appears. Merleau-Ponty makes the word absolutely inseparable from any thought, the latter requiring it as its "body." " It is of such an "embodied" thought that he speaks, when he says that "to think a thought is to adopt toward it an attitude which we learned first as regards "things." It does not eliminate the opacity of thought to itself but only raises it higher." 39 Like the object which it reveals, the word brings a burden of facticity into the revealing expression. It is not simply mine but was given to me by my culture whose configurations form a modifying context for it. My own use of it has added to this context so that the word stands as a figure on a background of cultural and personal worlds which converge in it. These enter silently into any expression of what is given, and would need to be rendered explicit if reflection were to embrace the perceptive formulation of things. Like the object, then, thought remains opaque to consciousness. It prevents consciousness from coinciding with itself in a total reflection, just as the object prevents this coincidence in total perception.

Though Merleau-Ponty would replace Husserl's description of essences with the description of things in their fullness, he cannot ignore the question of essences any more than he can the intimately connected problem of reflection. The general sense of his treatment of each is the same: neither the act of reflection nor the essence which an object presents can be divorced from the conditions of perception. The essence of the object is "that which cannot be varied without the object itself disappearing," " and

³⁷ P.P. 451.

³⁸ P.P. 212.

³⁹ P.P. 454.

⁴º Merleau-Ponty, M., Les Sciences de l'Homme et la Phénoménologie,

seems to bestow a certain measure of necessity on what appears. It lends as well a character of universality. "Insofar as, by means of my concrete experience I seize . . . upon an intelligible structure which imposes itself on me each time I think the intentional object I acceed to a knowledge which is valid for all." 41 Present to consciousness in the most natural uses of perception.42 the essence can be isolated by a method of imaginative variation in which the elements not necessary to the appearing of the thing are dropped.43 Up to this point there is essential agreement with the doctrine of *Ideen I*. There is further agreement on the fact that the vision of the essence must be based on experience," but Husserl maintains that despite this "a perfect seizure and comprehension of essence" 45 is possible. Merleau-Ponty insists that the dependence of the vision upon experience renders this impossible, and that the essence as known lies open to the alteration which future experience may bring. "We think always on the fact, on the visible," he says, "even when we think in terms of essences," 46 and his treatment of essences joins that of reflection in his remark that "the vision of the essence is an intellectual . . . elucidation or explicitation of what has been concretely experienced." 47

Meaning, then, is directly seized in perception and reflection serves only to render it more lucid and explicit. The latter advances the task of revelation which the former began and hence participates in that function of making things seen which defines consciousness. While it carries to its extreme the formulation of the view of things, the understanding which it attains may not cease entirely to be description in order to become a play of pure concepts. Reflection understands itself when it recognizes its basis in the consciousness of world:

Introduction et première partie: "Le Problème des Sciences de l'Homme selon Husserl" (Paris, no date), p. 30. This work will be cited as "S.H.".

⁴¹ S.H. 14.

⁴² Cf. S.H. 13.

⁴³ Cf. S.H. 30.

⁴⁴ Cf. Ideen I. 16-18; S.H. 28.

⁴⁵ Ideen 1, 224.

⁴⁶ S.H. 30.

⁴⁷ S.H. 28.

The task of a radical reflection, that is of one which wishes to understand itself, consists paradoxically in refinding the non-reflective experience of the world to replace in it the attitude of verification and the operations which are reflective, and to make reflection appear as one of the possibilities of my being.⁴⁵

Phenomenology itself reaches its greatest scope and depth in the attempt to describe that primitive fact. Merleau-Ponty poses the problem which dominates this final stage or phenomenology as follows: it is a matter of

knowing how I can be open to phenomena which transcend me and which, however, exist only in that I adopt them and live them, [of knowing] how the presence to myself (Urpräsenz) which defines me and conditions every foreign presence is at the same time de-presentation (Entgegenwärtigung) and places me outside myself.⁴⁹

This paradox is understood when the subject is described as time, which offers a coherent notion of the moving rapport with things and self which is consciousness. "Time must be understood as subject and subject as time." ⁵⁰ It is born of my relation with things." ⁵¹ Consciousness is, as Merleau-Ponty's statement of the problem recalls, both opening upon and movement toward things. As opening—a break in the en-soi—it provides a view before which each moment comes to be. ⁵² In coming into my presence each acquires an individuality against which no other moment can ever prevail. ⁵³ This presence which is consciousness is most intense and explicit now, in the present, and consciousness of the present is "final consciousness" ⁵⁴ for Merleau-Ponty. Succeeding moments file out of this presence, but their passing is never absolute: they sediment ⁵⁵ in consciousness and in doing so take on their aspect of past. In accumulating they give the

⁴⁸ P.P. 278-79.

⁴⁹ P.P. 417.

⁵⁰ P.P. 483.

⁸¹ P.P. 471.

⁸² Cf. P.P. 470.

⁵³ Cf. P.P. 484.

⁵⁴ P.P. 485.

⁸⁵ Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M., "Sur la Phénoménologie du Langage," Problèmes Actuels de la Phénoménologie, ed. H. L. Van Breda (Paris, 1952), p. 107. This work will be cited as "P.L."

subject a particular style ** which is an a priori element in determining the character of moments to come. Thus the presence of the subject is extended toward past and future. Time forms by means of him. "The objective world is too solid for there to be time in it. Past and future pass to the side of the subject to find . . . a possibility of non-being which accords with their nature." **

Consciousness then, makes possible the manifestation of things by providing for them the basic dimension according to which they are deployed. Things are known across a succession of moments in a "teleology of consciousness" 38 which permits it to refine its revelations and correct each by the next. That certain revelations seem to take on a timeless character. Merleau-Ponty attributes to the sedimentation of moments. "The atemporal is what is acquired ... [and] ... acquisition is an irreducible phenomenon." 59 "Truth is another name for sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our own." * But if the subject as sedimentation and flux provides an explanation for these characters of knowledge and truth, it is to be held accountable as well for the obscuring of knowledge and the preventing of a definitive grasp on truth. The sedimented moments accumulate to add to the opacity of the subject to himself, and their succession brings before reflection a constantly shifting scene.

Time as a succession of "nows" is rooted in the spontaneity of consciousness which Merleau-Ponty regards as temporality, or time in its fundamental sense. Each moment is generated by consciousness in its movement toward the world, a movement in which meaning is given both to what appears and to consciousness itself. Thus consciousness in general makes something in general appear before me," and yet this consciousness requires something in general in order to be. Only given visual consciousness could

⁵⁶ Cf. P.P. 378.

⁵⁷ P.P. 471.

⁵⁸ P.P. 453.

⁸⁹ P.P. 450.

⁶⁰ P.L. 107.

⁶¹ Cf. P.P. 454.

an object on this background appear as colored, but visual consciousness requires a colored object in order to be. In a real sense, then, consciousness poses itself. Such a notion would be contradictory if we were to consider consciousness as being, but to consider it as time is to open a way of understanding. Merleau-Ponty uses a description of Heidegger's to convey this:

Time is affection of self for self. The affective one is time as push or passage toward the future: the object of affection is time as a developed series of presents. But the two are only one because time is nothing other than the transition from present to present.⁶²

The encounter with time and its description is the culminating point of this philosophy. Metaphysics, for Merleau-Ponty is "the deliberate attempt to describe this paradox of consciousness and truth, exchange and communication . . . " 63 of which the notion of time provides the most adequate view. He rejects what he regards as the classic notion of metaphysics, identifying it with the activities of either a Cartesian consciousness, completely certain of its object because its idea reproduces it completely and because it can coincide with the idea in total reflection, or constitutive consciousness on the style of German Idealism, completely certain of its object because it created it. Philosophical reflection encounters its limit in the description of reality as time. "If we find time beneath the subject and if we connect (rattacher) to the paradox of time those of the body, world, thing, and other person, we will understand that there is nothing further to understand." 64 This is to say that there is no philosophy beyond phenomenology, an attitude which he is willing to formulate guite sharply: "I have never thought that phenomenology was only an introduction to philosophy. I believe that it is philosophy itself." 45 He maintains this position in the face of disagreement from other pro-

⁶² P.P. 487.

[&]quot; S.N.S. 187.

^{**} P.P. 419.

⁸⁵ Discussion following his paper "L'Homme et l'Adversité," La Connaissance de l'Homme dans le xx° siècle (Neuchâtel, 1951), p. 246.

minent phenomenologists who allow for the possibility of a movement to a "transphenomenal" level. 64

We are inclined to agree with the latter group. The strength of Merleau-Ponty's work lies in its renewal of perspective on the traditional problem of spirit and matter, and his recognition of the union of these which precedes their separation in thought is an unquestionably rich insight. But its development seems to be hampered by Merleau-Ponty's preoccupation with the doctrines against which he is reacting. Against the notion of a creative consciousness as dependent upon what is given becomes subordinate to that of consciousness as a spontaneous movement so tight that he diminished the possibility of the detachment necessary to reflection. In the face of reflection conceived as total presence of consciousness to self, he insists upon the opacity of object to thought, but often what is given seems to have only the role of preventing this coincidence. And where Intellectualist metaphysics implies monad-like things-in-themselves, he holds that what is given is something-in-general. But his reaction is not completely successful because total reflection and the creative consciousness re-assert themselves. Since what is given is something-in-general, the particular specifications of what appears seem finally to be traced to consciousness which generates meanings in a succession of moments. With this the notion of consciousness as dependent upon what is given becomes subordinate to that of consciousness as a spontaneous movement constituting meanings. This constitution of meanings is completion both of object as object and of self as consciousness. Here one gets the impression that the goal of coincidence with self dominates the movement. Consciousness is to be understood as time, and time is affection of self for self. While the facticity of both object and word make this coincidence impossible, they do not prevent the drive toward it from finally dominating Merleau-Ponty's notion of consciousness. Reflection, he insists, is inhabited by a "desire for absolute adequation" " and the phenomenological

47 P.P. 520.

⁶⁶ Compare his paper P.L. with others collected in Problèmes Actuels de la Phénoménologie.

reduction is treated as "the ambition to make reflection equal to the non-reflective life of consciousness." 65

It is the attempt to conceive a notion of reflection reconcilable with this philosophy of engagement which gives rise to such criticisms. Merleau-Ponty seems likely to remain vulnerable to them until he elaborates such a notion. When he remarks that "there would evidently be room to describe precisely the passage from perceptive faith to the explicit truth as we encounter it on the level of language, concept and cultural world," " he concedes the need for clarifying the actual functioning of reflection. remark does not, however, convey the amplitude of the problem which cannot be approached as if this genesis of meaning were a movement between two terms—perceptive faith and explicit truth -whose nature has been completely delineated. There are gaps in his treatment of both these termini. On the level of direct perceptive involvement in what appears, consciousness seems to be at once a movement toward individual (whose status as object is not settled) and movement toward world in general. These must be reconciled with each other as well as with the movement away from what is perceived which is necessary to reflection. More should be said of the conceptual formulation of things, reflection's thought of what appears, and as well of the essence which seems to be in some way correlated with it. Finally, that delicate equilibrium between consciousness as presence to an object and consciousness as presence to self should be more clearly revealed. We believe, however, that Merleau-Ponty's work contains the resources for making the needed clarifications.

We take the liberty of conducting our own speculations on the basis of these resources. They reveal themselves around the gaps in explanation mentioned above. In accordance with the method which we have been describing, we expect the exploration of the condition of what appears to throw light on the nature of consciousness. The latter is a movement "oriented as toward its

⁸⁸ P.P. Avant-Propos, xi.

⁴⁹ S.N.S. 188.

end toward a truth en-soi which is the reason of all the appearances." ⁷⁰ The object is given to consciousness and it both solicits this movement and resists its final consummation according to the law of immanence and transcendence which defines its condition. While the basic paradox of immanence and transcendence is recognized by Merleau-Ponty," the complexity of its play in perception is underestimated. That which I perceive transcends the particular profile in which it presents itself to me. It is "a physical thing (which) has necessarily in itself everything which it has been or will be able to manifest." 72 My fountain pen appears as black and it is by means of this color-its colorthat I see it. Thus the object as individual is the reason of all its appearances. Consciousness engaged in this object is a movement which goes straight at it 73 be means of a profile and seems committed to a goal of rejoining itself completely by seizing the individual and converting it into pure idea. But that which I perceive is also part of a context which is immanent in it and which constantly threatens to diffuse consciousness. Thus in perceiving my fountain pen I seize it directly as my black writing instrument. Neither the fact of being mine, being black, or being an instrument—nor any other specifying character belongs strictly to this particular thing. These characters are indifferent to the individual, defining rather great areas of the world into which the consciousness of this thing tends to be dispersed. To know this pen as black is not to distinguish it from any other of the many things which are black. Merleau-Ponty's tendency is to stress the importance of the background in determining meanings seized in perception and this to the extent that the world, background or context in its full sense, is treated as source of the object. "The world is . . . the inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn." 4 Here, not the individual but the world is the reason for the appearances. The movement of consciousness in its seizure of the object follows a

⁷⁰ P.P. 66.

¹¹ Cf. P.P.C.P. 123.

⁷² P.P. 445.

⁷³ Cf. P.P. 374.

⁷⁴ P.P. 396.

path like the one which Merleau-Ponty describes in remarking that "the quality is the outline of the thing and the thing the outline of the world." ⁷⁵ If shifts from the object to reveal the relations which condition it, and in the process the individual seems to dissolve into these. The goal of such a movement would seem to be the total revelation of the world as a network of relations which consciousness could completely express to itself.

Thus consciousness in transcending its own limits is double movement. The opacity of the individual in the first case and the dispersive effect of context in the second prevent it from rejoining itself by completely revealing what appears. The facticity of what is perceived is only partially overcome, and this by means of the verbal expression. That the latter have the unity necessary to the expression of any meaning requires not only that it triumph to some degree over the dispersive effect of context but also that it join the movement of engagement in context with that of engagement in the thing. The fact that there is such a triumph reveals the unifying force of the conscious effort which it climaxes. At times Merleau-Ponty favors the notion that this operation of consciousness completely determines meaning which it produces on an amorphous background, the world. His final notion of consciousness as temporality suggests this. Here, consciousness itself seems to be the reason of all the appearances. In other moments, however, he recognizes a consistency on the part of both individual ¹⁶ and world. The latter is "already constituted, but never completely constituted. Under the first rapport we are solicited; under the second we are open to an infinity of possibilities." "

The elements which underwrite this consistency are accessible to the imaginative variation of the object which brings to light "that which cannot be varied without the object itself disappearing." Thus, were I to alter that basic ensemble of characters which is the essence of what appears, I would find myself defining

⁷⁵ P.P. 465.

[&]quot;Cf. P.P.C.P. 125: "The thing does not impose itself on me as true for every intelligence but as real for every subject who shares my situation." Cf. also P.P. 253.

[&]quot; P.P. 517.

⁷⁸ S.H. 30.

another object. This ensemble constitutes "a primary center around which our acts of denomination are organized." " Thus my pen is, basically, a writing instrument, and all its other characters are characters of a writing instrument. But "writing instrument" and "instrument" are generalities. In calling them essential we would seem to be accepting the notion that what appears is fundamentally the converging of several areas of reality. The pen in this case would be the point of intersection of such areas as writing instrument and instrument, as well as such non-essentials as mine and black. No object imposes itself in such a fashion. The thing in my hand is a writing instrument, but it is also this pen. Indeed, the operation of the imaginative variation reveals an element of another order, the varying of which would cause the disappearance of the object. This is its individual incarnate state, manifested in the spatial location and deployment of what appears. Thus I never see a writing instrument, but always this pen, to which belongs the character "writing instrument."

These characters, the varying of which would cause the disappearance of the object, have a certain necessity and universality. They do not constitute the complete object, however, nor would the knowledge of them exhaust what appears. These fundamental characters are minima: the incarnate state sustains the thing in some degree of individual consistency against the anonymity which tugs at it from the world and against consciousness which would convert it into itself, while the essential determinations reveal only the thing's basic specifications.

The question remains as to the harmony between these two orders of elements and between the two movements of consciousness which are correlated with them. Yet a basis has been set for its solution. We insist more than does Merleau-Ponty upon the consistency as individual to what appears. This seems to us preferable to his simple option for world in the attempt to understand the individuality-generality paradox in the perceived. His choice leaves the world without adequate differentiation of its own, and invites one to take consciousness as its sole differentiating

⁷⁹ P.P. Avant-Propos, x.

element. To put the individual on a more equal footing with the world is to establish between the two a tension in which a mutual revelation can occur. Something in particular is always given as well as something in general. The incarnate state of the object supports it in a dialectic with the other objects which constitute its context. Hence, the figure-background structure is really constant in perception. Each object is necessarily engaged in several areas of the world and only thanks to such a context could it appear. But these generalities need to converge in an individual thing if they are themselves to come to light. Only when crystallized as its characters are they revealed: the figure-background structure disappears just as quickly with the loss of the figure as it does with the loss of the background. There is a mutual penetration of the planes of immanence and transcendence: the relation between object and world is an interior one like that between consciousness and what is given. The areas of the world enter the particular thing where they must be considered its profiles, inviting one toward its center. Those which are essential characters of the thing are necessary profiles. And the individual, by everything which specifies it, is a reference to the world in which it is. Essential characters are references to areas which must be in order that it be. Rather than interfering with the revelation of what appears, each plane of immanence and transcendence provides a resource against the obscurity of the other.

In its relation with things, then, consciousness cannot be considered a simple and direct movement toward either object or world. It is present in the object-world exchange in such a way as to permit the revelation of each by the other. The revelation occurs in the word. This "halt in the movement of consciousness" occurses the ensemble of the individual and generality, formulating its tension. In expressing this pen as writing instrument, or as black or as mine, consciousness reveals what is given by means of one of its characters or profiles. This pen is more than writing instrument, black, mine, and its expression by means of one of these characters does not exhaust it but respects its condition of immanence and transcendence. To

^{**} Cf. P.P. 454.

the extent that it does overcome the facticity of what is given, the word does so by availing itself of the resources which context provides. It formulates the characters of what is given as the generalities that they are: black, writing instrument, mine, are quite indifferent to this particular object, and the words which express them apply equally well to each of the great number of things constituting the areas within the world which these characters define. Thus, the expression of a thing by means of a character, essential or otherwise, has the aspect of taking that thing together with everything else which manifests this character. It is an understanding which reveals the thing as member of an ensemble, a comprehension which takes it as part of a world. The consciousness in which this particular object is comprehended or understood is consciousness of a world.

Such a conception of the revelation of things permits, we believe, a reconciliation of the conflicting descriptions which demand that consciousness be both engagement in and detachment from its object. To the extent that my seizure of this pen is a seizure of writing instrument, it detaches itself from the thing in its individuality in favor of an engagement in an area of context. But the various areas of context are profiles of this pen, and so their formulation is an entry into the thing in its particular concrete state no less than a detachment which surveys it. Thus the thought or concept, by formulating as general the characters of what appears, mediates at once both engagement in and disengagement from its object.

Merleau-Ponty rarely speaks of concept as we have just done, because of the Intellectualist history of that term which has led to its being taken as the total expression of what is and the complete awareness of self. As has been remarked more than once, it is in the verbal expression that what is given is revealed. Even if consciousness were to overcome completely the facticity of the object, still it would not completely coincide with itself because reflection would be thwarted by the facticity which the word brings into the expression. Yet the word is a means of revealing the object, and so a measure of triumph over its own facticity is indicated. Granted that I do not create the word. It is given

to me as "something to pronounce," " crystallized out of the possibilities of a total consciousness. Still, it is something to pronounce in a particular circumstance, namely, the encounter with the particular object. Word and object are given in the same stroke: not only is the naming of an object its recognition, but the recognition of the object, an initial grasp which includes its essence, establishes the word in the subject. At the beginning then, there is a mutual revelation, and in the time which follows, there is continued refinement and precision. It is true, of course. that each succeeding use of the word adds to its wake of heterogeneous elements those non-essentials which happen to enter the total experience in which it is used. Yet the continued exchange with an object reveals characters constant in its every appearance. This revelation requires an expression of the same constancy, and those elements in the word which affect it tend to become fixed as a central core of meaning. Thus occurs the vision of essences present in the common usages of perception. To the essential structure at the heart of what appears there corresponds a concept buried in the word. The progressive revelation of the former is the emergence of the latter in the dialectic within the intentional union of consciousness and object.

Concept is consciousness of essence. As consciousness of the essence it is present at the core of the object while surveying it as part of a required context. But essential characters must be present in the thing in its every appearance: they have a necessity and universality. It is to the fact that the concept is presence to these that we would attribute its time-resistant character. Merleau-Ponty holds that the subject in his capacity to acquire experience is responsible for this atemporal character of explicit truth. But the object certainly has a share in it. It offers to consciousness characters which resist erosion by time, its essence; and consciousness, to the extent that it is concept or view of the essence, must itself resist. What is indicated on the side of the subject in this regard is its capacity to be present in such a fashion to things and world. This is its conceptualizing power,

⁸¹ P.P. 462.

⁴² Cf. P.P. 450.

an opening out of consciousness upon the being of what appears, its most penetrating presence in the object-world exchange.

And the concept is presence to self. It is neither the complete coincidence which would annihilate the object, nor a withdrawal which would abandon the changing and ramified world. It is a presence of consciousness to itself by means of an object which endures and supports this presence. The effect of time which operates to alter constantly the perception of an object is overcome when, across a succession of moments, the same structure is expressed. To the extent that it is consciousness of this structure, the consciousness of one moment can coincide with that of the next. In this way, thanks to the characters of what is given, the perceptive view resists dispersion before reflection. And reflection, to the extent that it is a view of these characters as formulated. can coincide with perception. There is a comparable limited triumph over the fullness of the object. Direct perceptive grasp of the thing is presence to its essential characters as well as its total meaningfulness. To the extent that my reflective awareness of the expression of that thing is consciousness of the essence revealed, then reflection corresponds with the perceptive grasp of that basic structure.

What is given remains given, and the concept terminates an encounter with it. This pen is a writing instrument. It is this pen which yields me the concept "writing instrument," which must be regarded as a view of part of a concrete thing whose total meaning transcends this or any other particular view by consciousness. Yet, for consciousness to recognize itself as transcended is, in a certain way, to refuse to be transcended. And in fact, my consciousness of the object invites the belief that it has completely seized the latter. Merleau-Ponty has noted this. He regards it as an ideal element in consciousness, a presumption which the word installs in us as the limit of its effort. Treating his own example he remarks that "the cube with six equal faces is simply the idea-limit by which I express the real presence of the cube which is there, before my eyes . . . in its perceptive

^{**} Cf. P.P. 221.

evidence." "It seems to us very necessary to recognize that consciousness does express this real presence of the individual thing and probably legitimate to associate this expression with the notion of idea limit. The idea limit is a presumption, however, and the actual assertion of the total meaningfulness of the individual in all its uniqueness is in another expression. It is to be found, we believe, in the most abrupt of all verbal gestures, this. This is a formula, not for the thing reduced to an idea or even the presumption of such a reduction, but for the attitude on the part of consciousness of "astonishment before the individual."

The consciousness which had discovered itself as expression of a world sees itself as well as assertion of the individual. In each case the fullness of what is given renders the expressive gesture inarticulate. To recognize these terms as irreducible one to the other is to be drawn by the tension between them toward an area of reality in which some sort of a resolution is possible. The understanding consciousness seeks a character of the individual in its entirety which defines as well a general area. For Merleau-Ponty the individual is understood when reflection traces it back to the world, the source towards which its every implication leads. No need to go further because in the world we reach that which is irrevocably other than consciousness. There is a world! This is certain. But one need go this far because only in the world is there unquestionably a being other than consciousness. "The world is precisely that permanent being at whose interior I operate all the corrections of knowledge . . . " 45 Ultimately, the being of every particular being is simply part of that of the world. But the consciousness which has asserted "there is an individual" engages itself to move beyond world as Merleau-Ponty understands it. It has recognized the being-as-individual of what is given, a character within or coinciding with something in general. The latter provides too fragile a context for the understanding of this being which now stands on an equal footing with it. However we can say of both the individual and the world "it is." The fact that is a character of both, and each can be recognized

^{*} P.P. 236. Italics mine.

⁸⁵ P.P. 378.

as part of a more extensive context, that of being. We believe that a metaphysics which is the study of beings in being is possible.

The consciousness which recognizes itself as present to beings in being is revealed to itself as a being which opens upon and moves to embrace inexhaustible density on the one hand and infinite scope on the other. Such is the metaphysical consciousness, and its reflection is a description and understanding of the dialectic whose terms its inarticulate gestures have exposed.

With Merleau-Ponty we reject the notion of the metaphysical consciousness as one which reproduces in clear ideas a world which exists as a collection of monads. His philosophy of engagement—engagement of things in exchange with world as well as engagement of consciousness in what is given—constitutes to our mind an effective reaction to this doctrine. With its revelation of the primitive interpenetration of the various components of reality, his work brings home the need for a vigorous accounting for this initial situation as indispensable to the articulation of the other philosophical sciences which lay claim to specific areas of being. It is, in short, a justification of phenomenology as well as an indication of the depth and scope of its methods. Our treatment of the question of reflection attempts to use these methods and to move from within his work. The question of consciousness as thought reveals itself as part of a unity, and as dependent for its resolution upon an understanding of consciousness both as presence to self, and as presence to its object. It leads finally to an assertion as regards the nature of the object. But this movement from question to question is a description of a situation of fact, and it terminates in the recognition of a state which preceded it and awaited discovery. Things are and being is, and the consciousness which pursues its own engagement in them to the point where it recognizes this fact moves in a path not unfamiliar to Merleau-Ponty,

In our recognition of the being of each being we go further along this path than he permits himself to be drawn. We believe that he is thwarted by his adoption of the notion of consciousness which is primarily movement in pursuit of itself. This notion, as we have indicated, takes precedence over that of consciousness as opening upon reality. The effect of the assertion of the being of the individual is to recognise on the part of what is given the object-world tension which makes it impossible to describe consciousness as a direct movement either toward object or self. Consciousness is present to things upon which it opens and opening must be restored to its importance as descriptive of it. Moreover, consciousness withdraws from things to survey them, so that retreat cannot be absent from its description. All of these notions need be summoned and harmonized to convey the intentional character of consciousness which underlies the phenomenological method.

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CORNFORD ON THE BIRTH OF METAPHYSICS

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When he had finished his cannibal dinner, Homo javanensis presumably passed the evening in recounting cosmogonical myths. Reason, at least as exemplified in the everyday processes of problem-solving celebrated by the pragmatists, is much older, being shared by the brute creation. Yet the amalgamation of the two—the application of reason to the perennial subjects of myth—resulting in the first metaphysics, did not occur until just two and a half millennia ago, when Thales argued that everything is water.

This most stupendous revolution in all intellectual history may seem in retrospect to have been long overdue. However, since myths are far more satisfying, emotionally and esthetically, than metaphysics, which moreover has no immediate survival value, we should wonder not at the tardiness of this development but rather at its having ever got started.

Nevertheless that revolution did occur. One of its remote consequences is our present belief that it was a natural occurrence, explainable in terms of a continuous intellectual development among the Greeks of Ionia. Much of Francis M. Cornford's long and productive scholarly career was devoted to the problem of providing this explanation. His last word on the subject, the book *Principium Sapientiae*, was almost complete at the time of his death in 1943.¹

In this book, as in his first important work, From Religion to Science (1912), Cornford is concerned to show that "philosophy or science was not a motherless Athena" (188), but the culmina-

¹ Ed. by W. K. C. Guthrie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). References to this book will be indicated by page numbers in parentheses.

tion of a continuous development of religious and mythological thought. He asks: "Is the Milesian cosmogony the work of rational inference based on observation and checked by at least rudimentary methods of experiment? Or are its features to be referred to an attitude of mind uncongenial to natural science as we understand it?" (186). The book is an attempt to show that the latter alternative is correct.

Cornford begins by pointing out that the ancient natural philosophers made little use of experiment. Indeed, when one reads the works of those scholars who endeavor to show that the pre-Socratics were experimental scientists, one finds such writers preposterously overworking Empedocles' clepsydra and the occasion when Anaximenes allegedly blew on his hand. On the other hand (Cornford continues), the physicians of antiquity experimented frequently and systematically. They built up a considerable body of scientific knowledge based on this. They should be regarded as the true founders of the empirical theory of knowledge, and consequently as the first scientists.

Among the philosophers, however, Epicurus represents "the final outcome of Ionian physics" (12), and there never has been a more completely dogmatic non-empiricist. Hence we may safely conclude that the method of early philosophy was not experimental or scientific but dogmatic. "It is hard indeed to suppose that the earlier Ionians had established a genuinely scientific method, if it could be so entirely ignored by those who accepted atomism" (30). In answer to the question, if these men were not scientists, what was their criterion of validity in their pronouncements, Cornford filiates them with their predecessors, the poet-seer-sages, or shamans, who reached their conclusions by direct insight, or direct traffic with the gods, i.e., who exhibited the "divine frenzy" of which Plato frequently speaks. Cornford does not mean that the Ionian philosophers actually went into trances, or anything of that sort, but that their confidence in the truth of their utterances was derived from the precedent set by their shamanistic predecessors.

Undoubtedly Cornford is right to deny that the Ionians were experimental scientists, or empiricists. They did not perform experiments, they did not generalize tentatively from observation. But it weakens the argument to take Epicurus as the "final outcome

of Ionian physics". Epicurus, as everyone recognized until recently, made no scientific advances and used previous Democritean science only for his purposes, which were not scientific but moral. Cornford should have chosen Democritus instead.² He would have had no more trouble in showing Democritus to have been a non-empiricist.

Yet it does not follow that because a man is not an empiricist, he is a dogmatist, in a religious or quasi-religious sense, nor even that he does not deserve to be called a scientist. Empiricism is not the only rational approach to understanding reality.

In one very important sense, it is clear that the Ionians were not dogmatists; they were not dogmatic about their predecessors. but rather they criticized them most acutely. This fact is the key to their method. It was, in the first place, analogical. Considering that the subject of their researches was the universe at large—cosmogony, cosmology, meteorology—it could not be expected that they should have been empiricists in Cornford's strict sense, since even today this is not the method of cosmogony. Extrapolation of processes that are observable and controllable on a small space-time scale is the best that can be done. exactly what the Ionians did. Their speculative conclusions about cosmogonical processes were explicitly justified by analogy with natural processes accessible to observation. Furthermore, the progress of pre-Socratic thought is dialectical: the succession Thales—Anaximander—Anaximenes—Parmenides—Empedocles -Anaxagoras-Democritus reveals at every step advances based on greater awareness of the requirements of logical rigor, and the care to make their theories free of internal contradiction as well as proof against refutation by appeal to obvious facts. Thus the growth of ancient science is the growth of two criteria: internal consistency (which, I shall urge, is the distinctive achievement of these thinkers) and consistency of consequences with observation ("saving the appearances," which is, after all, the gist of scientific method in cosmogony today). The solid achievements of these men—the discoveries of the sphericity of the earth and the true

² Perhaps he would have done so, had he not been objecting to the Farringtonian picture of Epicurus as a great scientist and proto-Marxian.

theory of eclipses, for example, and the atomic theory of matter—should convince us that something more than "divine frenzy" or any offshoot of it was at work. The most striking and important characteristic of these men is that they troubled themselves to give reasons for their conclusions. Nobody before them did.

In considering the relation of the philosophers to the shamans, who in the grip of divine frenzy communicated directly with the gods, we must distinguish four questions which Cornford does not always keep separate: (1) to what extent did the philosopher usurp the social function of the shaman? (2) to what extent did the philosopher attribute his own insights to an experience analogous to the shaman's? (3) to what extent do the philosophers' insights trespass on the shamanistic subject matter? (4) to what extent are the criteria of the philosopher and shaman alike? Thus put, the questions are either easy to answer, or irrelevant to the problem, or both. (1) To some extent the philosopher superseded the shaman as a recognized authority, in the ancient world; his descendants today have perhaps extended their influence to some slight degree. (2) Cornford cites the fragment of Democritus (B 11) to the effect that "irrational animals, the wise, and gods have an extra sense", and accepts Rohde's interpretation that this statement connects "with the inspiration of poet and seer that philosophic intuition which Democritus called 'true-born wisdom'" (65). This may be so; it does not matter, because how exceptional men come by their original ideas is a psychological problem that has no bearing on the question of their validity. Perhaps inspiration really does come from the spirit world, as Mr. G. N. M. Tyrrell maintains. Even so, it still remains that for the Ionians as well as the Platonists "the visions must be interpreted by sober reflexion afterwards" (141), and it is only the nature of this "sober reflexion" that concerns us here. Thus the whole of Cornford's elaborate discussion of Platonic anamnesis, while of the greatest interest and importance for its own sake, must be dismissed as irrelevant to the history of the growth of rational methodology. (3) Cornford is surely right in saying that not only did the philosophers investigate the subjects that are the typical stock in trade of myth, but also that they directly inherited their problems, and some presuppositions and conclusions (e.g. that the world must have come into its present state out of a previous chaos) from the mythologers. Of this more will be said later. present we may be content to note that no continuity of method is entailed in this. (4) The criteria of philosophers and shamans have nothing in common, for the reason that the shamans had no criteria. A feeling of certainty doesn't count. In controverting this view, Cornford instances the numbers 9, 18, 27 in Anaximander (referring to the distances, in earth radii, of the various celestial hoops from the earth), and his contention that the earth is a drum three times as broad as high, as examples of pre-Socratic "dogmatism." "It is obvious that they are a priori and cannot be based on any kind of observation" (165). Perhaps so; prima facie, however, we have here an early example of the insistence that Nature must conform to reason, i.e., a sort of embryonic metaphysics of the mathematizing sort. One is presumably supposed to accept the figures because of their inherent reasonableness (v. the Pythagorean harmonies). This is the antithesis of shamanistic mysticism. Moreover we must not overlook the fact that these figures occur in the context of an astonishingly rational account of the nature of things, which is by no means devoid of references to observation, as Cornford admits (170).

To be sure, pre-Socratic philosophers frequently had recourse to self-evidence as a criterion of truth. Philosophy started off bravely enough. The Milesian cosmogonies are in the grand style. Yet in every case the principles to which they appeal are such as to recommend themselves as plausible to reasonable men of the time and place. If these grounds seem insufficient to us, that is because, thanks to the processes that they initiated, we are more adequately equipped to criticize. The sharp line between philosophy-science and mythologizing was draw for all time by Heraclitus: "Not on my authority, but on account of my argument, it is wise for you to accept . . ."

Cornford is correct, moreover, in insisting that the empirical theory of knowledge must be credited to Greek medicine, not to philosophy. The important point is that the more or less "pure empiricism" of the physicians is not of itself any more satisfactory as a scientific method than the rationalism of the cosmogonists.

Science cannot dispense with either. It is no accident that the first reasonably satisfactory canon of science was formulated by Aristotle, a Platonist who knew medicine.

In sum, the facts do not support the hypothesis that Ionian thought shows a continuity of method or criteria with the inspired utterances of shamans, or poet-prophet-sages. On the other hand, it is equally evident that the Ionians seldom appealed in support of their cosmogonies to anything much like what would be regarded as empirical evidence in the modern sense. We must therefore take a new tack if we desire to understand the rationale of their thought and its filiation to that of their predecessors.

But however slight the kinship between shaman and philosopher may have been with respect to criteria, the second half of *Principium Sapientiae* shows conclusively that the earliest rational cosmogony is schematically identical with previous myths. Cornford traces the lineage of Anaximander's cosmogony back through Hesiod to the Babylonian Hymn to Marduk, explaining also how it was possible for mythological material to become progressively more "rational."

In opposition to the usual supposition that myths and rituals arise out of primitive men's ascribing personalities to natural forces, then inventing mythical exploits of these personalities to account for natural phenomena, and finally instituting rituals to commemorate these mythical events and persons, Cornford proposes the following sequence: (1) Primitive men feel that their cooperation is essential for the continuation of the natural order. In particular, yearly rituals to insure the return of the growing season are instituted. The priest-king is the principal figure in these ceremonies. (2) The conception of Kingship as a sort of "Platonic Idea" in which particular kings only "participate" is formed. Concurrently, the program of the yearly ritual is abstracted from its instances. But the abstraction proceeds no further than the conception of the "Platonic Idea" of Kingship as a Divine Creator, and the program of the ritual as a cosmogonical myth of the Creator's exploits. (3) The myth becomes detached from its ritual setting and embarks on a career of its own when either the ritual falls into disuse or the myth is exported. In the latter case it may be expurgated or otherwise altered—perhaps "rationalized."

The Babylonian myth of creation was exported to the Mediterranean area before the fourteenth century B. C. through the port of Ugarit. It is the basis of Hesiod's cosmogony and theogony, as well as of Genesis i-ii. But in Hesiod, "the cosmogony... is not a myth, or rather it is no longer a myth. It has advanced so far along the road of rationalization that only a very thin partition divides it from the early Ionian systems" (198). The same is true of the Elohistic cosmogony. Yet in both cases the "rational" part is immediately succeeded by the most primitive sort of mythical material.

The order of events in Anaximander's cosmogony is the same as that in the "rationalized" creation myths. Furthermore, there is nothing in the common sense observation of nature to suggest that things have not always been as they are now. Hence Anaximander's achievement was to take "the final step in the process of rationalization, divesting the scheme of the last traces of mythical imagery" (200). Also he was consistent in his exclusion of mythical imagery, not reintroducing it later, as Hesiod had done.

This account of the lineage of the first rational cosmogony is most enlightening, as far as it goes; but it is incomplete. If we accept it—as I think we should—then philosophy is no longer "a motherless Athena"; but the question of paternity is still open.

For how are we to characterize and account for the "rationalizing tendency" at work on the myths? It is no reproach against Cornford to say that he did not account for this; it is even hard to say what would count as an explanation, supposing that we knew everything we want to know about the

² This is Cornford's positive conclusion, based on the similarity of the myths. It is puzzling that he says nothing about the creation myth of the Rig-Veda, which not only has the same structure as the Babylonian-Hebrew-Greek, but is *linguistically* akin to the Greek in the names of such divine personages as Dyaus (=Zeus, Dios). See the reconstruction by W. Norman Brown, *Journ. of the Amer. Oriental Soc.*, 62 (1942), 85-98; summarized in Finegan, *The Archeology of World Religions* (Princeton, 1952), pp. 133 f. Perhaps Cornford would have discussed this in his projected but unwritten chapter on India.

period. Nevertheless it may be possible to follow up some suggestions derived from Cornford to the point where certain aspects of the Milesian achievement can be more thoroughly appreciated.

If we follow Cornford closely in his investigation of the similarities between early philosophy and myth, we may tend to forget that the two are none the less as generically different as any two modes of thought can be; and that the differences are, first, that the Milesians and their successors gave reasons for their conclusions; secondly, that the reasons were publicly verifiable negatively, in that no appeals were made to special sources of information about the unobservable workings of supernatural beings; positively, in that the appeals actually made were to everyday criteria of common observation, or of rational plausibility, especially logical consistency. For example, Anaximander objected to Thales' water-principle, "inasmuch as air is cold, water is moist, and fire hot; if one of these were infinite, the rest would be at once destroyed." * The appeal here is simply to logical consistency. Again, "Anaximander says at the beginning man was generated from all sorts of animals, since all the rest can quickly get food for themselves, but man alone requires careful feeding for a long time; such a being at the beginning could not have preserved his existence." Here we have a "thoughtexperiment," if you like, but a remarkably cogent one, at once above and beneath the level of myth-making.

But why should evidence suddenly begin to be offered in support of assertions far less amazing than those in the myths? And why should the thinkers so austerely eschew the easy ways of supernaturalism?

The clue to a possible answer to these questions is given by Cornford in his account of the development of myth from ritual. One of the most fruitful anthropological advances of the present century has been the recognition that myths are not primitive pseudo-science; they are not invented to satisfy curiosity about the nature of things, but to objectify emotions. Still it seems to

⁴ Aristotle, Physics, iii, 5 (204b22).

Ps.-Plut. Stromateis 2.

be taken for granted that myth has a secondary cognitive function—that the literal content of myth is believed by the worshipper in the same manner that the literal content of scientific texts is believed by the present-day student, or that the thirty-nine Articles are believed by conscientious and informed contemporary Anglicans: that is, the propositions concerned are believed to be true; the personages described existed in the way in which the believer exists, and the events happened just as his own doings take place.

Self-evident as this assumption may seem, it leads to curious consequences. Individual Egyptians notoriously believed a multitude of logically incompatible myths, and this White Queenish facility is characteristic of primitive thought. In consequence some students have doubted whether the primitive mind is capable of any clarity of thought. Others, recognizing that the primitive mind is not the feeble mind, have defended these inconsistencies by pointing out their pragmatic significance. "Once one recognizes the processes of ancient thought," the Frankforts write, "their justification is apparent. After all, religious values are not reducible to rationalistic formulas. Natural phenomena . . confronted ancient man with a living presence, a significant "Thou," which . . . exceeded the scope of conceptual definition."

While it is true and important that to primitive thought the world is "Thou," not "it," this fact does not explain the primitive passion for contradictions. My wife is a "thou"; nevertheless the male nurses would soon come to my door if I persisted in asserting that she was a cow and also a winged serpent. Nor, surely, has any primitive society tolerated the habitual flouting of the law of contradiction in everyday mundane affairs.

The only possible solution to this paradox is the obvious one that to the primitive mind myths are simply not understood to make truth-claims at all. Myths persist despite their vulnerability to criticism, not because the primitive is astoundingly naive, but because the myth, to his understanding, does not make any assertions that it would be appropriate to criticize. The myth is

⁶ H. & H. A. Frankfort, Before Philosophy (London, 1949), p. 29.

not true, but neither is it false; its ritual significance is its only significance.

This is not to say that the myth is explicitly recognized to be an allegorical fiction, although that is perhaps a less misleading description than any other. Rather, the conception of a universe, continuous in space and time, embracing all real events, so that every proposition refers to it and is true if and only if it corresponds to some feature of it, has not yet been formed. Hence criteria of plausibility and logical consistency, which are applied as a matter of course in the prosaic affairs of daily life, are, equally as a matter of course, simply not invoked in the context of the supernatural. On the contrary, criteria for acceptability of myths are emotional and aesthetic only.

This a priori inference can be supported by a large amount of empirical evidence from studies of past and present mythologies. Space permits the citation of only one sample:

How little qualified are we to know the traditional, as distinct from the lexicographical, value of word and phrase, to interpret the traditional figurative diction—to know when a shaman does not intend us to place a literal interpretation on his words!... For instances we may turn to certain books of incantation current among the Mussulman bakshas which make mention of Turkish saints who mount on lions, dragons etc., while similar feats are attributed to many notable characters of the ancient Mussulman world. But it is clear from the oral literature current among the Tatars of Central Asia today that identical feats are there attributed to the heroes and heroines in a manner which shows that they are to be understood as among, not the actual, but the spiritual experiences of these people.

The transition from mythology to philosophy, then—Cornford's "rationalizing tendency"—consists precisely and wholly in a gradual awakening of the Greeks to a consciousness that there is just one world, and the extension of the conception of "literal truth" to that world. It dawned on the Greeks that all propositions meant to be taken seriously must be mutually consistent; the law of contradiction is applicable without qualification to all assertions claiming truth. Or it might be better to say

⁷ N. Kershaw Chadwick, Poetry and Prophecy, p. 70; quoted in Cornford, p. 103.

that this awareness was the invention of the general conception of literal truth.

The first explicit statement, that has survived, of this new conception of literal truth is found in the proem to Hesiod's *Theogony*: (The Muses speak) "We know how to tell many fictions that wear the guise of truth, but we know also how to declare the truth, when we will." As is to be expected, the recognition of this requirement of consistency does not, in its first appearance, entail a thorough-going critical scrutiny of the traditional mythology. Hesiod is conscious only of the obligation to rework his material into logically consistent form. He did not succeed, but the important thing is that he made a beginning.

Neither, as Cornford points out, did Anaximander emancipate himself completely from mythological thinking; he retained the program of traditional cosmogony. He took, however, the two decisive, literally epoch-making, steps of dispensing with anthropomorphism, and of defending his conclusions by rational argumentation. In his arguments cosmogony and modus tollens; each as old as the race, are wedded at last.

This development of a unified world-view becomes explicit in Heraclitus:

And though reason is common, most people live as though they had an understanding peculiar to themselves.... They that are awake have one world in common, but of the sleeping each turns aside into a world of his own."

To summarize, the hypothesis here proposed is that Milesian thought was the first metaphysics in the surprisingly narrow sense of being the first account of things-in-general to make a claim of literal truth, backed up by deductive reasoning; and pre-Milesian (more strictly, pre-Hesiodic) religious "cosmogony" was not intended, even by its advocates, as making assertions that could be true or false. Moreover, the foundation of metaphysics, not the practice of medicine, was the necessary condition for the eventual development of science as we understand the word; for many

^{*} See above, p. 450.

⁹ Fragments 92 and 95. See also 1-6, 14-20, 48, 91, 111.

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peoples have possessed empirical medicine, but only one has ever given birth to science.

If it is difficult to accept this hypothesis, this must be due, in part at least, to the fact that the religions with which we are most familiar do claim truth. However, this fact is to be explained historically as a reaction of religious thought to the new way of looking at things inaugurated in Ionia. It is curious that religious persecution for unorthodox belief is almost entirely confined to those cultures that stem from Palestine and Greece.10 There have been religious persecutions everywhere and at all times, but on investigation I think it can be safely said that outside the post-Milesian western world they have been almost without exception politically or economically motivated. This is easily understandable on the view here presented, because in the absence of logical and factual criteria of truth there can be no such thing as dogma in the strict sense. The history of heresy-suppression seems to begin in Athens about the middle of the 5th century B. C. The theory of religious persecution was completed by Plato in the Laws. That this development should be contemporaneous with the development of the philosophical and scientific consciousness is thus seen to be no accident; for we should suppose that the defenders of religious traditions, when faced with philosophical theories in opposition, would be forced to make truth-claims for their orthodoxies in self-defense, as it were. It may be paradoxical that the persecution of heretics turns out to be attributable to the philosophical and scientific, not the religious, spirit; but that is not the greatest paradox in the history of religions.

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¹⁰ As Cornford notes, the "rationalizing process", which I have here interpreted as the generalization of the conception of literal truth, was also at work amongst the ancient Hebrews. With them, however, it led to an exclusive monotheism rather than to philosophy.

THE SOPHISTS

RONALD B. LEVINSON

This indubitably learned work undertakes to present all the available biographical and doxographical data concerning the sophists, and to reinterpret them, from their sources thus assembled, in such fashion as to render full justice to their philosophical contributions. In this the author is following the example of many admirers of the sophists, but pressing far beyond their boldest hypotheses. He resembles his predecessors not least in his disposition to recreate the sophists into something perilously close to members of his own philosophical school.

The many difficulties the book contains are not due to its translator; Miss Freeman's well-marshalled English seldom leaves us in search of the intended sense. They are due rather to the complex character of the author's mind and to the exigencies of the thesis he is defending. One encounters flights of imagination in which lyrical transports alternate or combine with bold dialectical constructions offered as sober interpretations, and multiple quotations from ancient thinkers and modern critics, confusingly blended with our author's own comments. Signor Untersteiner displays an ability like that of the anatomist Cuvier, and can reassemble the entire structure of a lost sophistic writing from a single bone. He exhumes from the works of many other writers—Thucydides, Plato, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero-major conceptions, chapters, or whole treatises, mistakenly incorporated there by later editors, or borrowed without acknowledgment; these and sundry anonymous writings on relevant themes he confidently assigns to this or that beneficiary among the sophists. As the inevitable consequence of this process other thinkers, notably Socrates and Plato, are sadly diminished. Socrates becomes, indeed, almost a superfluity, in whose absence the history of Greek thought would have remained

¹ Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, tr. by Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954). Originally published in 1948.

unimpaired. Plato's works serve as happy hunting-grounds for supposed incorporations of sophistic insights; for the rest, he is shown as stone-and-gravel blind to the merits of these rival thinkers. Now, some discounting of Plato's satirical portrayal of the sophists may be admitted as legitimate and necessary. Untersteiner, however, has so far exceeded his allowance here as to reach the counter-absurdity, of which his interpretation of Thrasymachus in the *ne plus ultra*: to a proper reading, we are told, Thrasymachus is far from being a cynical denier of the claims of moral obligation. On the contrary, he is a broken-hearted idealist, and in calling justice "the advantage of the stronger" he is offering not his own conception of justice but, out of his bitter disillusion, describing what men in their tragic folly have made of that noble virtue.

But beyond all this, a formal assumption pervades the entire book and, for those willing to accept it, imparts a plausibility to the very boldest of its audacities. Like many a speculative philologist before him-here again his distinction is rather that of hyperbole than of innovation—Untersteiner is imputing to the sophists the conscious use of categories and principles which are conspicuously unattested in ancient thought. Such are the notion of dialectic as a logic of contradiction and resolution on a higher plane, and the conception of the will as a constituent ingredient and prerequisite to the determination of value—conceptions which are, be it noted, in close conformity with Untersteiner's own. It is only by ascribing these refinements of modern philosophical discourse that he is able to synthesize scattered and even contradictory utterances into the semblance of systematic unity, and to impart transcendent depth and significance to ideas which from any other standpoint appear to move on a level close to that of common sense.

It will not be possible to examine in detail the philological foundations of Untersteiner's positions, but we may adduce two examples of the structures reared upon them. His method is seen at its highest pitch of dynamic domination of the facts in his account of the sophist Hippias. That Hippias was a major thinker, except possibly in the field of mathematics, no generally accepted evidence attests, and of his writings hardly three sentences survive.

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But by the method described above, Untersteiner has multiplied his surviving works a hundredfold, and on this basis presents Hippias as an intellectual and moral paragon: true master of encyclopedic knowledge—equally able to give a swift answer to any question or to speak at eloquent length—ardent champion of democracy, pioneer in cultural cosmopolitanism, and the enlightened expounder of a doctrine of natural law, in which the tragic agnosticism of Gorgias at last found a cognitive (no longer merely an aesthetic and illusory) path of escape.

A similar process of conjectural interpretation has transformed the more important sophist Protagoras. Untersteiner has endowed him, also, with other men's wealth, and has filled in the nearly empty schedule of his life and works with reenforcing conjectures. Thus he has transferred to him without question, inter alia, the entire section of the Theaetetus in which Plato with great epistemological refinement expounds, elucidates, and draws out implications of the venerable sophist's views. Untersteiner has put forced and unwarranted interpretations upon the sophist's well-known dicta; in particular, nothing in the record justifies the contention that by "making the weaker argument the stronger" Protagoras had essentially in mind a program of reform founded upon a subtle fusion of epistemology and ethics, whereby less adequate decisions are to be replaced by others successively more humane, looking to a consummation in a humanly achieved ethic valid for all mankind.

To a book composed of such interpretations, for all their intrinsic attractiveness, we must reply, "A pretty thing, but not the sophists."

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THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETHICS VERGIL H. DYKSTRA

Mr. Toulmin proposes what he takes to be a new conception of the proper task of the moral philosopher. His book is a particularly disarming one, because of the author's genial and urbane style, a style characteristic of many who have been influenced by Wittgenstein and his followers. Instead of offering an ethical theory, as traditional moral philosophers have done, he proposes to consider the question: "Can we discover, from our knowledge of the kinds of human situation and activity in which ethical utterances find their primary use, the kinds of things that are relevant as arguments for one course of action or another" (p. 84)? He contends that his answer to this question need not and does not take the form of an ethical theory, but rather that "a descriptive account of our ethical concepts is what we need" (p. 194).

He then proceeds to analyse "the logic of moral reasoning," which consists of two parts: (1) The logical criteria by which we distinguish between good and bad moral reasoning, and (2) the limits which distinguish moral from other kinds of reasoning. Mr. Toulmin maintains that there is a clear set of logical criteria peculiar to ethics, to be used in evaluating ethical arguments or reasoning. These criteria are determined by the function or use of such reasoning. Whoever chooses not to accept these criteria is simply not talking about moral reasoning. There are alternative modes of reasoning, each having logical criteria appropriate to it, but there is one set uniquely applicable to the ethical mode.

According to Mr. Toulmin, in order to determine what these criteria are, we must examine "the different types of question which naturally arise in ethical contexts, and the ways in which they are answered" (p. 160). He suggests that we "consider, first,

¹ An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).

the simplest and commonest ethical question, 'Is this the right thing to do'?" (p. 144). (We later discover that this is the only ethical question he considers. It is not clear whether this is because he believes it really is the only ethical question or whether it is because he believes his analysis of this question and its answers provides a paradigm for all ethical reasoning. Presumably he intends the latter, yet he offers no evidence to support the notion.)

Mr. Toulmin tells us what an analysis of the question, "Is this the right thing to do"? can not be or do. "In talking of the 'analysis' of 'X is right,' philosophers cannot be referring to the 'meaning' of 'X is right.' The 'meaning' of 'X is right' is . . . 'X is the thing to do in these circumstances, to encourage others to do in similar circumstances, etc., etc.' . . . The question which the 'analysis' of 'X is right' can answer is the question, 'Which kinds of reasons are required to show that something is right (i.e., the thing to do, to encourage others to do, etc.)'?" (p. 154).

According to Mr. Toulmin, these reasons required to show that something is right are of two kinds, constituting two distinct kinds of moral reasoning. The first kind occurs upon those occasions when the question, "Is this the right thing to do"? is asked regarding some particular action. On such occasions, we must determine whether or not the proposed action falls unambiguously under some accepted practice or principle of the community. If we find that it does, that is the end of the moral reasoning in that situation. From a moral standpoint, it makes no sense to ask further whether the action is really right. If, however, we find that the proposed action is not unambiguously in accord with an accepted practice or principle of the community. either because there are conflicting principles relevant to the action or because there is no relevant principle at all, "we are driven back upon our estimate of the probable consequences" (p. 147).

The second kind of moral reasoning, to which the question, "Is this the right thing to do?" gives rise, occurs when the question is asked regarding an accepted practice or principle itself. When that happens, "the answer will (remembering the function

of ethics) be reached by estimating the probable consequences (1) of retaining the practice, and (2) of adopting the suggested alternative" (p. 150).

Mr. Toulmin claims that these two kinds of moral reasoning are not only mutually exclusive but also exhaustive. "The two kinds of moral reasoning which we have encountered are, therefore, distinct. Each provides its own logical criteria—criteria which are appropriate to the criticism of individual actions, or social practices, but not both" (p. 151). All other occasions upon which the question arises are beyond "the limits of moral reasoning—that is, the kinds of occasion on which questions and considerations of an ethical kind can no longer arise" (p. 160).

Since Mr. Toulmin is prepared to rest his case on his analysis of the reasons for saying that something is right, it is proper to ask whether he fully and accurately states these reasons. Here we must bear in mind that he has insisted he is not giving an ethical theory, either about the meaning of "right" or about what things are really right. He says, "I have simply tried to describe the occasions on which we are in fact prepared to call judgments 'ethical' and decisions 'moral,' and the part which reasoning plays on such occasions" (p. 160). The primary restriction to be observed by moral philosophers is that "they remain true to the facts of our usage" (p. 191).

(1) The first criticism of Mr. Toulmin's analysis is that the two kinds of moral reasoning are not distinct, as he claims they are. After discussing the way in which moral reasoning about what is right occurs either with regard to a commonly accepted practice or with regard to a particular action, he goes on to claim that the two are distinct, as we have seen above.

Apart from the other objections to which this claim is open, it should be noted that it quite contradicts Mr. Toulmin's own account of what the respective criteria are. We noted above that, for him, one of the tests of the rightness of an action is whether or not it falls unambiguously under some accepted practice or principle. However, it was also noted that this criterion can not be applied in those cases where there is either a conflict of principles or no relevant principle at all. In such cases, an

alternative criterion of rightness is what Mr. Toulmin calls "the appeal to consequences." Then when we turn to the second kind of moral reasoning, we find that there is just one criterion of rightness of accepted social practices or moral principles: namely. the appeal to consequences. Moreover, careful examination reveals nothing that distinguishes the consequences in the two cases. Hence, when Mr. Toulmin says there are no logical criteria appropriate to both, he forgets or ignores the fact that he has previously said something quite different. This oversight is obvious in his statement later that his description "has led us to see how, in particular types of ethical question and argument, good reasoning is distinguished from bad, and valid argument from invalid-to be specific, by applying to individual judgments the test of principle, and to principles the test of general fecundity" (p. 160). No recognition is made of the fact that he has previously made fecundity also one of the criteria appropriate to individual judgments. Even on his own terms, then, the two kinds of moral reasoning are not wholly distinct.

More important, however, than this inconsistency is the fact that Mr. Toulmin's position, that reasoning about the rightness of particular actions is wholly distinct from reasoning about the rightness of principles, is not a tenable one. What he fails to see is that in our ordinary moral reasoning, questions about the rightness of individual actions and questions about the rightness of moral principles are so inter-related that they can not be completely distinguished, much less separated. Of course, as Mr. Toulmin recognizes, we frequently justify an accepted social practice by pointing out that its consequences are somehow preferable to those of alternative practices. But who will deny that we often also justify the accepted practices or principles by means of some more inclusive and general principle? Or again, who will deny that we can and often do justify our choice of certain consequences rather than others by appealing to some sort of principle? Indeed, it may well be, as Sidgwick and others have maintained, that all justification is ultimately in terms of some general principle.

According to Mr. Toulmin, when we find that some proposed act falls clearly under a relevant principle of the moral code of one's community, it makes no sense to ask whether the act is

really right. "The test for answering questions of this simple kind remains the accepted practice, even though the action may have unfortunate results" (p. 145). The first objection to this is that it is of comparatively little practical value in reaching moral decisions, because seldom do we clearly understand not only the consequences and implications of a specific act but also what the accepted practices and moral principles of our community are. But a second and more serious objection is that it is plainly false that people do in fact ordinarily accept conformity to the practices and principles of their particular group as the only test of the rightness of an act. Yet Mr. Toulmin insists that even when a person discovers that acting in accord with an accepted practice will have unfortunate results, that person can not properly argue that it is morally wrong to perform the act in question. Mr. Toulmin claims that even where there is a "developing moral code," the code "in unambiguous cases remains mandatory" (p. 142). This completely overlooks the fact that we frequently say that not only is an accepted practice morally wrong at times but also that it is sometimes morally wrong to act in accord with a generally accepted practice. Conformity to the moral code of one's community or social group is certainly not the most important part of moral behavior. Mr. Toulmin gives evidence here, as he does elsewhere, that he fails to recognize any important differences between morality and legality.

(2) A second major objection to Mr. Toulmin's analysis is that not only are the kinds of moral reasoning he describes not distinct and separate, but neither are they exhaustive. His account of the limits of moral reasoning is not consistent with the ordinary use of language. This is especially true of his description of the "appeal to consequences."

For one thing, he is extremely vague about the nature of the consequences that are morally relevant. We do find him maintaining that the negative aspect (the avoidance of misery) is primary, while the positive aspect (the promotion of happiness and welfare) is ethical only in a secondary sense. "The notions of 'obligation,' 'right,' 'justice,' 'duty,' and 'ethics,' apply in the first place where our actions or institutions may lead to avoidable misery for others; but it is a natural and familiar ex-

tension to use them also where the issue concerns the chance for deeper happiness for others, and even for ourselves. . . . It is important, however, if we are going to do so, to notice one thing: namely, that it is an extension" (p. 159).

In addition to this curiously negative characterization of the consequences, there is an even more important fact to be noted about them. Mr. Toulmin claims that the morally relevant consequences are limited to those which concern the other members of our community. He makes this point repeatedly and explicitly in passages such as the following: "In general, then, if one is to reason about social practices, the only occasions on which we can discuss the question which of two practices is the better are those on which . . . it would be practicable to change from one to the other within one society. . . . If this condition is not satisfied. there is, morally speaking, no reasoning about the question, and pretended arguments about the merits of rival systems—personal preferences apart—are of value only as rhetoric" (p. 153). In another passage. Mr. Toulmin says that when we raise questions about whether a certain generally accepted practice is right, "we can now inquire whether, if some specific change were made, the members of our community would lead fuller and happier lives" (p. 159, my italics). If we have two alternative courses of action between which we must choose, "we estimate (as best we can) the effects which either course of action will have on the other members of the community" (p. 156, my italics). Or once more. "The notions of 'duty,' of 'obligation,' of 'morality,' are derived from situations in which the conduct of one member of a community prejudices the interests of another. . . . two courses of action are equally acceptable according to the established code, and their foreseeable effects on others [of the community] are equally tolerable, . . . if one is to choose between the two courses of action, it is on grounds of a different kind, for 'moral grounds' are no longer conclusive" (p. 157).

Such a view clearly means that if I protest against some accepted practice of my group or community on the grounds that the practice causes needless suffering on the part of a person or persons outside my community, my protest is not based upon moral grounds. Likewise, if I argue against a practice or act of

someone outside my group or community, on the grounds that his conduct is causing needless suffering, "my pretended arguments are of value only as rhetoric." In thus restricting moral reasoning, Mr. Toulmin further indicates his presumption that not only are communities and social groups definite and fixed but also that morality is purely a tribal affair.

There is a significant footnote by Mr. Toulmin at the end of his account of moral reasoning. He states, "I recall a conversation with Bertrand Russell in which he remarked, as an objection to the present account of ethics, that it would not have convinced Hitler. But who ever supposed that it should? We do not prescribe logic as a treatment for lunacy, or expect philosophers to produce panaceas for psychopaths" (p. 165). I do not claim to know whether Hitler would have been convinced by Mr. Toulmin's account, though I see no reason why Hitler would not have found it quite congenial. The kind of view Mr. Toulmin proposes would serve quite admirably as a support for the perverted racial conception of morality advocated by Hitler. And Mr. Toulmin certainly does not show that all who are unconvinced by his account are psychopaths and lunatics.

(3) A further criticism of Mr. Toulmin's analysis is that he shares with a number of other contemporary philosophers of linguistic usage the presumption that, in ethics as in other matters, there is something describable as the "we" who operate with "criteria," and that the philosopher's task consists simply in reading off these criteria. What he fails to recognize is that there is not a single clearcut system or pattern of ethical reasoning. People differ about ultimate standards and methods of argument. (This of course is not to say that there are no grounds for distinguishing relative merits.) This disagreement in ethical reasoning was clearly recognized by Sidgwick who in his Methods of Ethics describes some of the chief methods used in arriving at moral judgments and decisions. Yet even Sidgwick realized that his account was not exhaustive, and he was particularly aware that the various methods could not be reduced to a single pattern of ethical reasoning which everyone explicitly or implicitly accepts and follows.

In contrast with Sidgwick, Mr. Toulmin selects one method

and treats it as the only one. Characteristically, he does not put this view forward as a theory. He merely tells us that this is how things are, and even this is presumably something we already knew. It is quite possible that the criteria for moral reasoning which he describes are those currently accepted among a certain class or group of people, e.g., those at Cambridge, or perhaps all Englishmen. It may even be that these have always been the accepted criteria for some people. Even then, Mr. Toulmin's insistence that his are the criteria of valid moral reasoning serves as a surreptitious support for forms of argument dominant in some quarters. Which of us is not familiar with the argument, "Everyone does so-and-so; therefore you ought to do it"?

Mr. Toulmin would have us believe that what he is describing is not limited to time or place or circumstances, vet it is by no means obvious that this is so, and he offers little evidence to sup-His account of ethical reasoning serves rather as a "persuasive definition" than as a description. While allegedly giving an account of the way in which people decide how to act, he in effect says that certain ways of deciding are to be used. This is particularly evident in passages such as the one in which he says we must ask, "What kinds of argument, of reasoning, is it proper for us to accept in support of moral decisions"? (p. 64, my italics). We see all through his account the shifting between simply describing the reasons people do accept and singling out certain reasons as those which they should accept. When he says we must discover "the kinds of thing that are relevant for one course of action or another," it is not clear whether he means those things which are commonly taken to be relevant or those which are really and properly relevant. Perhaps there is no distinction for him. In any case, his account of ethics is not merely meta-normative but is also, in its own way, normative.

(4) A "final" criticism of Mr. Toulmin's position is that, although he does not admit it, he fails to answer the question which all through the book he insists is the all-important one. He says of his book, "We have insisted, and insisted ad nauseam, that there is a distinction between good and bad reasoning in ethics" (p. 63). He claims to have been trying to give an "explicit answer to the question from which we set out: namely, 'What is

it, in an ethical discussion, that makes a reason a good reason, or an argument a valid argument'?" (p. 160). His chief criticism of traditional moral philosophers is that they have not answered this question.

In a sense, one might of course very well answer the second part of this question by saying that what makes a valid argument valid is that there are good reasons for the conclusion. But one can not likewise, without circularity, also say that what makes a reason a good reason is that it makes an argument valid. Mr. Toulmin's position is that the answer to the question, "What makes a good reason good"? depends entirely upon the kind of argument in which it occurs as a premise.

He certainly would have us believe, and perhaps himself believes, that his book will tell us what makes good reasons good in ethical arguments. Yet not only does he fail to accomplish this, but he goes so far as to say that the question cannot be answered. Of course, as we have seen, he does tell us what he takes to be the good reasons and the rules for ethical arguments. But he claims that if those who ask, "But what makes these reasons good"? mean to ask, "Why these reasons"? their question has no answer. One must simply reply that they are the rules relevant to moral reasoning. "The question what makes a reason a 'good' reason . . . can only be answered in terms of the reasons we do accept" (p. 101).

To this, three things may be said in reply. In the first place, if the question as to what makes good reasons good is an unanswerable one, it is disingenuous on the part of the author to criticize traditional moral philosophers for not having answered it. In the second place, it is certainly true that the traditional moral philosophers no less than Mr. Toulmin have discussed the question, "What makes right things right"? and those who are familiar with traditional ethical philosophy may judge who has most adequately described the reasons which are ordinarily regarded as good reasons for saying that a certain thing is the right thing to do. Finally, to the extent that Mr. Toulmin is making recommendations as to how one should decide what things are right, I am sure many besides this reader will find his recommendations unacceptable.

Like many of his contemporaries, Mr. Toulmin has a great deal to say about what can or cannot be said, what questions can or cannot be asked, etc.; and, like many others, he believes that such matters can be resolved simply by giving attention to the way in which language is ordinarily used. Yet, curiously, he insists that the moral philosopher need not concern himself with asking what it means to say that a certain thing is right. The philosopher can and need only describe the reasons ordinarily accepted in support of judgments that something is right.

Having considered Mr. Toulmin's attempt to carry out the program just mentioned, we may venture to suggest that at least some of his mistakes are due to his not having understood fully and correctly the meaning of such words as "right" and "duty," and the contexts and situations in which questions about what is right arise. Few would deny that there is room for empiricism in ethics, and many will agree with him that most moral philosophers have given insufficient attention to the contexts of moral reasoning. Yet Mr. Toulmin fails to carry out his empirical investigation thoroughly enough, and he goes to the unfortunate extreme of trying to exclude all consideration of the meaning of ethical terms from his analysis.

It may be that he is guilty of faulty observation which has given rise to bad description. Or it may be that he is deceived into thinking he does not have or propose an ethical theory, when he really does have and advocate one. In any case, he has not, it seems to me, accomplished the task which he imagines and claims to have done. Nor has he shown convincingly that all that philosophers need and can do is to record the stock uses of language as a cure for the disease that is philosophy.

University of Oregon.

NATURAL RIGHT AND HUMAN NATURE NATHANIEL LAWRENCE

I

Contemporary philosophy is distinguished by a remarkable degree of confusion about philosophical theories of the state, coupled with a widespread indifference to all such theories and the contests between them. To make matters more puzzling, there seems to be no decline in political commitment nor callousing of political sensitivity. To the extent that this paradoxical situation exists among otherwise responsible men, we may be led to suppose that one or more of the following convictions have shaped their thinking: (1) Value standards are autonomous with respect to one another and/or with respect to other philosophical standards; (2) Value standards are partially or wholly rooted in the emotional level of human nature, and this level is itself not open to philosophical evaluation but will yield to inquiry directed toward purely analytical description; (3) Value standards are impertinent to political matters, which are always settled on a field of contest where reason is at best an ancillary power.

All the above views are statements of or from the so-called emotive theory of value, or are closely related to that theory. Where causal primacy lies or whether all these theories and views are effects of a more deep-laid cause is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the common bonds between the various views are evident; the views themselves are prevalent. Any work which challenges the current subjective intuitionism in matters of "right," "good," and the like stands out in illuminated relief. Such a work is Natural Right and History by Leo Strauss.

The virtues of Professor Strauss's essay are many. His scholarship is extensive, the philosophical imagination rising from his scholarship is stimulatingly employed. His lively insight into the historical settings of political theories is relieved by a recog-

^{1 (}Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.)

nition of the non-historical elements in those theories. He shows a critical but undispirited awareness of the maladies in even the more reflective of our current political theories. Within this general framework of admiration and applause I should like to offer, in the remainder of this essay, two groups of remarks having to do with the further criticism of various features of Professor Strauss's book.

II

Natural Right and History is an expansion of six lectures given under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation in 1949. It incorporates portions of at least five previously-published essays in philosophical and other journals.

The organization of the essay is curious. The author announces his views at the outset, some of them surely subject to contest, moves on to an analysis of Weber as the diabolus ex machina in the distinction between value and fact, and then launches into a critical discussion of some principal figures in the classic and modern traditions of natural right; Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, Thomas Aguinas (though not extensively), Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke. Interlarded are glancing, briefer references to Machiavelli, Protagoras, Hooker, Montesquieu, Kant, Calvin, Descartes, and Hegel. discussion and evaluation of these men are complete, the book is ended. It terminates with the analysis of Burke. Although the essay is argumentative it has no conclusion. There is no return to original themes, no strengthening of the original argument in terms of the views examined. To be sure, Burke represents a synthesis of certain elements in both the classical and the "modern" theories of natural law, but it is clearly chronology that accounts for his terminal position. Perhaps Strauss calculatingly and Socratically leaves us to our own thoughts, now that his opinions have been initially made clear and have been echoed throughout the critical examination of theory which comprises the bulk of the book.

The topic of the essay is the development of the relationship between right and nature in the history of political theory. However, little can be said of natural right without considering what is meant by "nature." In the classical period natura and goods have the same ambiguity. They may refer to the essential characteristic or property of a thing, or to the "world." In theory the best society is that which takes into account human nature and which is designed to bring that nature to perfection or fulfillment. Little is said of what came later to loom so large in the minds of political theoreticians: the "state of nature." To be sure Socrates (in the Republic) concerns himself with the origins of society, first at the level of pastoral need and then at the level of inescapable luxury; and something like these same two steps are present in the development of society as Lucretius deals with it, but the so-called "state of nature" plays a minor role in these This ambiguity of goots and natura is hardly discernible in context but only in retrospect, from a platform of alien modern conviction. In context, men had a "nature": nature had a "nature." A certain teleology was characteristic of both, and for human nature within nature in general some things were bad, some good. The problem of the good society was to find the convention that satisfies the natural demand.

At least by the time of Hobbes the notion of a "state of nature" intrudes itself and the natural is identified with the sociologically primordial. Whether this primordium is an historical fact or an explicative myth hardly bears on the new notion of "nature." The advance of the mechanical conception of nature and the correlative withdrawal of teleology from the realm of nature left man on his own, so to speak. To be sure, the denatured man still is a creature of feeling and reason. But under the separation of value from fact, and the insistence upon reason as at best a legislative rather than a cognitive faculty, reason could hardly remain as a primary motivating factor. So feeling stands alone. And finally the denial or sharp qualification of the idea that human nature is essentially social in character leaves us with self-centered man responding to pleasure and pain, personal feeling. This extreme position is one closely approximated in the writings of Hobbes. To what extent can an ethic and a politics be founded on selfcentered man responding to the pulses and prospects of pleasure and pain?

The foregoing summary of the contrast between the classical

and modern theories of human nature are, to a considerable extent, expressive of my own prejudices. They define, however, the area within which Strauss's examination occurs, and perhaps at least caricature some of Professor Strauss's own criticisms. These latter are much more carefully drawn, of course, than the above brief remarks. Strauss's exposition is tempered by detailed modification of my simplified complaints, and the emphasis is also more on the actual structure of the best society as envisaged by the several theories. But the general outcome is the same, a criticism of the degeneration and fluctuation of modern theories of human nature and natural right.

As we are conducted through this emporium of portraits of human nature and political theory, several of Strauss's singular abilities emerge. His skill in the comparative anatomy and the phylogeny of ideas is striking. For instance, he exhibits the Epicurean prototype, shows how some of its essential features survive in Hobbes and are passed on in modified form to Locke and Rousseau, even-in a sense-to Burke. Thus the modern views are already incipiently present in the classical period, awaiting-as a major catalyst-the forthright declaration of the superpatriot Machiavelli. Through what is often dense, flat prose there appears the sparkle of disciplined imagination: e.g., an explanation of why it is so hard to speak of the explicit teaching of the sophists (p. 117), an account of the reason for and the inevitability of the Socratic "unfinishable quest" (p. 125), a clarification of why some of Plato's arguments approach the good from the side of the pleasant (p. 126), an assault on the supposition of Cicero's "egalitarianism" (p. 135), a discussion of the weakness in identifying society with civilization and then indexing the latter in terms of art forms (p. 138), a review of Cicero vs. Cicero in the Laws and On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination, to show, among other things, that Cicero's Stoic cloak hides an Academicskeptic's skin (pp. 154-56)² and a conclusion that in Hobbes "Death takes the place of the telos" (p. 181).

² The problem here discussed, incidentally, is reminiscent of a similar problem with respect to where the author's sympathy lies, in the closing lines of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.

This very deftness leads Strauss into a few headlong assertions which will surely bring contest from other scholars. claim that all natural right is, on Aristotle's view, changeable (p. 157), should provoke interesting reactions in some quarters. More than one evebrow should be raised at the assertion that the tradition of the last three centuries regards "common sense" as a "hybrid, begotten by the absolutely subjective world of the individual's sensations and the truly objective world progressively discovered by science" (p. 78). Perhaps only questions of definition will be raised by the following, but I doubt it: "... we have to note first that the only thematic treatment of natural right which is certainly by Aristotle and which certainly expresses Aristotle's own views covers barely one page of the Nicomachean Ethics" (p. 156). Christian apologists may find the remark that "there is, then, no knowledge of natural right as such in the Old Testament" (p. 81) a bit myopic. And for sheer cavalier haste: "Why do the Hindus believe in their karma doctrine if not because they know that otherwise their caste system would be indefensible?" (p. 130). Finally, one should suppose that the primacy of Greek thought with respect to western philosophy is sufficiently doubtful so that when it is asserted it is also defended (see p. 82). As items in a public lecture given to an uncritical audience, such assertions deserve rebuke, the more because they are little needed in the essential structure of the argument. As features of a book to be read by reasonably cautious readers they are no more than interesting points for debate. With this sampling of ideas, some stimulating and some dubious, we must turn from the main body

No documentation is given in the text.

A first glance would lead one to suppose that this statement is ironical, but its context shows it to be quite innocent. Prima facie it is likely that any such statement commits the fallacy of simple causation, and indeed Strauss's exposition is marred by a wavering tendency toward this fallacy. Moreover the traditional establishment of the castes by Brahma, the relatively late introduction of the doctrine of reincarnation, and the conviction that "pleasant conduct" here will lead to reincarnation in any of the several castes do not seem to give the statement much support. See Brihad-Aranyake Upanishad 1.4.11, Chandogya Upanishad 5.3 and 5.10.7; tr. by R. E. Hume in The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (Oxford, 1921, 1931).

of the text to the first third of the essay, where lies the main concentration of the author's systematic remarks implicated with a shrewd criticism of Weber and some initial remarks on classical political theory.

Professor Strauss's polemic strength in Natural Right and History is directed toward a defense of the classical conception of natural law, including some of the unpopular results of that conception: "Prospero's rule over Caliban is by nature just. Justice and coercion are not mutually exclusive: in fact, it is not altogether wrong to describe justice as a kind of benevolent coercion. Justice and virtue in general are necessarily a kind of power" (p. 133). His polemic effectiveness lies in showing what is in one sense the central theme of the essay: that "historicism"-roughly that theory which finds all human thought essentially shaped by its historical context from which it can not disengage itself—has "politicized" philosophy, changed it from the "humanizing quest for the eternal order" to "a weapon and hence an instrument" (see chap. I, esp. pp. 33-34). Hence natural law in classic times is more concerned with the nature of the cosmos and human nature. whereas in modern times it seems more involved with the relation between natural right and positive law. This simplification should be taken with a small grain of salt, I think; in Athens there were axes to grind, even among the intellectuals. Nevertheless, the distinction is not only useful but penetrating.

Somewhere, in any theory of how human beings ought to be governed and why, implicitly or explicitly a theory of man and his nature must make its appearance. When Strauss lays bare the elements of the "modern" theories of human nature he is, as a critic, at his best. As well as the monologue form allows, the method is socratic. It can be rendered more so by attaching to each exposure the question, "Is this man as you know him, both in yourself and in others?" For my part I do not see how acquiescence is possible unless the responder is willing to settle for any caricature of human nature, if only the questions about it can be silenced. In the event that the caricatures are accepted, the only further remark must be something like, "Very well, see if you can live with the consequences."

The last two-thirds of Natural Right and History concerns

itself solidly, if not primarily, with the exposure of the effects of historicism as it replaces classicism. The weakest part of the book lies in the first third, alas, and may deter many a reader from going further. We must now see what the weaknesses are.

Ш

The devices used by Strauss against the nonclassical theories of the "best regime" include the tu quoque and dichotomy with reductio ad absurdum of one part. Now these are among the most slippery of all argumentative weapons. The tu quoque has a small handle which is very hard to grasp and a large blade with sharp edges. If you reach for the tu quoque in a bad light, you may get cut. Dichotomy always runs the risk of being either not exhaustive or not exclusive. Metaphorically, its defects are opposed to those of the tu quoque: the dichotomy may turn out to be dull, crushing what it proposes to divide, or not cutting deeply enough. I shall consider some examples of arguments resting on these types of arguments, and one or two others as well:

(a) I shall consider first some arguments regarding "historicism."

If principles are sufficiently justified by the fact that they are accepted by a society, the principles of cannibalism are as defensible or sound as those of civilized life. . . . If there is no standard higher . . . than the ideal of our society, we are utterly unable to take a critical distance from that ideal. But the mere fact that we can raise the question of the worth of the ideal of our society shows that there is something in man that is not altogether in slavery to his society, and therefore we are able, and hence obliged, to look for a standard with reference to which we can judge of the ideals of our own as well as of any other society. That standard cannot be found in the needs of the various societies, for the societies and their parts have many needs that conflict with one another: the problem of priorities arises. This problem cannot be solved in a rational manner if we do not have a standard with reference to which we can distinguish between genuine needs and fancied needs and discern the hierarchy of the various types of genuine needs. The problem posed by the conflicting needs of society cannot be solved if we do not possess knowledge of natural right. (p. 3)*

⁵ An additional question might be asked of this passage with regard

The same point is made more succinctly on the previous page: "To reject natural right is tantamount to saving that all right is positive right. . . . " But why should this be a genuine dichotomy? Think how easily the opponent of classic natural right might claim as a third alternative: "We experience either possible or actual discontent, for essentially idiosyncratic—though conceivably popular-reasons, with some regime; we then dignify the resentment, applying such terms as 'unjust,' 'immoral' etc., to it. We give our personal feelings objective construction and then hope for the best-namely, plausibility." Answers of this sort are traditional, at least since the time of Hume. But suppose such remarks could be hounded as Socrates hounded Thrasymachus' on similar matters, then consider some such answer as this: "States arise through convention and contract; within the conventional conception of the state the aim of security is never fully realized and thus the hope for a superstate, a world state, or what have you, arises. This state is then envisaged as the ideal which will fulfill the task of security. One can then have the point of view of the would-be citizen of the supersociety (as in the case of the Marxist)." which reveals all existing social orders as defective. The whole conception of the law and of justice, that is to say, may still be one of convention founded on necessity." In short, those conditions which lead us to a critical evaluation of the norms of our own society, may indeed be independent of that particular society, but not at all separate from society generally, or from the great historical currents. Strauss's use of dichotomy here is at best suggestive. Regarded as coercive for his argument, it may be escaped by the above and other devices.

(b) Let us now turn our attention to a familiar form of the tu quoque. "Historicism asserts that all human thoughts or beliefs are historical, and hence deservedly destined to perish; but historicism itself is a human thought; hence historicism can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot be simply true. To assert the historicist thesis means to doubt it and thus to transcend

to "... we are able and hence obliged..." Where is the indicated sequitur?

[&]quot; The Marxist would, of course, not allow the word "state" here.

it" (p. 25; cf. bottom of p. 24 and p. 19 also). But Strauss himself later recognizes that by introducing the conception of "an absolute moment in the historical process . . . in which the essential character of all thought becomes transparent"7 historicism evades this difficulty. His rejoinder to this is that in that case philosophy is absurd (pp. 29-30). But this is exactly what historicism claims. Strauss's honesty leads him to admit of this position that until "the most elementary premises of philosophy" are reconsidered "the issue of natural right can only remain an open question" (p. 31). His parting shot in the matter is an appeal to "simple experiences regarding right and wrong which are at the bottom of the philosophic contention that there is a natural right. Historicism either ignores or else distorts these experiences" (pp. 31-32). This type of defense, while perhaps the only one ultimately possible, if left in its adumbrated form may be regarded as just another inarticulate intuitionism.

In any event the tu quoque has proved to be a hard weapon to wield. The whole problem, insofar as it turns on the tu quoque, might be simplified considerably. Suppose we put the historicist position this way: Political thought is shaped by history; the problems of polity, and their solutions, arise only within the framework of historical influence. However, this judgment is not itself a part of political thought and hence does not apply to itself. It may be stated as a rule arrived at through a consideration of experience but it is no more the historical product of that experience than the multiplication table is the outcome of our experience with the countability of numerically grouped objects. It is, moreover, a rule expressing the limits of certainty among certain types of value judgment having to do with social relationships, but does not itself suggest any social prescription. Its function is disciplinary, but not evaluative. Such a formulation does away with the quasi-mystical conception of a "moment." and thereby actually is closer to the more usual contemporary anti-classical conviction. I do not know how this argument can be turned aside unless it is through lengthy con-

⁷ P. 28. He says (p. 29) that here historicism thus "surreptitiously" follows Hegel.

sideration of the a priori and the empirical. At the same time Strauss's presentation suggests at least this: A strictly empirical justification for such a rule can hardly be profitably sought. It must be said in fairness to Strauss, that it seems possible that the essentially continuing character of this problem is responsible for the odd organization of this book, in which there is an ending, but no conclusion.

The analysis of Weber provides other examples in which (oftentimes desirable) conclusions are reached by assailable argument or by claims posing as argument.

(a) Consider, for instance, the claim that "If philosophy in general is possible, political philosophy in particular is possible" (p. 35). Among the more printable retorts, one might hear, "On such grounds I might argue that because mathematics is possible, a mathematics of aesthetic value is possible; or because morality in general is possible, a morality of kite-flying is possible." Such comments are, alas, well-founded. Strauss's claim is spurious if it feigns logical strength. What follows the claim (q.v.) provides no material evidence, in default of formal validity. As the assertion stands, it simply commits the fallacy of division.

(b) The statement that "... assuming the Calvinist theology were a bad thing, its corruption was a good thing" seems to be a remarkable instance of dichotomy. At the expense of confessing ignorance of the issue at stake, I submit what seem to be analogous arguments: "The spread of state socialism through extension of governmental bureaus is a bad thing; corruption of these bureaus (or this socialism, to be more exact) is a good thing," or "The FBI and CIA practice of investigation in the lives of private citizens is a bad thing; corruption of these practices (or the theology which underlies their activities) is a good

⁸ Another of Strauss's statements seems to suffer from the same difficulty: "The strife-torn world demands a strife-torn individual" (p. 65). Here the context lends some justification, however.

[&]quot;See pp. 59 ff. The context is one in which, indeed, Strauss is reviewing Weber's view of Calvinism. But the particular statement under scrutiny is one in which Strauss exhibits what Weber should have said, and in which Strauss evidently—through silence, if by no other means—underwrites the type of reasoning employed.

thing." And consider the alarming similarity to "Communism is a bad thing; efforts which defeat or corrupt Communism are good efforts."

(c) Finally, there are arguments like the following:

It seems then, that what Weber really meant by his rejection of value judgments would have to be expressed as follows: The objects of the social sciences are constituted by reference to values. Reference to values presupposes appreciation of values. Such appreciation enables and forces the social scientist to evaluate the social phenomena, i.e., to distinguish between the genuine and the spurious and between the higher and the lower: between genuine religion and spurious religion, between genuine leaders and charlatans, between knowledge and mere lore or sophistry, between virtue and vice, between moral sensitivity and moral obtuseness, between art and trash, between vitality and degeneracy, etc. Reference to values is incompatible with neutrality; it can never be "purely theoretical" (pp. 63-64).

For sociological purposes, Weber or his aficionados would insist, reference to values does not presuppose appreciation of values. The dainty Bantu miss may mutilate her lips in a way that seems to me either comic or disgusting. As a sociologist I may, nevertheless, be compelled to recognize the value which her Bantu Brummel finds in the result. Recognition that a value or a standard of values is significant within the structure of a society clearly does not entail my critical involvement in those values. I may be so unassimilated to the society in question that, while recognizing that elegance of mutilation is the ideal, I am wholly incapable of appreciating or even discerning that elegance.

IV

Professor Strauss's often strong defence of the classical conception of natural law is marred by an implicit agreement with a proposition assumed by the opposition: namely, that the spirit of the classical view is inseparable from its formulation. Professor Strauss is occasionally at some pains specifically to deny commitment to this proposition (see pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, the tone of his remarks frequently suggests that he is so committed. The presumed genuiness of the dichotomy, "natural right/positive right," mentioned above, is an obvious case in point. In general,

Strauss's sensitive awareness of the incorporated values of traditional views leads him into an infatuation with the articles of incorporation.

More self-recommending dichotomies than "natural right/ positive right" have had to be discarded. For instance, the claim "the ether is a fluid or the ether is not a fluid" might as well have become the darling of the semanticists as have propositions about the present king of France. The case of the "ether" brings up an obvious point, however. The men who pursued the properties of the ether chased a will-o'-the-wisp. But their vanishing target was a construct founded on a legitimate speculation. When "the ether" collapsed, the need for accounting for the factors which led to its construction became more urgent, not less so. An analogous situation occurs in the history of "natural right." The variations of that theory depend, more or less explicitly, on a theory of human nature. Classically, theories of human nature are also involved with theories of natural law. It would seem difficult to reinstate, or strictly to defend, any of these theories. to just the extent that we accept the thesis of the evolutionary descent of man, for instance. Classical "natural law" and modern "natural right" are both founded on sets of principles which include the phylogenetic isolation of man from other beings. Rather than trying to reinstate these doctrines of "nature" as we can identify them historically, it seems to me, we should do better to investigate what justification, if any, underlies the conviction that moral insight and the sense of obligation are not merely shaped by political and social conditions. The defence of a dead dogma is but little honor to the insight that gave rise to it.

For those who can shelve the running objections to this theme which Professor Strauss often makes unnecessarily vulnerable, his book will be a valuable new glance at familiar theories. There is profit to be sifted from his critical remarks, as well. There is weakness, however, to be noted in some of the arguments which he employs, and a conservatism about the *nature* of the problems he investigates, which will make his work seem pointless to impatient readers.

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MARITAIN IN HIS ROLE AS AESTHETICIAN NATHAN A. SCOTT JR.

Many years ago Santayana, in his famous essay on "Penitential Art," suggested that the modern period in art is a "lenten" period, in which art is laboriously seeking to recover a purity and an innocence that were lost during the long years of the post-Renaissance experiment in the making of veristic, discursive, reproductive forms of poetry and painting. How vain, said Santayana, modern art is now telling itself

was the attempt to depict or beautify external objects... Nature has the urgency of life, which art cannot rival... What is that to the spirit? Let it confess its own impotence in that field, and abandon all attempts to observe or preserve what are called things: let it devote itself instead... to purifying its sensibility, which is after all what nature plays upon when she seems to us beautiful. Perhaps in that way spirit may abstract the gold of beauty and cast the dross away—all that allow of preoccupation with material forms and external events and moral sentiments.... It was an evil obsession with alien things that dragged sensibility into a slavery to things which stifled and degraded it: salvation lies in emancipating the medium.

And it was, indeed, the desire to emancipate the medium that provided the generative impulse for all those revolutionary movements in the arts in the latter half of the last century that gave to the beginning of our period its exciting modernity. In poetry it gained expression in the l'art pour l'art aesthetic of the Parnassians, and ultimately in Mallarmé's poésie pure. In music it gained expression in the school of Debussy whose members created audible worlds as self-enclosed as a poem of Mallarmé; and later on it gained new realizations in the work of Schoenberg and Satie, Bartok and Stravinsky. And in painting it gained expression in the new abstractionist practice of the line of artists descending from Cézanne and Seurat through the Paris fauves to the Cubists and their heirs. In every area of the ferment that was taking place what gave unity to the period's style was the boldness and determination with which the artist sought to purify his medium:

so that, in a way, the destinies of all the arts converged in one, as the modern artist, seized by a fit of introspection, courageously undertook to reduce his art—whether poetry or painting or music—to its own pure, formal laws.

In his earlier essay in aesthetics—after lengthily disposing of a number of Aristotelian-Thomist distinctions between the speculative order and the practical order, between the "useful" arts and the "fine" arts, and so on-M. Maritain, in the most interesting passages of Art and Scholasticism, concerned himself with this astonishing "growth of self-consciousness" in the modern artist.1 And what chiefly occupied him was the thought that, in submitting to the idea of making art out of the idea of art, the artist might become so fascinated with technique and so estranged from the existential world of nature and the universe of man that he should forget that, unlike God, he cannot create ex nihilo. He wanted, then, to confront him with the futility of claiming any kind of aseity for his art, for pure art, he said, "involves nothing, the subject being completely whittled away. I call that a sin of idealism in relation to the matter of art: pushed to the extreme, a perfect building, with nothing to build." The idea of making poetry out of the idea of poetry or painting out of the idea of painting can, in other words, never yield anything but sterility, since the kind of "metaphysical vastness" that characterizes greatness in the arts has always been a result of vital transactions between the creative Self and the universes of Being. And for the poet or the painter to seek to allay the kind of "eucharistic passion" that arises at the very center of the artistic process is for him to run the risk of suicide, since it is for him to isolate his art from everything that is not "its own peculiar rules of operation." There is one long and wonderful sentence in which the lesson is summed up, as M. Maritain says that he would remind modern art that

being of man, it can no more fence itself off from things than he; that being in man, art always ends by confessing in some way the weaknesses of man; and that in devouring the substance of the artist and the passions, the desires, the speculative and moral virtues which make it truly human, it is also devouring its own subject of

¹ Art and Scholasticism, tr. by J. F. Scanlan (New York, 1943).

inherence; that being in a way for man—if not in itself, at any rate so far as regards the use to which it is put—it will in the end decay if it rejects either the constraints and limitations required from without by the good of man or the service of our common culture, which requires it to make itself intelligible, accessible, open, to shoulder the burden of the inheritance of reason and wisdom by which we live. . . .

This was his message to the artist of our period in Art and Scholasticism, and thus it is not surprising that the names that figured most prominently in it were the names of Rimbaud and Mallarmé, of Gide and Cocteau, of Valéry and Picasso and Breton.

Now it is this sensitive understanding of the predicament of the modern artist that forms the basis in his latest book for a more highly generalized theory of art.2 One might well have supposed, of course, prior to the appearance of the present volume, that M. Maritain's major work—Art and Scholasticism (1920), Degrees of Knowledge (1932), Preface to Metaphysics (1934), Science and Wisdom (1935), True Humanism (1936), Ransoming the Time (1941), and Education at the Crossroads (1943)—was behind him. But in this monumental book on art and the nature of poetic knowledge which the Pantheon Press has recently published with such remarkable beauty and elegance, he reveals that, in preparing to deliver the initial series of the A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, he made one of the supreme intellectual efforts of his life, to state as rigorously and systematically as possible his full understanding of the artistic process. And the result is a magnificent volume that deserves to stand alongside the really great essays in theory of art of this century, alongside such books as Croce's Estetica, Roger Fry's Vision and Design, Worringer's Abstraktion und Einfühlung, Malraux's Les Voix du Silence, and Susanne Langer's Feeling and Form.

What, in effect, M. Maritain does is to suggest the possibility of our understanding modern art more profoundly in terms of a

² Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953). References to this work will be indicated by page numbers in parentheses in the text.

revision of the aesthetic premises which the distinctively modern practice in the arts has fostered; and this revision and correction of the conventional rationale for modern art practice then becomes itself the basis for a general aesthetic.

The fundamental doctrine upon which the Mellon Lectures are based is that art has its real source not in operation, as modern aestheticians have so frequently supposed, but in a "knowledge of the very interiority of things" which proceeds from a deep "spiritual communion with being." For art does not come into existence until things have resounded in the poet so deeply that both they and he are enabled, at a single awakening, to "come forth together out of sleep." What is required is that the poet should permit himself to be invaded by the reality of the objective world and should himself seek to invade the deepest recesses of his own subjectivity— the two movements of the spirit being performed together, as though one, "in a moment of affective union." When the soul thus comes into profound spiritual contact with itself and when it also enters into the silent and mysterious depths of Being, it is brought back to "the single root" of its powers, "where the entire subjectivity is, as it were, gathered in a state of expectation and virtual creativity" (239). And the whole experience becomes "a state of obscure . . . and sapid knowing" (ibid.). Then "after the silent gathering a breath arises, coming not from the outside, but from the center of the soul—sometimes a breath which is almost imperceptible, but compelling and powerful, through which everything is given in easiness and happy expansion; sometimes a gale bursting all of a sudden, through which everything is given in violence and rapture; sometimes the gift of the beginning of a song; sometimes an outburst of unstoppable words" (243). And only when this point in the artistic process has been reached may operation begin. For the artist to initiate the processes of operation at any earlier point is for him "to put the instrumental and secondary before the principal and primary, and to search for an escape through the discovery of a new external approach and new technical revolutions, instead of passing first through the creative source . . ." (223). Then, what is produced is but "a corpse of a work of art—a product of academicism" (63). "If creative intuition is lacking, a work can be perfectly made, and it is nothing; the artist has nothing to say. If creative intuition is present, and passes, to some extent, into the work, the work exists and speaks to us, even if it is imperfectly made and proceeds from a man who has the habit of art and a hand which shakes" (60).

M. Maritain, it should be immediately said, is not seeking to reinstate any sort of enervated, sentimentalist romanticism: he is not asking the modern poet to cultivate "transports" and rapture" and "delirium" and "frenzy," for these, he recognizes, may often "proceed . . . from spurious sources. The real blessing is poetic intuition, and not any kind of thrill" (244). And he would have us remember, the austerity of modern poetics notwithstanding, that "Nothing is more real, and more necessary to poetry, and to any great work, than inspiration" (243).

Inspiration requires, of course, "the rational toil of the virtue of art and all the logic and shrewdness, self-restraint and selfpossession of working intelligence" (246). For art, as Maritain the good Thomist likes to say, is "a virtue of the practical intellect—that particular virtue of the practical intellect which deals with the creation of objects to be made" (49). And thus there is an essential relationship between art and reason, for reason discovers the rules by means of which the work—whether it be a poem or a still life or a sonata—may be successfully brought into existence. The rules are not, of course, "ready-made recipes, taught by professors in schools and museums, but vital ways of operating discovered by the creative eyes of the intellect in its very labor of invention" (53-54). And when art refuses to live in a climate of reflective intelligence—when it worships ignorance and rudeness-it is, Professor Maritain says, a sign of weakness. But the reason and the calculation that are in the poet, he declares, "are there only to handle fire" (218), and to grant them anything more than this purely instrumental function, simply for the sake of adherence to a puritanical formalism and a spurious austerity, is to be guilty of a gratuitous dogmatism.

At "the single root" of the poetic process, then, there is a profound act of creative intuition or an act of cognition through connaturality that tends to express itself in a work of art (the poem or painting playing "the part played in ordinary knowledge by the concepts and judgments produced within the mind" [118]). And in this cognitive act the soul "suffers things more than it learns them," experiencing them "through resonance in subjectivity." The thing that is cognitively grasped is simply "some singular existent," "some complex of concrete and individual reality, seized in the violence of its sudden self-assertion and in the total unicity" (126) that is constituted by "all the other realities which echo in this existent, and which it conveys in the manner of a sign" (ibid.). Thus it is, says Professor Maritain, that poetry is, as Aristotle said, more philosophic than history—not, however, "with respect to its mode or manner of knowing, for this mode is altogether existential, and the thing grasped is grasped as nonconceptualizable. But with respect to the very thing grasped, which is not a contingent thing in the mere fact of its existence, but in its infinite openness to the riches of being, and as a sign of it" (ibid.). Yet-though what is most immediate in the dynamic process of poetic intuition is "the experience of the things of the world, because it is natural to the human soul to know things before knowing itself" (127-128)-"what is most principal is the experience of the Self-because it is in the awakening of subjectivity to itself that emotion received in the translucid night of the free life of the intellect is made intentional and intuitive, or the determining means of a knowledge through congeniality" (128).

But how is the creative intuition of the poet incarnated or internalized in a work of art? It is upon this question that many of Professor Maritain's finest pages are based, and this phase of his argument deserves careful recapitulation. He begins in the VIIIth chapter of the present volume by noting that the presence of poetic experience within the soul first manifests itself by "a kind of musical stir, of unformulated song, with no words, no sounds, absolutely inaudible to the ear, audible only to the heart..." (301). This stir is produced by waves stirred up in the preconscious life of the intellect by the experience of poetic intuition, and he calls these waves or dynamic imaginal and emotional charges intuitive pulsions. The "moving continuity" between these pulsions is "a kind of melody." These pulsions expand as the poetic intuition expands; and with this expansion

"explicit images awaken, more distinct emotions resound in the fundamental emotion"—till the enlarged musical stir produces a music that emerges into consciousness and the poet is brought to the point of being ready to begin operative exercise. At this point the process of expression begins, and the poet becomes attentive not only to the music of intuitive pulsions but also to all the words which begin to emerge from the unconscious, taking up for use those which are consonant with the original intuition and casting aside all those which are not. In this second stage—the stage in which poetic intuition begins to be objectivized—creative intelligence is "at play as working reason, accomplishing a properly so-called artistic task, applying the secondary rules of making, taking care of the arrangement of words, weighing and testing everything. Here all the patience and accuracy, all the virtues of craftsmanship are involved, and intelligence works and works again, takes up the task anew, uses all that it knows, displays the most active sagaciousness to be true to its own superior passivity. to the individual inspiring actuation received—poetic intuition and wordless meaning or melody—to which it does not cease listening" (305-306).

Now, as creative intuition is disengaged from the obscure night of the poet's subjectivity and gains its proper incarnation in poetic theme and in "the fertile mathematic" of poetic form, how is the resultant poem to be perceived by the one who reads it? What is the mode of its action upon those of us who receive it? What is conveyed to the reader? Here, in his careful handling of this issue, M. Maritain's thinking proceeds along lines which many of our ablest critics and aestheticians have taken in recent years, and thus, since he comes out of a tradition of thought in many ways very much different from theirs, this convergence of doctrine takes on an especial interest. Professor Cleanth Brooks. for example, in his book The Well Wrought Urn, has raised the question, "What Does Poetry Communicate"? And in the essay in which he takes this question up through a close inspection of Herrick's poem "Corinna's going a-Maying," he argues with great force that the question as to what poetry communicates is itself wrongly put, since it suggests that the poet is precisely what he is not—namely, an expositor who conveys a hard core of rational

discourse "poetically," embellishing an idea or set of ideas with certain appropriate decorations. When we closely examine our experience of the successful poem, Professor Brooks insists, we discover that the poet is not a communicator or an expositor but a maker who "explores, consolidates, and forms' the total experience that is the poem"—and an experience into which the poem itself carries us further and further in a process of exploration. What the poet gives us is not a set of easily manageable abstractions that are separable from their poetic form by way of paraphrase but, rather, an experience that is incarnated in the radical unicity of a poetic structure which is itself "the only medium that communicates the particular 'what' that is communicated." And by structure Professor Brooks does not mean form "in the conventional sense in which we think of form as a kind of envelope which 'contains' the 'content.'" By structure he means the "structure of meanings, evaluations, and interpretations," "the pattern of resolved stresses," the "pattern of resolutions and balances and harmonizations" in which the actual life of the poem so completely consists that, in answer to the question as to what poetry communicates, we are brought round to "this graceless bit of tautology: the poem says what the poem says." The poet, that is to say, explores and consolidates a given experience in his poem, and what we are given is not a set of paraphrasable abstractions but the unity of the experience itself— in which we can share, if we are willing to engage in the kind of strenuous imaginative prehension demanded by the special sort of object that a poem is.

Now, in his handling of this question as to what is transmitted by the poem to the reader, M. Maritain shows himself to be in fundamental agreement with Professor Brooks and, indeed, with many of the most serious literary theorists of our period. He begins by observing that "the poem is essentially an end, not a means. An end as a new creature engendered in beauty; not a means as a vehicle of communication" (306). And whatever communication is achieved is "an effect of superabundance, terribly important for the poet, for he is a man, but additional with respect to the prime essential requirement of poetry" (301). For the prime essential requirement of poetry is to convey not "a piece

of information" but "the same poetic intuition which was in the soul of the poet: not precisely as creative, but as cognitive, both of the subjectivity of the poet and of a flash of reality echoing the world" (ibid.). M. Maritain does not, of course, mean here that it is the task of the reader and the critic to enter into the subjectivity of the poet: what he wants to insist upon (and it is very close to Professor Brooks' contention) is that a genuine experience of poetry involves "a participation in the poetic knowledge and poetic intuition through which the poet has perceived a certain unique mystery in the mystery of the world" (309). The poem exposes us to the "flash of reality" originally grasped by the intuitive emotion of the poet: what is communicated, if communication is to be spoken of at all, is (to use Professor Brooks' words) this "experience," formed and consolidated in poetic structure. Or, to use M. Maritain's words, the reader is brought back to the music of the poet's intuitive pulsions by the music of his language, and thus he is enabled not to enter into the poet's subjectivity but to see, to know something of what the poet saw and knows. What we receive, in other words, finally, is an intel-"We receive a transient and incomparable knowing, lectual gift. a vision, a fleeting revelation." But though the poet bestows an intellectual gift upon us, the royal law of poetic expression is not "the law of rational and logical connections, it is the law of the inner connections between intuitive pulsions, and of the unconceptualized intelligibility of which the images quickened by poetic intuition are the vehicles" (315).

The argument of this latest and perhaps most important book of M. Maritain is very long and is enormously complicated by all sorts of fascinating subtleties which cannot be suggested by any such bald summary as this. But here, at any rate, are the broad contours of his account of the poetic process, as it originates in those pulsions of the spirit by which the moment of creative intuition first makes itself felt in the poet's psyche and as it terminates in the internalization of the music of those pulsions in the poem through the agency of the poem's inner melody or poetic sense, its theme, and its harmonic structure (which are "the three epiphanies of poetic intuition" or the three modes of its passage into the work of art).

One phase of his analysis remains, however, to be touched upon, and this is that which grows out of his inquiry into the guestion concerning the relevance of the concept of beauty to the completed product of the poetic process. He is, of course, aware how generally today discussions of beauty in aesthetics are regarded as unforgivably anachronistic, but he is himself unwilling to submit to this current prejudice, for he believes that the idea of beauty must always be a salient notion in the philosophy of art. Indeed, M. Maritain desires to enlarge the traditional catalogue of transcendentalia in Scholastic philosophy (ens, res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum) by the addition of a seventh, pulchrum—a procedure which he feels in no way to be really a modification of the tradition, since his reading of St. Thomas confirms him in his conviction that this was really the view of Aguinas also, who, for some reason or other which remains obscure, failed to make it clear. But M. Maritain himself wants unequivocally to insist upon beauty's being accorded this high status, for he believes that it-like Unity, like Truth, like Goodness-is as infinite as Being-itself. And he means, I think, that in so far as all things that exist participate in the power of Being-itself and resist the threat of Non-being, to that extent they show forth fullness of Being which is integrity, order-and-unity which is consonance, and the kind of light that causes the intelligence to see which is radiance: that is to say, they show forth beauty. "Thus, just as everything is in its own way, and is good in its own way, so everything is beautiful in its own way. And just as being is present everywhere, and everywhere diversified, so beauty spills over or spreads everywhere, and is everywhere diversified" (163). Thus it is, in Professor Maritain's view, that beauty, in transcending every genus and category and in permeating or imbuing everything, shows itself really to belong in the realm of transcendentals.

But transcendental beauty is not the beauty that our senses perceive, and since this is the beauty upon which the issues of aesthetics focus, M. Maritain feels obliged to introduce, by way of contrast, the idea of aesthetic beauty which is, he argues, "a particular determination of transcendental beauty it is transcendental beauty as confronting not simply the intellect, but the intellect

and the sense acting together in one single act; say, it is transcendental beauty confronting the sense as imbued with intelligence, or intellection as engaged in sense perception" (164). His question is, then: what is the significance of the concept of aesthetic beauty for the philosophy of art?

In order to understand the circle of definition that M. Maritain draws around this problem, we must recall that, in his view, art (and here I mean what he means by the "fine" arts as opposed to the "useful" arts) originates in Poetry—that is, in "that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a kind of divination" (3). And the distinctive thing about Poetry, in contrast to Science and Art (i.e. in the sense of productive action, factibile), he argues, is that in it the creativity of the spirit is entirely free, since there is nothing towards which it must tend in order to be specified and formed; whereas, in Science "the creative function of the intellect is entirely subordinate to its cognitive function," the object being to "conquer" Being by concepts and judgments and reasonings; and in Art the creativity of the spirit is entirely subordinate to the work which is to be made. But in Poetry it is wholly free: vet, even so, it cannot help tending "toward that in which the intellect has its ultimate exultation," toward "that which causes the pleasure or delight of the intellect" (170). And thus it is that beauty, though not the object of Poetry, as conceptualization and "cognitivity" are the objects of Science, is yet its necessary correlative and what M. Maritain calls the "end beyond any end" of Poetry.

Now Poetry is the motive power of art, since poetic intuition yearns for expression of itself, and this expression must necessarily be something made: so "Poetry is committed to the productive activity of art . . ." (171). And though the artist does not set out to produce a beautiful work but only a good work, he, nevertheless, does in fact engender in beauty in so far as his art is moved and quickened by the grace of Poetry. Beauty, then, is not something to be produced by the artist but is rather something "to be loved, and mirrored in the work." M. Maritain, with his customary penetration, sees, of course, the danger here, for once the artist became—as he did become with the advent of Roman-

ticism—"a priest performing the rites of beauty, it was difficult for him not to adore beauty. And once beauty was made into a goddess, it was difficult for the artist, when later on he continued advancing in self-awareness and in the discovery of his own spiritual powers, not to quarrel with the goddess, and sometimes to be fed up with her, and sometimes to break with beauty, or keep house with beauty only grudgingly and spitefully, because he had fallen in love with some foreign seducer, closer to man than to art" (176). And herein M. Maritain locates the spiritual predicament of the modern artist, to the discussion of which many of his most brilliant pages in the Vth and VIth chapters are devoted.

This, then, is the doctrinal scheme of Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, which is marvellously buttressed by an enormous body of cogent reference to the history of literature and painting and music. One puts the book down, indeed, with a sense of bafflement at how a philosopher who for over thirty years has kept so busy with the subject matter of his field could have found the time to achieve such immense erudition in the arts. And one is also struck by the thoroughness with which M. Maritain, in the years since he has been in residence in this country, has studied the literature of contemporary American criticism: the names of men like R. P. Blackmur, Kenneth Burke, John Crowe Ransom, Francis Fergusson, and Allen Tate frequently figure in his discussions. There are, to be sure, occasions when one questions the validity of particular judgments—as when, for example, together with the canvases of Cézanne and Rouault and Braque, he mentions those of Henri Rousseau and Chagall as belonging to that body of work which gives us the "feeling that we are in the presence of an exceptionally great epoch"—and then ranks, below Rousseau and Chagall, Paul Klee as being among the "less resounding names." And one may also find it a little curious that Arthur Lourié should be regarded as providing us with "the greatest example in contemporary music" of profundity, of "creative inspiration." Yet, despite these occasional eccentricities, the book displays, on the whole, an elegance and sureness of taste that mark M. Maritain's as what is unquestionably the finest aesthetic sensibility among the major figures of modern philosophy.

There are, it is true, occasional unclarities—which may themselves, though, be less a consequence of fundamental obscurities of thought than they are of the labyrinthic involutions of the rhetoric which at times tends to run away with itself. finally, the book shows itself to be the kind of triumph with which the critic can never be altogether at ease; for he is most at home with failure or at least with what is only partially successful. And in the presence of complete success—which is what I think this book, taken in the frame of its own premises and presuppositions, represents— he can only admire the patience with which the project was conceived: he can only notice the various details and admire the skill with which they have been joined together and remind himself that no list of them will ever be equivalent to the whole of which they are parts. Then if, as is true in this instance, the architectonic splendor of the book is matched by its power to organize and illumine that which is outside itself—in this case. the life of art—we have, indeed, received a benediction for which we may well be grateful.

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BIDNEY'S HUMANISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY LEON J. GOLDSTEIN

The ultimate goal of scientific or "nomothetic" anthropology is to provide theoretical accounts for various kinds of socio-cultural phenomena. Such an anthropology is concerned with the way in which the particular characteristics of the various systems of culture develop and change. In pursuit of this end anthropologists have come to recognize that by and large all members of the human race, irrespective of what culture they are members or bearers, share the same bio-psychological human characteristics. To emphasize this fact serves no theoretical purpose of scientific anthropology, but those who may be inclined to dispute it, i.e., who would wish to assert that bio-psychological factors are in some way significant for the study of socio-cultural change, would, in my view, be hard pressed to defend their opinion in face of the already amassed ethnographic and ethnological literature and what that literature presupposes.

"An adequate theory of culture," says David Bidney in Theoretical Anthropology¹, "must explain the origin of culture and its intrinsic relations to the psychobiological nature of man. To insist upon the self-sufficiency and autonomy of culture, as if culture were a closed system requiring only historical explanations in terms of other cultural phenomena, is not to explain culture, but to leave its origin a mystery or an accident of time" (65). Earlier, on the same page, he writes, "Culture is not an 'objective construct' whose existence is independent of man; it depends, rather, upon man's innate equipment and biological inheritance." These formulations reflect both his own interests and his misconstrual of the intentions of other anthropologists. One would suspect from the way he puts it that it was quite common for anthropologists to talk about a self-subsistent entity, culture,

¹ David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953). Page numbers given parenthetically in the text will refer to this volume.

really existing independent of human beings. This is simply not the case, but the reasons for his view must be made apparent.

An examination of Bidney's book may be attempted in either of two ways. These are, in my estimation, complementary, and the development of one approach need not preclude the other. The first of these is somewhat the more systematic of the two. It would involve an examination of Bidney's treatment of anthropological "superorganicism," that methodological standpoint which would dispense, for purposes of theory construction, with the concern for particular persons, their problems, volitions and aspirations. Bidney's view of this approach and his rejection of it are widely ramified throughout his book, and it is possible to show that much of what he advocates for anthropology is intimately related to this.

Unfortunately, an examination of Bidney's treatment of superorganicism would require an entire paper for itself. In what follows, I have made use of the alternative approach of interpreting Bidney's book—at least the parts to be discussed in the sequel—in terms of the kind of problem that attracts him to anthropology, the sort of question he hopes to answer through the use of anthropological data and concepts. I will seek to understand what is involved for Bidney in the notion of "humanistic" anthropology, as contrasted with the "scientific" anthropology of superorganicism. We will discover that much of what he maintains in his book reflects his concern with humanistic questions.

Bidney entitles his opening chapter "The Problem of Man and the Human World." This concern with man's problem characterizes the entire book, and it is this that distinguishes the book from others on the subject of theoretical anthropology. In the sense that anthropologists give to "theoretical anthropology," Bidney's book cannot actually be deemed a contribution to their subject. For anthropologists are not concerned with the problem of man. They are interested in man and his works, and their

² This point of view is to be found in such works as: Emile Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method (Chicago, 1938); A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago, 1952); and Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, a Study of Man and Civilization (New York, 1949).

theoretical papers and volumes represent attempts to provide systematic accounts of them. Attracted by some particular system of culture, some anthropologists may ask. How has this come to be as it is? But Bidney is not especially concerned about the answer to this question: he prefers to discover how it is that the members of the cultural group make use of their cultural heritage in order to solve the problems that confront them. To be sure, he does recognize that anthropologists may discover cultural regularities and cultural processes, but he does not believe that such discovery is the fundamental task that confronts the study of culture. In the end he must conclude that "cultural anthropology is not a natural science in the same sense that physics is, but rather primarily a historical and normative science preparing the way for the arts of the educator and the reformer" (18). While anthropology may be concerned with what man is. for Bidney it must equally be concerned with what he ought to be (5 ff.).

This orientation of Bidney's seems clearly to account for the way in which he reacts to the various attempts of anthropologists to characterize culture. Most writers whose definitions are treated would be somewhat surprised at the manner of his treatment of them. However, once we are clear about the difference in interest that separates Bidney from these others, his treatment of these definitions is not entirely surprising. A good deal of futile argument may be avoided if we recognize that Bidney is not seeking an answer to the same sort of question that we discover to be of primary interest to other anthropologists. I believe that if Bidney were more conscious of this, he might have been somewhat restrained in the levelling of criticism which turns out, upon examination, to be merely the rejection of work that does not contribute to the solution of problems that interest him. Bidney's polemic against superorganicism is precisely this sort of thing.

Bidney is seeking an ontological theory of culture, whereas other anthropologists seek only definitions suitable to their methodological and scientific needs. That this is a correct characterization of Bidney's quest may be seen from the manner in which he seeks to classify the kinds of definition that have been offered by anthropologists. "From a philosophical point of view," he

writes, "the most significant feature of current definitions of culture is the fact that they presuppose either a realistic or an idealistic approach. The realists as a group tend to conceive culture as inseparable from the life of human beings in society; it is a mode of social living and has no existence independent of the actual groups to which it is attributed. . . . On the other hand. idealists tend to conceive culture as an aggregate of ideas in the minds of individuals, as a 'stream of ideas,' 'conventional understandings,' and 'communicable intelligence'" (23 f.). Actually, he deems this latter to be subjective idealism, which is usually the view "of those who identify culture with communicated ideas." There are other anthropologists for whom "Culture is thought to be a conceptual 'construct' and therefore is said to be an abstraction from the actual, noncultural behaviour which exemplifies it." Such a view of culture he calls "conceptual idealism" (24).

There is an unhappy tradition in the non-anthropological literature of anthropologists which seems to hallow the use of vague and imprecise expressions. This is particularly the case for attempts to define culture, and I can readily see that it is partially responsible for Bidney's treatment of such definitions. When an author writes "culture is" or "culture consists of" it is easily suggested to the reader that what is being discussed is some entity or object that is called "culture." (The fact that these definitions serve no systematic or theoretical purpose in the writings in which they are proposed, whatever the intentions of their proponents, surely adds to the suggestion.) The reader then supposes that he is being told something about the nature of that object. And if, as in the case of Bidney, he is already predisposed to seek out an ontological theory of culture, he may well be inclined to treat these attempts at definition as attempts, usually ineffectual, to make a contribution to the same end. But in the context of anthropological work, "culture" at best is a class term; it is never the name of a thing. Anthropologists study a wide variety of phenomena—kinship, social systems, political organization, mythology, religion and magic, to name some. For them, the term "culture" is used as a general word by means of which they refer to these phenomena without having to enumerate the various kinds.

Their theories, when they have them, are never about culture. but about the sort of thing that I have mentioned. Thus, there are theories about kinship, joking relations, magic and other cultural phenomena, but nowhere in the literature of anthropology is there a theory of culture. Some anthropologists have sought to present a general characterization of the sort of phenomena with which they deal, and, consequently, they have proposed definitions of "culture." Since for many the distinction between "culture" (a word) and culture (a putative existent) seems not to be clear, such definitions have been taken to be theories of culture. If they are theories, I suppose that they must be ontological theories, for they would seem to say what a thing is, taken by itself and for no other theoretical reason. From the point of view of anthropological theory, it must be insisted, these definitions are unnecessary and are never used. Their sole effect is the sort of confusion we are now discussing.

After making the aforementioned characterization of those theories he calls "conceptual idealism," Bidney tells us that the views of Kroeber are to be included among these. Later on, we are informed that "A similar transcendental concept of culture is put forth by historical materialists, such as Leslie A. White, but the latter regard technology and the material conditions of social life as the primary... factors in the evolution of culture" (26). If Kroeber is an idealist and White a materialist, and if their definitions are about some really existent entity, i.e., if their definitions are ontological theories of culture, then surely the two of them must have very little in common as theoretical anthropologists. But just the opposite is the case, as is well known to them as well as to anthropologists in general. If there are philo-

^a Malinowski's Scientific Theory of Culture was unfortunately misnamed, and on two counts. It is dubiously scientific, and it is not a theory of culture but a proposed method for handling cultural phenomena. To discover how Malinowski used his method in the attempt to construct theories about magic, language, sex, mythology, law, etc., one is required to consult his books, papers, and monographs on these particular subjects.

⁴ Cf. White, The Science of Culture, p. 90 f.; Kroeber, "White's View of Culture," American Anthropologist, N.S., 50, 405-14, reprinted in The Nature of Culture, pp. 110-17.

sophical differences between them, they seem largely irrelevant to their anthropological theorizing. And this seems to make suspect Bidney's analysis of their definitions as ontological theories.

In sum, anthropologists define "culture" because they want to have a general characterization of the sort of phenomena with which they deal, and because many of them seem to feel that the greater the number of precise definitions they have available the better scientists they will be. I rather suspect that often the kind of interests that a given scholar has will affect the definition that he proposes. Anthropologists who are for the most part ethnographers and have made their best contributions in the amassing of empirical data may well be partial to what Bidney calls "realistic" definitions. Those who are perhaps more concerned with the possibilities of socio-cultural theory construction, aware of the important role that the use of theoretical constructs has in physical theory, may wish to consider the use of "culture" as such a construct. To conclude that this makes them philosophical idealists is grotesque. Bidney rejects the various definitions he discusses not because they have little or no value methodologically or for nomothetic anthropology, but rather because they are bad metaphysics. He does this, I feel certain, only because those interests in anthropology which are peculiar to him impel him to seek an ontological theory of culture. And it is this concern, rather than the needs of anthropology in the usual scientific sense, that provides his only standard of criticism.

The problems of men are largely problems of adjustment to nature and society. If one studies these problems, one may well be concerned with particular people in particular situations with determinate ways of thinking and reacting. The scientific attempt to account for how the given situation came to be as it is or how the existent modes of thinking and reacting developed, may seem remote. What is given in concrete reality are people with cultures and problems. And in the concretely existent there is no separation of the cultural and the psychological. Bidney is not concerned to discover how any particular phenomenon of culture has

come to be as it is. He is interested only in how human beings use that phenomenon to solve some of the problems that may confront them. Ultimately these are problems that are derived from the fact that men are men; the specific nature of human beings is said to be determinative of the needs, hence the problems, of human beings. If culture is viewed in its character as the instrument by means of which these needs are satisfied, if the origins of cultures are discovered in the necessity to solve problems, then what is wanted is a view of culture that relates it to the nature of man.5 It is only in such a context of analysis that we can understand Bidney when he says, "Human nature and human culture are polar entities which may not be understood adequately apart from each other; each taken by itself is an abstraction from the concrete actuality which is a union of the 'matter' of human nature with the 'form' of culture" (76). But this assertion cannot be assimilated to any system of scientific anthropology. For all that Bidney seems to say is that culture is human culture, that human culture has characteristics that reflect the fact that it is human culture, and that for man to have developed culture indicates that he had the potentiality to develop it. Since all the cultural forms studied by cultural anthropology are forms of human culture, the affirmation of this fact solves no theoretical problems.

Those anthropologists who recognize the advantage for theory formation in conceptually separating the cultural and the psychological are thereby enabled to seek regularities that are entirely socio-cultural. They may, if they are fortunate, discover that certain determinate cultural forms under determinate cultural

^{*} While most anthropologists have not proposed such definitions of "culture," notable exceptions may be found among the anthropological functionalists, especially Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. Malinowski emphasized bio-psychological needs (see his A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays, Chapel Hill, 1944), but Radcliffe-Brown was more interested in social needs (see his Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London, 1952). It is interesting to note that the latter claims that his key notions, the sociological structural principles, are "deducible... from the fundamental nature of human society," (The Nature of a Theoretical Natural Science of Society, Chicago, p. 72), just as Bidney seeks to relate his notion of culture to the essential nature of man.

conditions may result in certain other specifiable cultural forms. Professor George P. Murdock, in his well known study, has sought to discover those socio-cultural variables that are relevant to the development and change of systems of kinship nomenclature, and he has sought to specify the precise forms that these variables must have if they are to result in some specifically determinate kind of system. This theory does not, of course, presuppose that cultures exist without human beings; it only recognizes that should the theoretically necessary and sufficient conditions obtain in any given culture system for the development of some specific type of kinship system, we may expect such a system to develop regardless of who the people having the culture are. For such theorizing, Bidney's notion of psycho-cultural evolution is quite beside the point.

The possibility for the development of this kind of theory exists because scientific anthropology treats the bio-psychological heritage of the human race as constant—at any event, constant as compared with the much more variable phenomena of culture. Bidney's humanistic anthropology does not permit this assump-On the contrary, we find him asserting that "Human nature and culture are historically correlated phenomena which vary together in time" (76, my italics). It is true that Bidney admits that "the innate biological potentialities of man remain more or less constant" (76), but I must confess that I fail to see that this has any significance for what Bidney is trying to assert. Perhaps he means only that there must be something that must characterize men as men, be they Hopi men or Andaman men. But I should have thought that it is this common characteristic of humanity that we have in mind when we use the term "human nature," and I find Bidney's attempt at distinction very unclear. As for explanations of culture change, Bidney wishes to claim that it results from the development of human nature. The cultural and the psychological develop together. Biological man has the potentiality for psycho-cultural evolution, indeed, for psychocultural progress (77 ff.). What troubles me here is that I do not know how to take psychology in Bidney's system. I fear that

^{*} Social Structure (New York, 1949), especially Ch. 7.

if we take seriously this attempt at a "theory which denies the complete autonomy of psychology and history' and maintains instead a psychohistorical approach to the study of psychological and cultural phenomena" (79), we may take psychology in either of two senses, neither of which is particularly promising. In one sense, we would appeal to the psychological in order to account for the cultural. We would argue that cultural change presupposes psychological development, and the evolution of culture would be accounted for in terms of the evolution of human nature. I am inclined to suspect that Bidney's own view is close to this in as much as he does say, "with reference to the problem of cultural evolution, the psychocultural enables us to postulate different stages in the evolution of the human mentality, without, however, assuming any necessary laws of mental development for humanity as a whole" (79). But what sort of explanation does this get us? Every change in culture reflects a change in human Hopi human nature differs from Andaman human nature, and so we need not be surprised that Hopi culture differs from Andaman culture. And how do we know that Hopi and Andaman human natures differ one from the other? their cultures are different, of course! But this is hardly an explanation. It is based entirely upon verbal facility, and is circular in every application.

The other, and I believe related, sense in which we may take psychology turns out to be no sense at all. We have innate and constant biological potentiality, on the one hand, and sociocultural activity, on the other. Bidney would connect the psychological to the latter, and would, thus, make it part of the relatively changing and evolving rather than of the more stable potentiality. I suspect that this represents a confusion of two different notions of mentality, the psychological and the phenomenological, with the

The reference is to historical ethnology.

⁸ I believe that I am using this term not unlike its use in such works as Wilbur Marshall Urban, Language and Reality (London, 1939), pp. 62, 134, 162 and 167 (note especially the distinction made between emotive and intuitive meaning on p. 162 and elsewhere); and Florian Znaniecki, Cultural Reality (Chicago, 1919), pp. 27 and 30 (see his distinction beween form of experience and form of consciousness on pp. 27 and 32).

characteristics and the theoretical problems of the former being entirely ignored. The phenomenological is concerned with the content of experience and the meaning of the content for those who experience it, whereas the psychological deals with widespread and recurrent ways of experiencing and types of experiencers regardless of the content-Zuni kinds of content or Hopi kinds of content. The terms "phenomenological" and "socio-cultural" are used respectively in the contexts of epistemology and anthropology, but often they deal with the same sort of thing, especially if, with whatever justification, one seeks to separate these notions from their theoretical universes of discourses in order to talk about "real things." When Bidney writes about the "psychocultural" he is doing precisely this. He is seeking to unite the phenomenological and the cultural, and when he says that they vary together he is saving nothing more than that the content of a people's culture and the content of their experiences vary together. But this says nothing about that other notion of the mental that I have called "psychological." In his introduction to a recent symposium, Professor Darryl Forde makes a remark which, if suitably interpreted, seems appropriate at this point. He says, "But while beliefs in supernatural action and in human ability to control it through prayer and sacrifice, rite, and spell have their foundation in universal features of human psychology, the forms they take, the contexts in which they are evoked, are related to the rest of the cultural pattern and to the social system." Bidney has attempted to deny this distinction between the "forms" of culture and the "universal features of human psychology," but all that he has succeeded in doing is to blur another clear distinction, that between the senses of mental that I have mentioned above. this distinction is restored, Forde's distinction presents itself as well. Though we may agree with Forde that the nature of the human race is a necessary condition for the forms that human cultural phenomena take, we must also see that it is not a sufficient condition for any particular such form.

^{*} African Worlds, Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples, ed. with an Introduction by Darryl Forde (London, 1954), p. xii f.

We are all familiar with that fact of academic life which has come more and more to separate people called "anthropologists" from other people called "sociologists" and to place them into different departments. And we may well be interested to learn whether or not this fact of institutional differentiation has any significance for social science—in particular, for the theory of social science. Perhaps there is no fundamental difference at all, and whether one is a sociologist or an anthropologist depends only upon what sort of empirical data one wishes to work. By his use of the adjective "sociocultural," Professor Sorokin seems to indicate that he places no great stock on any alleged difference, and his use of both cultural and social data for one and the same theoretical purpose seems to confirm this. 10 And Professor Nadel, notwithstanding his close association with British social anthropology, expresses the view that the difference is only one of abstraction, perhaps with no theoretical importance.11 On the other hand, Professor Radcliffe-Brown makes much of the importance of the social, and rejects any notion of the cultural as being the merest abstraction of dubious significance. 12 Others may wish to argue that "social" refers to groups of people, whereas "cultural" to their ways of doing and thinking. It is not always clear in such instances whether this makes the notion of the social exhausted by analysis into groups of people, on the understanding that the particular forms of social organization are cultural, or whether something else is intended.

Although there are any number of profound differences between the views of Bidney and those of Radcliffe-Brown, much of the way in which the latter speaks of culture and society suggests that the two share an essentially similar view on the nature of the present problem. Radcliffe-Brown, in the papers referred

¹⁰ Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. (New York, 1937-41), passim.

The Foundations of Social Anthropology (London, 1951), p. 78 ff.
 "On Social Structure," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 70, 1-12, reprinted in Structure and Function in Primitive Society, pp. 188-204; "White's View of a Science of Culture," American Anthropologist, N.S., 51, 503-12.

to, speaks of social structure as basic and real; he believes that culture is abstract and chimerical. This suggests that one opts for one or the other as required by one's ontological commitments. This view of the problem is clearly the one taken by Bidney, as we may see from the following. "For the anthropologists, culture was the ultimate reality sui generis and society was but the vehicle of culture, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of culture. For the sociologists, on the contrary, society was the ultimate reality which rendered intelligible the nature of man and of the social institutions by which he is governed. Both sociologists and ethnologists agreed that culture is the product of social intercourse and independent of psychology; they differed only as regards the metaphysical metascientific issue of the ontological priority of society and culture" (96, cf. 120).

It may very well be that there are or have been social scientists who would accept Bidney's interpretation of their positions on the point at issue. But I am rather doubtful that this would be very common, nor is it credible that to be either an anthropologist or a sociologist requires a particular ontological commitment. Are there any specific metaphysical doctrines that one must affirm, however tacitly, when one decided to become a physicist or a psychologist, not to say a physicist in explicit preference to becoming a psychologist? When a man decides to become a biologist he thus affirms his belief that the study of life and its development is of great importance and that he wishes to participate in it. But he surely need not wish to commit himself to a panpsychist or hylozoist ontology for which only the living is real and the inanimate mere illusion. One may become a biologist without believing in the ontological priority of life.

I have no doubt that Bidney's interpretation of the problem could be supported by formulations found in social science books, in which imprecision of expression is compounded with inadequate understanding of the requirements of scientific explanation. It is often the case that social scientists over-emphasize the theoretical importance of those kinds of socio-cultural phenomena that most interest them. Thus, sociologists and social anthropologists will be very much concerned about the significance of social structure for the study of socio-cultural persistence and change. On the

other hand, ethnographers are apt to spend much of their efforts in insisting upon the importance of cultural phenomena in accounts of socio-cultural development. Some scholars have been even more restrictive in selecting the determining phenomena, the means of production (Marx) and the means of reproduction (Freud) being among the best known examples. Were we to take these overstatements too literally, we would often be required to conclude that the writer being studied was of the opinion that all socio-cultural data other than his own special favorite are epiphenomenal. And it may indeed be that there are writers who would be willing to accept such a conclusion. But such a conclusion is not a necessary interpretation of their work, and I do not doubt that there are any number of them who would be willing to accept reformulations of their positions that would enable them to avoid so extreme a view. In any event, I wish here only to insist that the decision to emphasize the theoretical significance of one rather than another factor, or the desire to engage in the pursuit of one science in preference to all others, does not require a particular ontological affirmation.

"The foremost theoretical assumptions [of anthropology and sociology]," Bidney writes, "are that every new kind or type of phenomena " requires the postulations of an autonomous level of reality subject to its own laws of development and that social and cultural facts require the postulation of distinct levels of social and cultural reality, each of which is sui generis. In opposition, I have urged . . . that neither social nor cultural facts constitute a distinct ontological level of reality intelligible through itself alone" (118 f.). Bidney accepts the first of these assumptions, viz. that each science requires its own separate and unique level of reality (48 f., 257), but he denies that the social and cultural are such separate levels (119). Bidney concludes that "Neither society nor culture is viewed as comprising the whole of the human situation, and neither is treated 'as if' it was a reality sui generis, requiring no reference to the other. Hitherto the

¹³ By "phenomena" Bidney here means the subject matter of a science, and by "new kind of phenomena" presumably the subject matter of a new science.

study of man in society has suffered from the arbitrary philosophical assumptions of the primacy of either society or culture . . . In the future, a unified discipline of anthropology, comprising social anthropology and cultural anthropology, is bound to replace the segmented pseudo-sciences of social anthropology and culturology" (103).

I tend to agree with Bidney that the distinction in question may be doubtful, but only because I am not clear that there is any methodological or theoretical purpose served in making the distinction. But this is not the place for a protracted discussion of this point, and, instead, I will simply make some comments on Bidney's reason for rejecting the distinction. It is essentially the same as that which led to his rejection of the view that psychology and anthropology are distinct sciences; viz., the fact that ontologically they do not deal with distinct levels of reality, but make their abstractions from the same body of data. Bidney's insistence that distinct sciences must be correlated with distinct levels of reality has wide ramifications in his book. And, in his views, a corollary of this is that no more than one science may be applied to the study of any one given body of data. Few, if any, will dispute the fact that an account of the falling of a cat from a high place could be provided by physics. But the study of cats is a matter for zoology, which seems to suggest that Bidney's view is somewhat difficult.

Bidney entitles one of his chapters "Metaanthropology and Anthropological Science," and it is relevant here that some attention be paid to it. But first we must discover what Bidney intends to convey by the notion of "metaanthropology" or "metacultural" factors. "As against the view that metaphysics is either prescientific, postscientific, or superscientific, the thesis is here advanced that metaphysics is or may be the theoretically postulated aspect of science, as well as the postscientific ontological speculation compatible with science, though not an integral part thereof" (163). "In the last analysis, an ontological, metascientific theory is an attempt to explain why phenomena are related in a given manner by referring to some aspect of reality which provides an

intelligible ground for their occurrence and interrelation" (164). A few pages on, Bidney writes, "Nature as a whole may be said to be metacultural, because it provides an indispensible condition for the cultural process and may not therefore be regarded as derived from culture alone. There is nothing mystical about this concept of metacultural reality; it connotes simply that ontological factor within experience which provides the precultural conditions for any cultural processes whatever" (168).

Having noted these fairly similar characterizations of the metacultural, let us now consider the following, which immediately precedes the passage just quoted from p. 168. "One of the most important tasks of the student of metaanthropology is the investigation of the basic, logically primitive assumptions as to the nature of the world and of man involved in any one given cultural system. The task of rendering explicit these fundamental ontological postulates and assumptions is said to be metaethnological, since the reality with which the investigator is here concerned is metacultural, that is, it is presupposed as given and ultimate by the adherents of any given culture, as something to which their empirical cultural institutions and behavior must conform and with which it must reckon, rather than as the product of their own creation and invention." Bidney here asserts that underlying the behavior, values, leitmotifs, and other cultural manifestations in any given socio-cultural system is a system of ideas and beliefs concerning the fundamental character of man and the universe. That he cites Sorokin and Northrop in this connection makes it clear that this is what he intends (169 ff.). But is this notion of the meta-cultural at all the same as that presented in the passages quoted in the previous paragraph, or are we forced to the conclusion that Bidney has confused two notions and has subsumed them under one term?

Prima facie this latter seems to be the case. There seems surely to be a difference between the natural, meta-cultural conditions for the possibility of cultur, on the one hand, and the underlying themes, patterns or motifs that characterize any particular culture, on the other. However, to restrict our analysis to the level of the prima facie meaning of words, paying no heed to the context of Bidney's program for anthropology, would be super-

ficial indeed. And while it does seem, for the moment, that Bidney does not use such terms as "metaanthropology," "metacultural," and "metaethnology" in a uniform and consistent manner, when we view his use of these terms in the context of his interest in humanistic anthropology this no longer seems to be the case.

For scientific anthropology the focus of attention is upon socio-cultural phenomena, how they operate and how they change in time. For such an anthropology there would be a clear difference between characterizing culture, e.g., claiming it is patterned, that it has underlying presuppositions, etc., on the one hand, and pointing out the natural and biological conditions for the possibility of culture, on the other. It is from the vantage point of such anthropological interests that it seems as though Bidney has confused two separate notions. But for humanistic anthropology it seems that the main interest is not upon culture as such, but rather upon its utilization in the solution of the problems of man, i.e., in the adaptation of the individual to his social and natural universe. The different systems or patterns of culture are the different ways in which human beings have effected their adaptations. For any individual to survive in his universe he must participate in some socio-cultural system, and this requires both that such systems exist and that man possess the biological and environmental potentialities for culture. These are coordinate requirements, and from the vantage point of his humanistic interests Bidney is no doubt justified in treating them as of equal relevance. In sum, it seems that Bidney does use the notion of the meta-cultural in a more or less consistent fashion, for he uses it in reference to everything that is presupposed or required for the possibility of any individual's participation in cultural life. And while this involves biological and environmental factors, it also includes "the basic, logically primitive assumptions as to the nature of the world and of man," that may be found in any given system of culture.

I believe that enough has been said in the foregoing discussions to illustrate how intimately Bidney's views on the matters

discussed are related to his interests in humanistic, in contrast to nomothetic, anthropology. We have seen how his concern for an ontological theory of culture has led him along paths not usually traversed by anthropologists and has resulted in his misrepresentation of the views of others. He fails to recognize that his program is not the same as theirs and has not, of course, bothered to consider whether or not the possibility of one program precludes the possibility of others.

Since it has been necessary to keep this paper within reasonable limits, I have, perhaps arbitrarily, treated only some of the various problems discussed in Bidney's book. But I do believe that these are the basic problems around which much of the book is developed. Other matters discussed are freedom and authority, ideology and power, normative culture and value, cultural integration, cultural crisis, cultural history and natural science, myth, and cultural dynamics and origins. To treat all of these in an adequate manner would require a good deal of time, effort and space. I rather suspect that if our analysis were continued in the manner of the above sections, it would be further demonstrated that the aims and methods of humanistic anthropology are quite other than those of the more usual scientific anthropology. In particular, Bidney's notion of anthropology as a "normative" science (48 ff.) and his endeavor to resurrect the eighteenth century notion of human perfectibility (76) are understandable only in light of his humanistic interests. They are without relevance to the attempt to develop a theoretical system that will enable us to account for how socio-cultural phenomena develop and change. And since we can never determine the truth of any solutions proposed by humanistic anthropology in answer to the questions raised by scientific anthropology, Bidney's attempt to replace the latter with the former seems untenable.

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VIVAS ON JORDAN'S DEFENSE OF POETRY

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Professor Vivas has written that no future aesthetic criticism should "dismiss the tremendous achievement of Jordan's contributions." Since I agree with this belief I shall confine my comments to some of Professor Vivas' adverse criticisms.

By way of preface it should be noted that Jordan was mainly concerned with formulating a metaphysics of value and a philosophy of art. And although this formulation can serve as a foundation for specific art criticism, Jordan was not attempting such criticism, and should not be held responsible for not doing what was extraneous to his purpose. It is helpful to remember also that Jordan's polemics are directed against a philosophy of subjectivism in the theory of art criticism and art creation; i.e., he denies that the private consciousness is the sole standard of the nature and value of a work of art, and he denies that the artist creates by merely revealing the state of his own internal feelings and emotions.

Professor Vivas finds the following defects in Jordan's work:

I. There is a paradox arising from Jordan's assertion of the artist as both creator and discoverer of reality. This paradox is not adequately resolved because: (1) Jordan proposes to mediate between the existent world and the world of poetry by the principle of analogical identity, and this principle is employed in such a protean fashion as to be unclear. (2) The term "existent" is not explicitly defined. (3) We are left wondering about the ontological status of objects that lack "reality" and are mere existents. (4) Form is held to be found in things and not given by the imagination, so how can art be literally the creator?

II. (1) There is an irreconcilable opposition between Jordan's assertions that imagination operate freely and yet has its

¹ This journal, VIII (Sept. 1954), 175.

own logic. (2) There are no rules for this logic of the imagination.

III. There is a contradiction in Jordan's view of the poet as the creator of culture and as the mere appropriator or user of the philosopher's ideas.

I shall consider these points in order.

(1) It is true that Jordan relies heavily on his principle of analogical identity; yet it seems clear to me that all uses of the principle have a common basis in meaning. Analogical identity is a principle of synthesis in the realm of value objects parallel to mathematical or absolute identity in the realm of scientific objects. The realm of value is basically concerned with the qualitative aspect of reality, and the realm of science is basically concerned with the quantitative aspect of reality. Jordan calls the identity of differences among qualities analogical identity, in contradistinction to the utter sameness of identity in mathematics and science. For example, in mathematical identity two triangles are one only in abstraction: in reality two triangles are two. And whereas in science quantities are exclusive (and the principle of contradiction holds), in values, where the reality is quality, opposite qualities may characterize the same object. In Jordan's philosophy it is characteristic of real objects to be constituted by a mutuality of qualities. For example, the reality which is a family is an individual entity constructed on the principle of analogical identity, the family's quality being different from that of any of its members and derived from the mode of relations holding between the members. Other instances of the relation of analogical identity are the relation between body and mind and the relation between the form and sense of a poem. In all of these instances, the plurality of particulars (particulars being essentially separate) is superseded in their unity.

Analogical identity, then, is the mode of inter-reference of existence and value as these together constitute reality. This is perhaps most clearly stated in Jordan's *The Good Life* where the term "natural" (the realm of existence) is carefully distinguished from the term "cultural" (the realm of value). It is pointed out

there that "natural" refers to "what man, his world, and their relations originally are; 'cultural' refers to man, his world, and their relations after they have been modified by human action" (pp. 4-5).² The relation between the natural and the cultural leads Jordan to say that what is commonly called experience is ambiguous, pointing in one direction to what are called facts and in the other toward what are called values. He writes:

Values seem to belong to the mind-life, facts to the world of nature outside. However, the meanings of both mind and nature seem to rest upon relations that must be assumed to hold between the two after their distinctness has been recognized. . . . Apparently, then, the fact that a significant distinction can be made between mind and what is not mind implies some kind of relation between them. So the attempt to isolate in thought either mind or nature rests upon a relation that is supposed to connect them. Mind and nature are then correlative terms. But since correlative terms are determined by an abstract relation, which is certainly not the relation involved here, they are better described as analogical terms, and their relation a relation of analogical identity. . . . In this case the relation is taken in the sense that each of its terms is included as part of the content or meaning of the other. Experience, when we think of it in terms of value, is not intelligible until after we have presupposed experience as fact and as its necessary analogue. The relation between fact and value is then one of mutual implication. . . . This does not mean that fact and value are two kinds of fact; it does mean that fact and value are two descriptive and constituent characteristics of everything that is real. The full explanation of their relation can be adequately given only in the logical determination of the aesthetic object, where their relation is one of mutual implication and analogical identity. (pp. 75-77)

(2) I do not agree with Professor Vivas that Jordan leaves the term "existence" not explicitly defined, although Professor Vivas is certainly correct in saying: "Jordan seems to have in mind some sort of contrast between 'reality' and 'existence' and that the reality of poetry includes existence." Jordan, however, has had quite a lot to say about existence. "Objects" he says "remain mere things of and in nature until transformed in and through action." This is the distinction mentioned above between act or existence and value. Each, existence and value, is unreal in

² All page references, unless otherwise noted, are to Jordan's Essays in Criticism.

the absence of the other. Art, that is, transforms existence. As Jordan says, "It is only as life points . . . beyond the conditions of its mere existence to that which endows its existence with significance that it can be the stuff of a genuine art. It is only as life . . . fills a place in the cultural scheme that it becomes the real for any artistic assertion" (p. 313).

Incidentally, Jordan devotes page after page in *The Aesthetic Object* to expounding what he means by existence and its methodological concepts. Existence is defined in terms of these concepts. An object considered only as existing is an abstraction from reality in the sense that the analogous value concepts are not involved for the purpose at hand. Certainly it should not be said that Jordan leaves one in the dark about his use of the word "existence."

- (3) So far as the ontological status of objects that lack reality and are mere existents is concerned, it follows from the above that the status of existence considered by itself is one of abstraction. To be real means more than to exist. Reality is the union of existence and value. In Jordan's terms the parts of a whole are, as parts, comparatively unreal. For him what is real is always individual, and an individual is an instance of a universal. This is not true of a part. Since reality involves qualities-in-relation, either qualities or relations considered separately are so far unreal. The unreal is the incomplete, the abstract.
- (4) I think Jordan would answer Professor Vivas' two questions: "If form is found in things, how can the creative act of the poet give them reality? How can art be literally the creator?" by his theory of the imagination, which I will deal with below in section II, and by the distinction he makes between the real object an artist creates and the "cosmic reference" of that object. By "cosmic reference" Jordan means the reference which a word, for example, has to the universe; a reference there for anyone with eyes to see. Unfortunately, it is usually only the artist who can see. Jordan has tried to develop the idea that a word is a reference to some specific aspect of the universe when the universe is regarded as a cultural system; that is to say, the meaning of a word is precisely the reality of the cultural scheme of things in that aspect that is represented by the concrete content of the

word. The word "tree" means all of nature that can be utilized in the creation of culture, from the policeman's club to the Hobbema painting or the Forsyte saga. The cosmic reference of a word is to the total or universal system of signification—the idea of meaning universalized.

It seems to me, then, that although it is certainly true that Jordan treats art objects as instances of reality, it is just as certainly true that he has more furniture in his universe than just art: e.g., there is all the reality embodied in the world of culture. Jordan says,

Reality is come upon in art.... The essence of art is form. The content of this form is Culture. The individuate elements of Culture are institutions. To the question "what is created in a work of art?" the answer is: an object of culture. The universal that governs the design of a work of art, that determines the form of every individuate object of art, is Culture. (pp. 253-54)

Culture is Nature modified by Intelligence (and nature is modified by intelligence in two ways: by actions asserting themselves in the industrial, economic, and political institutions—and by passions asserting themselves in art). (p. 297)

And it is the function of art to give body and form to the reality as it is found in culture and thus insure its continuity in time . . . through the creative act. (p. 312)

A particularly clear statement on the relation of the reality which an art object has to the reality of the universe is the following:

. . . all the arts are the arts they are because of the fixed characters of reality to which they give form; and giving form to a character of reality means showing how a quality that is real can be given substance and thus demonstrated as itself the reality in one of its infinite phases or modes. And every phase of the real that is asserted to us by the arts is simply a recognized quality of the substantial culture that has come into being. Culture is, therefore, for the arts, the ultimate fact, the reality which all of them seek. Art uses life and experience and nature and spirit in order to put them behind; to destroy them, to cast them into the furnace of form and recast their substance in the molds of culture. (p. 304)

It seems to me not unintelligible that a rough piece of marble has a form which the artist reforms. Or, as Jordan says, the sunset is there, designed in nature, but it is given an exalted design when it is painted (p. 308).

What the painter does . . . is to demonstrate by color and space the significance of the real as formed and structured in nature. But the realities will not be seen, or their significance known, by any except artists until their sensible existence is demonstrated; and this representation of them in existence is the function of the artist. He sees the real and beckons the rest of us to share his vision. . . . He does not call our attention to himself. What the artist creates he finds to be real already in the nature of things but as yet unseen. (pp. 174-77)

I conclude this comment by remarking that I think Professor Vivas has misconstrued Jordan's sentence "poetry is literally the creator and legislator for the real world" as if the sentence read "poetry is literally the creator and legislator of the real world." Jordan does write, however: "It is believed that the literary motive gives form and direction to the other forces that are creative of culture, viz., religion, politics, industry, and whatever other moral forces may be effective in determining a culture" (p. 146). It must also be remembered that Jordan wrote a book called *The Theory of Legislation* devoted to a kind of legislation, namely, political, which deals with what he calls "the ultimate aesthetic object, the state—the state being the ultimate harmony of all the urges and objects of life and experience and nature and spirit, imaged as constituting a designed whole" (p. 296).

- II. The two problems to be dealt with in this section are: (1) How can we reconcile the assertions that imagination operates freely and yet has its own logic? and (2) What are the rules of this logic of the imagination?
- (1) I think it is important to keep clearly in mind that the freedom of the imagination is not license. Logic, in any of its forms, is an enabling statute, not a restrictive rule. Thus to be bound by nothing but the law of form is to be free. As Jordan says, imagination's freedom consists in its being able to make use of any content it may acquire from its circumstance, and this content is infinite.

Literary people seem to forget that even the imagination with all its creative power cannot "make" out of whole cloth. (p. 95)

The imagination . . . derives the materials with which to make its activity real from the medium in which it lives. This medium of the imagination is the whole complex circumstance of the environment including the cultural tradition with a content that is practically

unlimited in variety. (p. 88)

The act of the artist consists in the creation of an object that is individual out of a profusion of elements that are there real in the nature of things. . . . What (the artist) sees that is not there for the rest of us is the interpenetrating relationality among the things given, which presents to him the profusion with a structure; and this presented structure enables him to articulate the elements with respect to a form that is suggested in the qualities of the elements. (p. 238)

The nature of things is not apparent. It is the artist's creation which discloses, uncovers, discovers, the realities of the universe. Thus, though thousands have seen Egdon Heath, it is not until Hardy describes it that objective dread and doom stand before us. An object has been created that is not a state of Hardy's mind or of anybody's mind. Imagination, that is, creates new objects, not out of nothing but out of the elements of qualitative reality presented to it; these qualities are synthesized into a new object.

Incidentally, I believe Professor Vivas is wrong when he says that Jordan "seems to mean that the imagination is free from the laws which govern scientific and speculative or philosophic knowing" because Jordan, in fact, says, "Imagination is the speculative reason, the reason that as contemplation works free from temporality in poetry and metaphysics..." (p. 101).

(2) Concerning the second question raised in this section, namely, why hasn't Jordan given us a sketch of the rules of the logic of imagination? Professor Vivas has himself pointed out that Jordan's Essays in Criticism does not attempt to lay down executive techniques but is concerned with the metaphysics of value and the philosophy of culture. In The Aesthetic Object, however, Jordan does attempt to work out the concepts of what he calls value logic. This elaboration occurs in a concentrated dose of one hundred and twenty-five pages wherein he tries to clarify his set of value concepts, which set includes the concepts of appropriateness, ambiguity, cumulation, analogy, color, tone, color-tone, rhythm, feeling, line, mass, form, design, and

individual. It must also be remembered that Jordan is using the word "logic" in what he calls its broadest sense; he says,

Logic in its aesthetic use takes the form of speculation upon objects with respect to which time and space and their substance quantity... are no longer limits to the reason. A broader use of the term "logic" refers to the use of reason in its function of imagination effecting a synthesis of the two regions of science and logic, unifying the world of time and space with the world of color and tone. This is metaphysics. (p. 102)

Jordan does give some examples of the way he applies his concepts (see pp. 337 ff. for instance), but the main point to be kept in mind here is that Jordan is setting forth the conditions of the intelligibility of art objects and is not writing on the technical details of method and analytical procedure involved in literary criticism.

III. In the last section of Professor Vivas' article he asks how the poet can be the creator of culture if he merely uses the philosopher's product, and why the poet is to be blamed for creating badly if he can only create with the bad material supplied

him by the philosopher.

I have already pointed out that for Jordan there are many forces creative of culture and that when he says, "poetry is literally the creator and legislator for the real world" he is not saying that poetry is the creator of every aspect of the real world. What Jordan does say is: "We are not arguing that the literary motive is the 'cause' of the political or the religious or the industrial systems (all of which are parts of culture). All we are arguing is that it is of the same stuff with these systems and has all their strength and all their weakness" (p. 148). "It would of course be folly to charge the failure of modern literature altogether to the literary man. . . . The failure goes deeper than could have been caused by any type or class of men" (p. 159).

I believe Jordan's view here to be like that expressed in Professor Vivas' essay on *Literature and Knowledge*, where Professor Vivas asserts that an aesthetic object is not absolutely selfsufficient but depends on its creator's presuppositions; that is, if one allows that an artist's presuppositions are themselves gathered in part from a real world and its climate of opinion—just as Céline's view of the world as evil did not spring fully armed from Céline's brow.

Although Jordan does not give to the artist as his primary function that of creating ideas (what he does create is systems of form and informed objects), Jordan does expect a good artist to understand ideas and to translate them into objects. "He must know the ideas in their adaptability to form, must see them in their possibilities of design" (p. 161). The artist must at least have this much of vision, for without it he dies.

The chapter on "Literature and Culture," to which Professor Vivas refers, concludes by castigating modern literature for the insubstantiality of its form. Insofar as modern artists have not the vision to see that the material presented to them by our modern philosophers is for the most part subjective nonsense, they are in the same position as the man hired to design and build a house who has not sense enough to see that the building materials given him are rotten. Jordan would not hesitate to castigate such a builder, and he does not hesitate to castigate what he finds to be, to put it mildly, the inordinate emphasis on the purely subjective in both the modern artist and the modern philosopher.

To turn to a related point raised by Professor Vivas: When Jordan talks of the proper objectification of love being the holy family I do not think he is saying the poet must sing, on penalty of liquidation, of Mary, Joseph, and the Child. In the line next to the ones quoted by Professor Vivas, Jordan talks of the love lyric and its objective structure. What he is arguing in this context, I believe, is that the mere presence of intense emotion is never enough, not for the poet and not for anyone else. I must doubt that the Jordan who is in love with Donne's "A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning" would liquidate in the name of his philosophy, as Professor Vivas suggests, "Sappho, Catullus, the Provençals, Boccaccio, the Shakespeare of the sonnets, his fellow Elizabethans, Swift, the author of Lady Chatterly, the writer of Remembrance of Things Past, and that of The Counterfeiters." He would merely try to discriminate among them.

In conclusion: although there is much of Jordan which I do

not understand, I cannot agree that his philosophy is radically inconsistent in its reflections on the place in the world of culture of the artist and the philosopher. Jordan does not advise the poet to go to the philosopher for ideas. It is not a question of advice. Ideas are there in culture, and no man can avoid them. And although it is the philosopher's distinctive function as a philosopher to speculate, to clarify ideas, whereas the artist's distinctive function is to create art objects, this distinction of function does not exempt the artist from his obligation as a man to think; to quote from *The Good Life*, "the primary obligation of the person is the obligation to know" (p. 159). If the poet in all innocence takes cat for hare, this is to strain innocence too much and "to give reason for assigning a large share in the responsibility for the collapse of contemporary culture to literature."

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WEISS'S HISTORIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

I would like to comment on the second part of Professor Paul Weiss's Wingate lectures, particularly where he deals with God and history. Explicitly he offers an argument for the existence of God; implicitly he presents a new view of the nature of history. Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the position it seems to me desirable to list some of the basic motifs of the thesis.

- 1. The relationship established between God and possibility on the one hand and the aspect of realization on the other is, in a way, an explication of the Aristotelian position (p. 257 ff.). Though Professor Weiss does not proceed along strict Aristotelian lines—in view of the fact that he does not put forth the doctrine that realization has to precede possibility—he still holds an Aristotelian view in the sense that for him possibility has no self-sufficient, independent ontological status, but must find its supplement and complement in reality—in this context, in God.
- 2. This modification of the classical Aristotelian view is a consequence of his attempt to acknowledge that existence is both "epochal" and continuous. He holds that existence is continuous, because it points to a full reality, but is discontinuous in its own realm precisely because it is only a partial realization. Full realization, which is outside and above existence, is the bridge providing the continuity of existence in general and of history in particular.
- 3. There is a third motif closely related to Cusanus' view on man and Christ. Cusanus thought that there is no man in whom the idea of man is perfectly realized. This idea is inherent in man only as a possibility; only in Christ is the idea of man fully realized.

¹ This journal, VIII (Dec. 1954), 246-63.

To be sure Professor Weiss does not say that God is the realization of man. He says that God is aware of the unrealized possibilities of man, possibilities which man himself cannot know because he is confined to the realm of the partial realizations only. Hence his is not a christological argument. But the very connection between possibility and full reality as a connection providing the conceptual tools for the understanding and the establishing of the relation between man and God is like that hinted at in Cusanus.

4. The fourth motif is his "historical occasionalism." Although Professor Weiss does not say that human beings are devoid of a historical consciousness, that is to say, of a consciousness of the continuity of mankind in and over the process of time, he seems to assume that such continuity must be rooted in God. It follows that in our immanent historical consciousness we participate in the consciousness of God, or see history as continuous because of the continuity of God. This would be a transplantation of Malebranche's position from the realm of objects in general to the realm of history.

The last consideration brings us to the heart of the problem of the interpretation of history as inherent in Professor Weiss's view.

We need to refer to God in order that history be a single story and not a series of disconnected epochs, completely encapsulating the beings which dwell within them. God is needed in order to make the work of men at different times into the work of mankind in history, and to make the various realizations of the good in the course of time into a single exhaustive realization of the entire good for all time. (p. 259)

Though the statement is also about the history of the world it seems to be correct to assume that the real point is about the history of mankind. This positive determination of the relation between history and God implies a negation of the possibility that the unity of history could be an immanently human affair. The assumption seems to be that the immanent historical consciousness of the human generations—generations which are objectively tied up one with the other and are subjectively aware of this relation—either is unwarranted or else does not offer an

ontological ground for the unity of human history. The idea seems to be that unless there is an ontological realm which keeps various epochs together there is no unity in history, even in terms of a human consciousness realizing, knowing, and establishing a link between epochs. But even on this view God does not function in this context ontologically. God knows history only in its unity. Hence Professor Weiss in effect replaces human immanent consciousness by a divine transcendent consciousness.

The shifting over from one kind of consciousness to another tacitly presupposes that the consciousness overlooking the unity of human history is a consciousness not confined to any specific epoch of that history. Now, human consciousness is confined; hence it is caught in limitations which are precisely the limitations to be overcome if we are to overcome the epochal nature of the historical process. A comprehensive consciousness must have its bearer—this seems to be the view—in a being which is not caught in history but dwells outside and beyond it.

Is this refuge in transcendence really necessary for the sake of the historical consciousness and a continuous historical unity? Professor Weiss seems to think that the only way to establish history is to overcome historicism and the only way to overcome historicism is to make history rooted in, or at least related to, But it is the particular feature of human consciousness that, though its contents may be historical only and separated into different epochs, consciousness as such transcends this limitation. We can establish our own relationship to the ancient Greeks, see them in their setting and see ourselves beyond their setting and vet related to it, becauses the immanent historical consciousness is always more than the items it grasps and is concerned with. There is a unity of history because the consciousness of the later generations looks at the facts of earlier ones as in themselves relevant to later generations. There is no need to assume that only God can see the difference between "being a Greek" and "being a man." 2 This difference is inherent in our

² "We need to refer to God in order to be able to say that Greeks are not only Greeks but also men, perfect in the one case and deficient in the other." (p. 259)

immanent historical consciousness for (a) we know different forms of being and thus that to be human is not to be exhausted at least factually in the "Greek way of life," and (b) we have or may have an idea of what human existence is like and can turn this idea into a standard of actual human historical existence determining whether the Greek way of life did or did not realize this standard. Both the comparative approach, that which knows more than one realization of human existence, and the evaluative approach, that which utilizes the concept of man as a standard, presuppose a human consciousness transcending any specific historical epoch but still remaining human. They do not require us to participate in the consciousness of God. We can see a continuity without reference to a transcendent grasp. What we actually need is only the perpetual transcending of any specific historical realization and not an everlasting transcendent being. As Professor Weiss himself says, "while in history we are beyond history; twentieth century beings, we are also men" (p. 260). But to be beyond history is to be beyond any specific realization in any specific historical epoch. This is to be man as a metaphysical species sui generis. The idea of man does not presuppose the reality and the idea of a being which is supra-human and suprahistorical. It might be a useful methodological device to try to determine the essence of man by pointing to his difference from God. But a methodological device, granted that it is a useful one, does not connote an ontologically necessary relationship.

The question whether the consciousness of historical unity and continuity is immanent or transcendent, is closely related to the issue of the nature of possibility. We shall confine our attention to the nature of possibility of man.

Professor Weiss says: "But without God the ethical ideal could remain unrealized, and the course of history would leave in its wake myriads of possibilities which are not capable of realization" (p. 259). The idea presupposed is that possibility cannot be left unrealized. There is always a gap between the nature of man and the nature, e.g., of the Greek man, unless there is a locus for the unrealized possibility. This locus has to be a reality because possibility is subordinate to reality.

But we may wonder about the application of this view to the

problem dealt with, that of the nature of man and the relation of his nature to history. To put the question in somewhat traditional form we may ask: is possibility a privativum, pointing to something which is not yet, or is possibility a positivum, pointing to definite status? Professor Weiss's view seems to be that possibility is a privativum and as such needs supplementation and support on part of God, who is a positive reality. As against this we may wonder whether it is not of the very nature of man to be more than his own reality, that is to say, to transcend his own reality by being capable of more than he actually exhibits in his reality? The status of man as a subject points to this feature: to be a subject is to be more than the given circumstances of existence; it is to be aloof from the given reality, mastering it. master reality is to go beyond it. Because man is a subject he carries within himself the unexhausted reservoir of possibilities, which cannot be realized precisely because man is more than any realization of his potentials. Hence in terms of the nature of man we do not need the assumption that possibility needs a utopian realization. Possibility is realized partially only, and always points to the superior position of the unrealized over against the realized.

From this a conclusion has to be drawn as to the connection between the nature of man and the realm of history. Because man is a being dwelling in possibilities, he is a historical being. History is a realm created by man himself. Because he transcends nature by virtue of his being a creature with possibilities, he creates the realm of history—a realization prompted by his possibilities, not a given reality, as nature is. History is created by the very essence of man.

Because man is a being dwelling in possibilities which go beyond realities and even realizations, history by its accumulative process exhibits the nature of man. It shows precisely what man can create by virtue of his being a subject, that is to say a being with possibilities. The possibilities are not a constant quantum which have been and can be seismographed in a God who is outside history. The possibilities are discovered through realizations, that is to say, through history. To be a subject is to be capable of realizations, but there is no indication as to what these realizations will be.

Professor Weiss seems to think that possibilities have to find their mirror in realizations. But there is a tenable view that possibilities are not polar concepts but independent realities, and as such are superior to any sort of realization. To be possible is not to be less than real but more, because to be possible is to be the starting point for any new realization.

Thus we come again to the immanence of historical consciousness. Because man creates history he can see history. He can see history and have the consciousness of the continuity of history precisely because of his nature as a being with possibilities. An historical consciousness is a way of transcending any given historical epoch. This transcending is possible because man is more than his realizations. The status of consciousness as concerned with realities and still not itself a sheer reality is an expression of the nature of man. This shows that the solution of the problem of historical continuity and unity is to be sought in the realm of history itself. Paraphrasing Professor Weiss himself: the problem of historical consciousness is posed by history and has to find its solution there.

This comment is not concerned with the validity of his historiological argument for the existence of God. The historiological argument presupposes a being which is fully real and hence can have the consciousness of reality, even a reality which has not been realized in the actual course of history. What Kant said about the connection between the cosmological argument and the ontological holds good for the "historiological" argument too. But our concern was with the understanding of history as it underlies the "historiological" argument.

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AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF LATIN

AVERROISM, III

STUART MAC CLINTOCK

V

The abbreviated accounts of William of Auvergne and Thomas Aguinas given earlier were introduced to show how some important 13th century philosophers handled the problem of assimilating Aristotle to Christian doctrine, and to suggest the remarkable ingenuity, subtlety, and perseverance with which they approached this task." It must be remembered, of course, that these modes of assimilation involved essential modifications in both the letter and the spirit of the original doctrines of the Stagirite. William of Auvergne identifies the active intellectual principle with God Himself as illuminating activity, and by thus "completing" Aristotle he is enabled to place his entire account in an Augustinian framework. Aguinas is concerned to reject the Augustinian hierarchical universe as far as he can, along with its illuminationist theory of knowledge, and so he effects his own alteration of Aristotle by placing the active intellectual principle in the souls of particular individuals, that is, he multiplies the principle into as many souls as there are individual But at the same time he has to restore some of the Augustinianism that he was trying to eliminate, for in order to be orthodox he must maintain that the soul is an immaterial incorruptible entity, capable of separate subsistence. Historically speaking, this solution might be considered as going against the main current of 13th century Christian philosophizing; in general, his successors are found in the Augustinian tradition, holding for

⁴⁴ For the first and second parts of this essay see this journal, VIII (Sept. and Dec. 1954), 176-99, 342-56.

illumination from God passed through the hierarchical universe, and accounting for the unity of the human individual by means of a plurality of substantial forms.

We are once again back to the faculty of arts and to Siger of Brabant, and we are concerned to set forth his attitude toward the problem of the soul in Aristotle, not paraphrasing it, as was done earlier, but giving it in terms of the analytical discussion of the preceding two sections. A vitally important point must be made at the outset: Siger is not consciously attempting to accommodate Aristotle to the Faith. He is interested only in reconstructing the Stagirite's own argument in a systematic and coherent manner. regardless of whether the conclusions come into conflict with Christian doctrine or not. Admittedly, he recognizes that these conclusions are sometimes at variance with Christian teachings, and he makes no attempt to blink these variations, but there is not in Siger any of the Thomist conviction that reason, properly exercised, cannot do otherwise than confirm the truths of faith. No—Siger reluctantly finds that properly employed reasoning can sometimes produce conclusions in conflict with truths of faith. analysis of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul, as presented in his De anima intellectiva, leads him to conclude that the rigorous application of systematic reasoning to the given premisses could have led to no other answers than the ones that Aristotle seems to reach. Bonaventure, faced with this dilemma, assumed that Aristotle's reasoning was proper and therefore concluded that his premisses must have been wrong; Aquinas agrees with Siger that the premisses were correct and therefore decides that the reasoning was faulty or perhaps merely inadequate, since the conclusions reached fail to confirm the truths of the Christian Revelation. Siger, however, finds both the premisses and the reasoning proper, and thus he is ultimately forced to the device of calling the resulting conclusions only "philosophical" and saying that they are always replaceable by the apodeictic certainties of the Faith. The recent research on Siger-Gilson, Van Steenberghen, and Nardi-has recognized that he was by no means insincere, or deliberately controverting the Faith; these commentators well understand that he is trying carefully and dispassionately to set forth the Aristotelian argument in all its consistency. When the

conclusions reached appear to be contrary to Christian doctrine, he can do no more than say, as he does:

It must be pointed out, as was remarked at the outset, that our principal intention is not to investigate what the truth is with respect to the soul, but rather what the opinion of the Philosopher was regarding it.⁴⁷

or again, he cautions:

For we are here asking only about the intention of the philosophers, and especially about that of Aristotle, although possibly what the Philosopher felt was otherwise than the truth; and there have been passed on through Revelation certain things about the soul, which cannot be attained by means of natural reason. But at this point we are not concerned with miracles, for we are discussing natural things in a natural fashion.⁴⁸

or finally:

Clearly the strict interpretation of Aristotle of the kind that Siger gives has been subjected to many pressures—rational attacks and ecclesiastical warnings—and his remarks reflect these assaults, with their recognition that Aristotle, systematically taken, concludes in opposition to the Faith at several crucial points;

⁴⁷ Siger, De anima intellectiva, ed. cit., 163: Dicendum, sicut et a principio dictum est, quod nostra intentio principalis non est inquirere qualiter se habeat veritas de anima, sed quae fuit opinio Philosophi de ea.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 153-54: Quaerimus enim hic solum intentionem philosophorum et praecipue Aristotelis, etsi forte Philosophus senserit aliter quam veritas se habeat et per revelationem aliqua de anima tradita sint, quae per rationes naturales concludi non possunt. Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus. This last sentence is paraphrased from Albertus Magnus, in his commentary on the De generatione, who says: . . . dico quod nihil ad me de Dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram. Opera omnia, ed. Borgnet, IV (Paris, 1890), 363.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 156-7: Hoc dicimus sensisse Philosophum de unione animae intellectivae ad corpus; sententiam tamen sanctae fidei catholicae, si contraria huic sit sententiae Philosophi, praeferre volentes. . . .

nevertheless, he insists stubbornly on the rational justice of his own interpretation, admitting only that it may be inadequate when faced with the certain truths of faith. There is no hint of any modification of a more radical interpretation under fire.

There is another tradition that must be corrected here: Siger is by no means blindly repeating the commentary by Averroes on this section of the Aristotelian texts. This was recognized nearly 50 years ago, but has been neglected by most scholarship since. The German scholar F. Bruckmüller, published a detailed and careful analysis of the *De anima intellectiva*—its sources and content—and he established that Siger's treatment of this problem was considerably at variance with that of Averroes. On the basis of a very close comparison of the relevant texts in Aristotle, Averroes, Siger, and Aquinas, Bruckmüller concluded that Siger, far from automatically parroting the rendering of Averroes, was really attempting a reconstruction of his own, trying to achieve an understanding of his own of the original sense of the Stagirite.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ F. Bruckmüller, Untersuchungen über Sigers De anima intellectiva (Munich, 1908). This dissertation, difficult to locate, has been summarized shortly by Van Steenberghen in his Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites (II, 642-43). Bruckmüller's study, which effectively disposed of Mandonnet's thesis that Siger was merely repeating Averroes, was the occasion of a bitter scholarly exchange, during which Mandonnet even accused Baeumker and von Hertling of conspiring to subvert the value of his research. Be that as it may, it is unfortunate that Bruckmüller's essay is not consulted more often, for it sets forth, in a cautious and well-balanced account, that Siger's treatise is an independent interpretation of his own. founded on sound Aristotelian principles. Van Steenberghen, loc. cit., recognizes the force of Bruckmüller's argument, accepts the value of the work as established, and thus understands that Mandonnet's picture of Siger's unregenerate and heretical "Averroism" was too superficially conceived. Van Steenberghen's own account, however, raises certain difficulties. He is reluctant to abandon Siger's "Averroism" altogether, and so he distinguishes (op. cit., 643-44) an "Averroisme sensu stricto" from an "Averroisme sensu lato." By "Averroisme sensu stricto" he appears to mean Averroes himself, along with certain Latin followers of the Commentator who blindly reproduce his doctrines. Whom these latter might include, I have no idea; no 13th or 14th century master with whom I am acquainted called himself an "Averroist," nor claimed that he was parroting Averroes' theses without thinking. Not until the very end of the 15th century do there appear in Italy masters who deemed themselves to be "Averroists." John of Jandun does call himself the "ape of Averroes" at one point (Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicorum [Venice, 1525], f. 84 vb),

From the way that I presented Aristotle in section III, and Siger in section II, it is obvious that I am in close agreement with Bruckmüller's basic thesis. Siger is not presenting any blind repetition of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle, but he is attempting a reconstruction of Aristotle in what he understands to be the Stagirite's own terms. Furthermore, and here I am perhaps going beyond Bruckmüller's carefully-limited analysis, Siger seems to have been fairly successful at recapturing the

but the context clearly indicates that he is speaking only about the particular matter under discussion, about which he considers Averroes' comments adequate. The designation "Averroisme sensu lato" is applied by Van Steenberghen to any philosopher who claims that Aristotle cannot be properly understood except as favoring doctrines such as the unity of the separated active intellect, regardless of their motives for such interpretation. By setting up this distinction, Van Steenberghen is enabled to preserve for "Averroism" the Siger that Bruckmüller had set up in a position of his own. Salva reverentia eius, it seems to me that Van Steenberghen's scheme needs modification, for under the conditions he establishes such modern scholars as Nuvens would have to be called "Averroists sensu lato," when they recognize that Aristotle cannot be made to diversify the active intellect, nor to introduce this diversity of intellects into the number of individual men. Van Steenberghen here illustrates one of the main conclusions of the present study: that historically the name "Averroism" has been applied with pejorative intent (and superficially) to anyone who maintains the unity of the active intellect (and certain other doctrines, of course), regardless of the reasons for which he maintains it. I would not, of course, like to be taken as denying that the designation used thus has been meaningfully applied, or as denying that there were "subversive" naturalistic tendencies among the arts masters during the 13th and 14th centuries, but I would like to argue that the historian achieves more fruitful results when he goes beyond superficial designations and investigates the underlying issues in purely philosophical terms. Van Steenberghen does, at the conclusion of his study, prefer to replace the term "Averroism" with the less-colored "heterodox Aristotelianism," as far as Siger of Brabant and 13th century masters of arts are concerned (although this latter term still smacks of exaggeration and radicalism; I would prefer the plain "Aristotelianism" myself; it is time the "Aristotelianism" of Aquinas was jettisoned); this recognition of the independent and varied traditions in the arts faculty is repeated in his latest summary of the state of the problem ("Siger of Brabant," The Modern Schoolman, XXIX [1951], 11-27). Genuine "Averroism," he seems to imply, comes in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries (in which persons, I do not know; clearly the "Averroism" in this later period is just as multiform as that of the 13th century). This would seem to eliminate the need for distinguishing "Averroisme sensu stricto" from "Averroisme sensu lato," except as a polemical device to be used against Bruckmüller.

original sense and spirit of Aristotle in connection with this problem of the soul, despite the fact that centuries of transforming interpretation and commentary have intervened. Averroes' complicated neo-Platonic hierarchical universe holds no interest for Siger, who begins, like Aristotle, with the ensouled body naturally at home in the physical world. Siger explicitly cites Averroes exactly twice in the De anima intellectiva: once in a non-significant use, in the prologue, 31 and once to interpret the text of Aristotle at a more critical place. 22 In any case, however, his citations of Averroes are not made to be aping him in any way, but merely in order to bring the weight of an important authority to bear on the issue at hand. Aristotle's agreement with Plato on various important issues does not make him a Platonist. Like Aristotle's. Siger's investigation is concerned only to analyze the principle of the living activity that the human composite manifests. It begins with man as a living being with an inherent principle of activity -the soul-and his endeavor is to discover how the highest mode of being human—thinking and understanding and reflecting appears to involve an immaterial incorporeal aspect, a removal of some kind from the body and its sensitive and vegetative activities. 53 This immaterial incorporeal aspect is found to be the

⁵¹ Siger of Brabant, De anima intellectiva, ed. cit., 145.

⁸² Ibid., 162: Dicendum est secundum expositionem Commentatoris et forte intentionem Aristotelis secundum praedicta, quod anima separatur a corpore ita quod manet, licet non sit eius actus, tamen nec penitus a corpore separatur, eo quod etsi non sit huius corporis corrupti actus, tamen est alterius corporis actus, cum secundum intentionem Philosophi species humana sit aeterna sicut et perfectio eius quae est anima intellectiva.

by the name $soul^3$) reads as follows: "Concerning this first question it must be understood that by the name 'soul' we must understand that by which the animated body lives. For something animate is distinguished from something inanimate in virtue of living, namely, that the animate body lives, and the inanimate does not. By an animate body 'living' we mean that it feeds, grows, reproduces by means of semen, senses such as in seeing and hearing, desires, understands, moves with respect to place, according to itself and not because of anything extrinsic. Wherefore, whatever of these aforesaid (characteristics) is inherent to any body, we say that that body lives and is animated; and the soul is the principle of the aforesaid (characteristics) and is the cause in animated bodies. And thus appears the first of the proposed problems, namely, what must be understood by

intellective soul, a separated substance, and, as such, it must be unique in its species and somehow available for all men when their individual sensitive souls are properly disposed with phantasms.

Now the matter is still more complicated, for this conclusion is not, strictly speaking, that of Aristotle himself, although Siger's attitude and procedure to this point have closely resembled that of the Stagirite. To illustrate certain differences between Siger and Aristotle here, and to show how Siger's adherence to his rendering of Aristotle creates real difficulties for him, some additional historical remarks are necessary. When the 13th century receives Aristotle, it is the original considerably transformed. The Neo-Platonic and Arab transmutations of his thought lost sight of its functional character, and of the discontinuity between nature in process, on the one hand, and discourse viewing aspects of the process, on the other. They insisted rather on the position that nature and discourse exactly reduplicate each other; this meant that elements of discourse were made into real existing entities. The tendency to read Aristotle in this fashion was further reinforced by the 13th century Latin West itself. Deprived of Aristotle's biological works for many centuries, and possessing only the logical writings, the Latin West had forgotten the Stagirite's emphasis on process in nature, and had concentrated on the formal modes of discussing process. So when this current of interpretation was fused with the Arab tradition, which was saying something similar, the principles of process of Aristotle's biology were, so to speak, substantialized, and his philosophical grammar became fundamentally nominal, rather than verbal or

the name 'soul'; it is that by which what is living lives, or the principle and cause of living in animated bodies." De anima intellectiva, ed. cit., 146. By the third question (How is the intellective soul the perfection and form of the body?), however, Siger has discovered that the soul does operate in some sense apart from the body: "The act of understanding is in one way united to the body, and in another way separated. For unless this act were united in one fashion, it would not be true to say that this man understands. In another fashion, however, this act of understanding is separate from matter, since it is not in any corporeal organ, such as the act of seeing in the eye, as the Philosopher remarks." Ibid., 152.

adverbial. J. H. Randall, Jr., remarks, concerning this manipulation of language:

These abstract nouns reinforced the Platonizing tendencies of the Averroistic commentaries to make independent existences out of the substantives of discourse. Verbs were turned into nouns, and operations into substances.³⁴

It is this general shift in interpretation that rendered Aristotle's teachings on the soul so difficult for the 13th century to handle; where he was talking about aspects of a process, they read real parts of a substantial entity. In Aristotle himself, man is a composite of soul and body, the former being the inherent principle of the activity of the composite, providing being to the matter or body. The individual composites that make up the race each manifest vegetative, sensitive, and intellective activities made possible by the presence of the soul or form or principle of Each individual man according to his own life and process. innate and unaided capacities feeds, reproduces, senses, moves locally, and thinks. But since the activity of understanding in material men has an immaterial content and reveals an immaterial operation, Aristotle's discussion remains incomplete until he supplies something to account for this fact. This he does by his active intellectual principle-incorruptible, separate, impassible, unmixed, immortal, and extrinsic to men. This is not a part of the soul of individual men, but, as I have suggested, probably something like the fact of discourse and communication itself, a guarantee for men's knowledge of universals; it plays an active part in the process of knowledge without actually being an organic aspect of the individual soul.

I would suggest that it was not only the laconic character of Chapter 5, Book III, of the *De anima*, that caused trouble for the 13th century in understanding and assimilating Aristotle, but it was also the fact that the kind of approach I have just presented had been transformed into something unassimilable, either to natural philosophy or to theology. When Siger of Brabant read Aristotle, he began, like the Stagirite, with the

⁸⁴ The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, and J. H. Randall, Jr., 259-60.

ensouled body, and sought for the explanation of intellectual activity. Centuries of interpretation, however, predisposed him to understand Aristotle's active intellectual principle as a part of the soul, in some sense, and thus he was forced to conclude that this intellective part of the soul was separate, unique, and immortal, yet appropriated to the body during the actual process of knowing, which cannot, of course, take place without the images that the body provides from its senses. Siger understands that it is the individual man that thinks and knows, and thus the superficial appearance of Aristotle's text, as presented to him, raises enormous problems for him, for he has to reconcile the fact of individual acts of intellection with the clear implication of his text that there is but a single separated intellective soul for all men. All that he can say is that this soul is somehow appropriated during the activity of intellection to individual men, whose cogitative souls are diversely prepared by differing phantasms so that differing acts of intellection result.

Thomas Aguinas faces the obverse of these difficulties. In objecting to this view and insisting that the principle of intellection must be diversified according to the number of individual men, and that these diverse intellective souls are the inherent forms of the various human composites, he is on very sure grounds, philosophically speaking. These grounds are, however, philosophical and not historical; that is, common experience tells us that diverse acts of intellection are caused by the diverse souls of particular men, who themselves activate universals in particulars, but this is clearly against the sense of Aristotle's text, as then presented, where the active aspect of knowledge is clearly called separable and incorruptible, which leads easily to its being unique in species. Siger gives a proper explication of the Aristotelian text, in the form available to him, thus satisfying his explicitly avowed intention-discovering precisely what Aristotle meantbut Aguinas, by his criticism of Siger, shows that the Aristotle that Siger interprets so literally eventually is involved in intolerable difficulties, which can best be solved by breaking up the intellective soul and introducing it into the individual men as their substantial forms. This alteration by Aquinas is not, however, a return to the original sense of Aristotle, except insofar as it attempts to account systematically for the fact of individual intellection (a fact which Siger is well aware of, but which he has some difficulty in handling with the Aristotle that was available to him). Aquinas is by no means returning to the original biological Aristotle, for, as I have indicated, he preserves an important feature of the Augustinian tradition in his doctrine of the soul as an immaterial entity in its own right; he is modifying the Aristotle known to the 13th century, not in terms of recognizing the spirit of the original, but in terms of what he conceived to be true principles. His whole effort, in other words, was not historical, but philosophical; Siger's was historical and interpretative, but not philosophical. Siger, seeking an accurate historical account of the text, encounters philosophical deadfalls; Aquinas, seeking a certain philosophical position, finds it necessary to modify the original Aristotle for his purposes.

Perhaps the complicated status of the present discussion might warrant a short summary of its current position. First, Aristotle as presented to the Middle Ages was no longer the biologically—and functionally—disposed original, for this had been altered (by neo-Platonists and Arabs, and by the logically-oriented early Latin West). Second, Siger of Brabant, in his De anima intellectiva, presented a reconstruction of Aristotle which breaks him away from his Augustinian framework insofar as it follows the procedure of the original-beginning with the human composite and proceeding to the fact of intellectual activity, but which at the same time explains this intellectual activity by adhering to the customary mediaeval interpretation of Aristotle, which makes the active principle of intellectual activity in some sense a part of the soul itself. This placed Siger in the awkward position of having to locate the active part of the intellective soul outside of man, and involved him in all the difficulties of accounting for individual acts of intellection. Third, Thomas Aquinas recognized the awkwardness of this view with respect to individual intellection, and so he boldly broke up this active principle into as many intellective souls as there are individual human beings. Each of these souls serves as the substantial form of a human composite, but is also capable of separate subsistence, after the body's dissolution. This view, the first part grounded in common experience, and the second part faithful to the deepest Christian feelings, clearly does violence to the sense of the Aristotle who was presented to the 13th century, not to say the original. The first part forced Thomas to deny the unity of the active intellect, going against the sense of the text.

The second part of Aquinas' position provided him with the strongest motives for attacking the interpretation presented by Siger and his fellows in the faculty of arts; the doctrine of the unity of the intellect is severely inimical to the possibility of personal immortality. To provide for this possibility under his own reconstruction, he has to make the individual souls that are the substantial forms of the bodies at the same time capable of separate subsistence, unlike all other substantial forms. But, as I have suggested, this doctrine seems to introduce an incoherence into the rational orderliness of his structure, for man, qua substance, is now simultaneously material and immaterial.⁵⁵

To return to Siger himself, however, his analysis is a model of exact interpretation. He realizes that the attempts to modify and transform Aristotle in order to meet the doctrines of faith are violating the sense of the original. It is not possible, on the basis of the Aristotelian text, to claim that the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body; all that can be said, when strictly rendering the text, is that this soul functions as form during the actual process of knowing, somehow conjoined in an accidental fashion to the body during this process. And, as a separate substance, the soul cannot be otherwise than unique in its species—that is, not on the basis of any purely philosophical reasoning, founded on evidence derived through the senses.

nicely at the beginning of the 16th century, when it is well resolved by Pietro Pomponazzi. Pomponazzi takes something from each view, and discards the rest: from Aquinas he accepts the view that there are individual intellective souls which are the substantial forms of human individuals, and from "Averroists," the refutation of the Thomist doctrine of individual immortality. See Pomponazzi's De immortalitate animae in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, 280-381; the introduction by J. H. Randall, Jr., 257-79, is extremely enlightening. There was no such resolution in the 13th century, where the Augustinian mode was still pre-eminent. However, John Buridan, in the 14th century, provides a solution close to Pomponazzi's.

Siger's systematic analysis of Aristotle demonstrates for him the clear impossibility of assimilation to the Christian tradition without essential alteration. Aquinas' effort to that end shows the correctness of Siger's view, for his rendering faithful to Christian doctrine is only done at the cost of transforming Aristotle, both in his 13th century rendering and in his original sense. It is tempting to say, therefore, that Siger's enterprise is more closely akin to the original than Aquinas'; first, he follows the same mode of procedure that the Stagirite did, and second, his account as a whole exhibits logical rigor and complete consistency in terms of the texts at hand. Aguinas, firm in his conviction that reason can confirm truths of Revelation, finds an essential adjustment of Aristotle necessary, if answers are to be provided in conformity with Christian doctrine, but his adjustment cannot even be called Aristotelian in spirit, introducing as it does philosophical difficulties not present in Aristotle himself. Siger, on the other hand, systematically examines the text in its own terms, and arrives at a consistent approximation of its sense, but he is then faced with the appalling conflict of these conclusions with doctrines of the Faith, and can only state the possible inadequacy of unaided reason, and the unlimited superiority of evidence provided through Revelation.

VI

In his analysis of the soul, then, Siger of Brabant falls into the general tradition of interpretation that I have called "Aristotelian." It is quite otherwise with John of Jandun, the other "Averroist" usually claimed for Siger's twin. Although Jandun employs the text of Aristotle, and the commentary of Averroes, as his philosophical vehicles, the propositions in which his thought is presented, his entire attitude and approach are thoroughly in the tradition I have called "Augustinian." The soul is a substance in itself, capable of separate subsistence."

⁵⁶ John of Jandun, Quaestiones . . . De anima (Venice, 1552), f. 71 ra: Si anima intellectiva hominis et anima sensitiva non essent diversae substan-

Were this not so, men would be incapable of knowing universals at all.

For that any form providing being to matter, especially without there being any other substantial form, would not be extended according to the extension of the body, I do not see, unless it could be made possible on the basis of a divine miracle; and that any form individuated by the individuation of the corporeal matter would receive a universal comprehension distinct from the sensitive comprehension, I do not see how this is possible, except by a divine miracle or something of that kind.⁵⁷

As an immaterial entity able to subsist independently of the body, it cannot be the substantial form of the human composite. It serves as form to the body during the actual process of knowing. It is not at all the form dans esse formaliter to the body it informs. Jandun, as was pointed out earlier, repeats the solution of Siger on this head, with the intellective soul functioning as operans intrinsecum, appropriated to the body in the activity of cognition; Jandun explicitly credits Siger with this solution. **

But, although verbally coincident, Jandun's answer has been given for quite other reasons than Siger's. The latter, following Aristotle, began with the ensouled human composite, and found it necessary, from the texts, to locate the active principle in the process of knowledge in an active intellect subsisting outside of men, unique for the race. Jandun, however, has begun from the other direction, so to speak, with the soul assumed to be a separate substance, and thus he faces the problem of explaining the manner in which the intellective soul is the form of the body (as it clearly is, in some sense). He cannot take the solution put forward by Aquinas, which not only does violence to the sense

tiae sequeretur quod in materia corporis humani non esset aliqua forma substantialis individualis et propria homini inhaerens ipsi materiae hominis. . . .

⁸⁷ Ibid., f. 66 ra: Quod enim aliqua forma dans esse materiae, praecipue sine quacunque alia forma substantiali, non sit extensa secundum extensionem corporis, hoc non video nisi ex solo miraculo divino contingere posse; et quod aliqua forma individuata individuatione materiae corporalis recipiat comprehensionem universalem diversam a comprehensione sensitiva, hoc non vide possibile nisi solum per divinum miraculum et huiusmodi similia.

³⁸ See this journal, VIII, pp. 190-98, for further details of Jandun's solution.

of Aristotle—breaking up the active intellectual principle—but also attempts to establish the certainty of individual immortality—not provable, according to Jandun, once the intellective soul is said to be the substantial form of the body.⁵⁹

At this point in his argument, Jandun is faced with the problem that all 13th and 14th century Augustinians were troubled by—a problem that Aquinas never ceased to indicate—namely, how to preserve the uniqueness and individuality of the various different human composites. How can a composite of soul capable of separate subsistence, and body already informed with inherent vegetative and sensitive principles, be considered to have anything like an adequate unity? Jandun understands the seriousness of this matter:

It is clear that activities must be said to take place in unique substances. But if the intellective soul is separated from man according to being, then the entire composite of this soul and corruptible man is not one thing, for no single thing *simpliciter* can be constituted from diverse entities. This is without doubt the major difficulty of what is being proposed, and I know that it is the fundamental argument of those who destroy the philosophy of Aristotle and the Commentator. **

Jandun employs a familiar device to cope with this problem: the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms. The various capacities of the soul—vegetative, sensitive, and intellective—are explicable as being manifestations of distinct forms within the human composite. The unity of man results from the fact that these forms are present in an order of being and perfection; thus when the separate intellective soul exercises its capacity of informing and vivifying a body, it is perfecting and completing the reality of a previously imperfectly-real composite of matter and

⁸⁹ Cf. John of Jandun, *Quaestiones...De anima*, ed. cit., ff. 57v-60v, 63r-66r. These are the questions on whether the soul is the substantial form of the body, and whether the soul is unique for all men.

bo Jandun, op cit., f. 59va: Operatio non est nisi entis et unius, haec est manifesta; modo, si anima intellectiva est separata secundum esse ab homine, tunc totum compositum ex ipsa anima et homine corruptibili non est quid unum, cum ex diversis subsistentibus non constituatur aliquid unum simpliciter. Sed hic indubitanter est maior difficultas huius propositi, et scio quod hoc est ultimum posse illorum qui destruunt philosophiam Aristotelis et Commentatoris.

certain lesser forms of the soul, vegetative and sensitive. The conjoining of the intellective soul to the body involves a completing and perfecting of a hierarchy of forms appropriate to various activities of man. Jandun uses the following argument, based on the coincidence of discourse and reality, to support his conclusion.

If there were not one substantial form by which a man is animal, and another by which a man is man, then there would not be one concept of man qua man, and another qua animal. . . . *1

On the other hand, Siger of Brabant denies the principle of the plurality of forms at some length. The source of the opposition's error, he remarks, is this (the reverse of Jandun's argument just given):

. . . that which is distinct by reason, is believed to be distinct in its condition of being, and since the form of the species is, by reason and by definition, composed of several parts, it is believed that there are parts in the thing. **2

The vegetative and sensitive activities that men exhibit are powers of the same single substance, for Siger, of a single form immanent to the body of man. The intellective soul does not, as we have seen, form a substantial union with the body at all, for it comes as an operans intrinsecum only, temporarily informing the body during the activity of understanding. In other words,

^{*1} Ibid., f. 54b: Ex hiis arguo sic: si non esset alia forma substantialis per quam homo est animal et per quam homo est homo, non esset alius conceptus hominis ut homo est et ut animal. . . . John of Jandun was very interested in the problem of the plurality of substantial forms, and, in addition to treating it in his questions on the De anima (III, 12), Physics (VII, 8), and Metaphysics (II, 10), he also wrote a lengthy independent work on the subject—De pluralitate formarum et diversitate generis et speciei—of which there are at least two manuscripts: Escorial lat. f. II 8, ff. 52ra-78ra, and Rheims 493, pp. 151ra-166v.

^{**} Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones naturales, edited by P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au xiiie siècle, II, 97-107. The present citation is from the first question—Utrum forma speciei sit composita ex partibus in re existentibus—ed. cit., 101: Radix autem huius positionis est, quia illud quod est ratione distinctum, creditur in essendo habere distinctionem; et cum forma speciei ratione et definitione ex pluribus sit composita, creduntur ista esse partes in re. The difference here exhibited between Siger and John on this matter of the relation between language and what it talks about is, I suggest, often a convenient touchstone for distinguishing Aristotelian from Augustinian.

the problem of a possible plurality of substantial forms does not arise at all for Siger; the union of intellective soul and human body in the process of intellection is no more a substantial one than is the union of pilot and ship in the process of passing up the channel. Once again, Siger is being rigorous in his pursuit of Aristotle's meaning, and the possibility of a plurality of substantial forms does not even occur in the discussion of the intellective soul.

The difference between Siger and Jandun is due to the divergence in their fundamental attitudes toward the enterprise of philosophy. 53 To repeat the divergence with regard to the present issue, Siger began with the whole individual man, a composite of soul and body, which exhibits vegetative, sensitive, and intellective Aristotle himself warranted the obvious fact of this immaterial intellectual activity by assuming an incorruptible immortal intellectual principle separate from men; Siger, who received Aristotle in his neo-Platonic and Arabic guise, understood him to mean that the active power of the soul involved in intellection was outside of man and conjoined to him only during the intellective process. This principle, as separated, could not either for Aristotle or for Siger be deemed the substantial form of the human composite, for any such form would, on strict Aristotelian principles, have to be generated and corrupted with the body, and could not be credited with incorruptibility, separability, and immortality, as Aristotle does credit it. The problem doesn't even arise for Aristotle, where the active intellectual principle is not a part of the soul in any sense; it does arise for Siger, who gets from the commentators the neo-Platonic or "Augustinian" interpretation that this principle is a part of the soul, and he thus has to conclude from the Aristotelian text that the intellective soul does not form a substantial union with the body. There is a substantial form inherent in man, a single soul informing him which manifests vegetative and sensitive activities; in the exercise of the highest of these activities, the so-called cogitative soul, man is disposed so that he may be temporarily conjoined to a separate

of the plurality of forms has been noted without comment or explication by Chossat, art. cit., 570, and by Nardi, "Anima e corpo nel pensiero di San Tommaso." Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, XXIII (1942), esp. 70-72.

intellectual principle, and indulge in the activity of intellection in accordance with the manner in which his cogitative soul has been disposed by phantasms derived from the senses. John of Jandun. on the other hand, has begun with the activity of a soul that can subsist independently of the body—as a substance in itself—and thus he is confronted with the problem of the conditions under which this soul does inform the body. He understands the teaching of Aristotle that the general intellectual principle is separable, and thus cannot be the substantial form of the human composite. repeats from Siger of Brabant this conclusion that the intellective soul serves only as form operans intrinsecum, appropriated to the body during the activity of understanding. On the other hand, being in the Augustinian mode as he is, Jandun makes different use of this form operans intrinsecum than did Siger, for John has to solve the problem of the unity of the human individual, which he does by making the introduction of the intellective soul into men the completion of a hierarchy of forms which are characteristic of the activity of the individual. Like Siger, Jandun has the intellective soul as something separable, not a substantial form, and conjoined to the body only during the act of intellection, but unlike Siger, the difference in his fundamental approach to the problem causes him to posit this intellective soul as somehow completing and perfecting an ordered hierarchy of forms within the individual.

To conclude the present account of Jandun's doctrine of the soul, he conceives it to be unique for all men, for it is called a separable immaterial incorruptible intellectual substance, and every such substance must be unique with respect to species. Like Siger before him, Jandun has a very extended discussion of this problem, and he remains unable to see the philosophical justice of any view except Averroes' rendering of Aristotle which he takes to be closest to the original sense of the Stagirite. Also like Siger, Jandun fully appreciates the significance of this conclusion with regard to the teachings of faith, and so, although he stubbornly insists that purely philosophical methods—systematic reasoning based on evidence derived from the senses—cannot support any answer save that of the uniqueness of the separate intellect, he nevertheless constantly proclaims that faith and truth

tell us that intellective souls are substantial forms, are as many as there are individual men, are infused in them in an act of creation, and are capable of separate subsistence following the bodies' dissolution."

VII

In conclusion, then, it is hoped that enough has been set forth to justify the proposition suggested originally, namely, that the philosophies of Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun are, at least with respect to the problem of the soul, considerably different in their basic intention and procedure. Although both men are speaking in the context of the interpretation of Aristotle, and although they use the same philosophical language and even the same propositions to express their conclusions, nevertheless their fundamental approaches to the problem of the soul are very divergent. If the two views are summarily compared with that of Aquinas, some interesting contrasts are possible. Of the three thinkers-Siger, Thomas, Jandun-Siger is probably closest, in his De anima intellectiva, to the original sense of Aristotle, beginning, as he does, with the ensouled composite man, and gradually finding natural explanations for the natural activities that man engages in. I do not mean to say that he completely recaptures the original Aristotle; clearly, the functional Aristotle had been substantialized, so to speak, by Aristotle's ancient and mediaeval commentators and his minimum intellectual principle had become an actual part of the soul. But Siger's paraphrase of the Stagirite is rather successful, and he is clearly attempting to come to grips with the natural problems in terms like those of the original.

Both Aquinas and Jandun, however, depart considerably from the Aristotelian view—Thomas from both the original and the mediaeval, and Jandun from the original. Aquinas faces the problem of personal immortality, that is, the soul must not only be a substance capable of separate subsistence, but must be diversified according to the number of individual men. Thus he

⁴⁴ Quaestiones . . . De anima, ed. cit., f. 66ra, and passim.

first has to make Aristotle's rudimentary intellectual principle into an active part of the soul, and then he must break this active part up into many individual souls, and finally introduce these souls into individual bodies as their respective substantial forms. Jandun, like Siger and unlike Aquinas, says he is interested primarily in an accurate exegesis of Aristotle's text; but, unlike Siger, he approaches the text differently, initially assuming the soul to be a separately-subsisting substance, and thus being confronted with the problem of preserving the integrity of the human individual, which problem he solves by means of the theory of the plurality of substantial forms. We are not primarily concerned, however, with the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, except as his views can provide enlightening contrasts with the views of the other two philosophers What is under discussion is the meaning of the designation "Averroist," and the conclusion indicated by the present analysis of Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun is that lumping them together under the heading "Averroist" performs only a very superficial association, based on their advocacy of certain verbally-identical propositions. Although they use a common philosophical language, and although they operate alike within the doctrinal context of the faculty of arts, interested basically in the rigorous analysis and systematic understanding of the Aristotelian texts in their own terms, their fundamental philosophical attitudes, and consequently their approaches to this material, are, in certain vitally important respects, quite distinct.

Are we not now, perhaps, in the position of having come full circle in the present discussion? It was suggested, at the end of section III, that finding simple verbal correspondences between philosophers' teachings was not a very fruitful way to proceed, especially when trying to assign a useful meaning to a name such as "Averroist." The comparison of Siger with Jandun was intended to show that basic philosophical principles differentiated them sharply one from the other, and also that the similarity between their conclusions was superficial, involving little more than a common use of commonplace philosophical themes, which were used, however, by the two for different purposes. But we now end, in one sense, where we began, for the analysis has suggested

that, in point of historical fact, the designation "Averroist" actually has been used as a superficial label, slapped on with deprecatory intent, when certain themes, stated in conventional ways, appeared, without regard for the fundamental philosophical issues and contexts involved. On the other hand, the heretical nature of advocating the unity of the intellect is well-known, and it would be ridiculous to deny the legitimacy of applying the name "Averroist" to holders of this view, just so long as it is remembered that the name has generally been used with this disapprobative significance, and just so long as it is not forgotten that the continued use of a label in this superficial fashion may eventually operate to obscure the existence of a large variety of philosophical positions among the thinkers sharing the label. Historically speaking, the designation "Averroist" has been applied in this superficial fashion, and doubtless entirely fairly, because the unity of the intellect is heresy regardless of whether it is reached via a Siger of Brabant or via a John of Jandun. But the historian of ideas often has interests other than those of the polemicist, and he may be more concerned with articulating the variety of opinion found under the label "Averroism," rather than being content to dismiss it quickly as heretical, thus vacuous and sterile. Its heresy is undeniable, but its vacuity and sterility are no more and no less than those of any other important philosophical tradition during the Middle Ages; the demise of "Averroism" (or the demise of the use of the name) coincides with the presumed demise of traditional scholasticism in the 17th century."

These concluding remarks may well pass beyond the limits warranted by the detailed comparison of Siger and Jandun; if so, they might be regarded as hypotheses to be denied or confirmed or modified by additional research. It is certainly clear, however, that adequate answers to this problem must be preceded by exhaustive re-examinations of many individual philosophers.

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⁸⁵ This continuity of "Averroism" has been recently noted by B. Nardi in his "Le fine dell'Averroismo," in the collection *Pensée humaniste et tradition chrétienne aux* xv° et xvi° siècles (Paris, 1950), 139-51.

The sixth annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America will be held at the University of Chicago on March 25-26, 1955. Papers will be presented by Professors Frederic B. Fitch, Yale University; Richard M. Martin, University of Pennsylvania; Milic Capek, Carlton College; and Calvin D. Rollins, Brooklyn College. In addition, Professors Newton P. Stallknecht, Indiana University; Francis C. Wade, Marquette University; and William Earle, Northwestern University, will participate in a panel discussion on Freedom. The Presidential Address, to be given by Professor Charles Hartshorne, is entitled, "Some Important though Empty Truths." Further details about the meeting can be obtained from the Secretary, Professor John E. Smith, 207 Linsly Hall, Yale University.

George P. Conger, Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Minnesota, will deliver the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures on Comparative Religion at the University of Calcutta early this year. The lectures, on the general topic, "Toward the Unification of the Faiths," will be published eventually in book form.

The fourth International Thomist Congress, sponsored by the Pontificia Academia Romana S. Thomae Aquinatis will be held in Rome, September 13-17, 1955. The theme of the Congress will be the doctrines of St. Thomas in relation to 1) the present state of the sciences, 2) the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic, and 3) existentialism. Information may be obtained from the Secretary, Piazza della Cancelleria 1, Rome, Italy.

A proposed new journal devoted to the history and interpretation of ancient philosophy hopes to begin publication in 1955. It is to be edited by D. J. Allan and Professor J. B. Skemp, with the assistance of a committee comprising Professors C. J. de Vogel, H. Cherniss, and G. Vlastos. Two numbers per year are planned, and the subscription price is \$3.00 or £1.1. Anyone interested in

subscribing should send his name (not money) to Mrs. A. C. Sprague, Yarrow West, Bryn Mawr, Pa., so that the editors may have some indication of the number of subscriptions on which they can rely.

A new journal in the field of mathematical logic will also begin publication in 1955, the East German Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik. Günter Asser and Karl Schröter will be the editors, and they are to be assisted by a number of foreign consulting editors, including some western scholars. The editors announce that though the philosophical aspects of mathematical logic will not be ignored, "only those contributions will be published that are distinctly mathematical in character." Manuscripts are to be sent to the Institut für Mathematische Logik der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin C 2, Unter den Linden 6, and subscriptions, costing around 50 East Marks per year, can be arranged through the Deutsche Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin C 2, Niederwallstrasse 39.

Another new journal, The History of Ideas News Letter, edited by Rosalie L. Colie of Barnard College, Pierre R. Garai of Columbia University, and Samuel I. Mintz of City College, has already begun publication with an issue which appeared in December 1954. The editors hope to supplement the work of the older Journal of the History of Ideas by printing the type of material—short articles, notes, etc.—which, because of the heavy demands made upon its space, that journal finds it difficult to include. Subscriptions cost \$1.00 per year, and all inquiries about the new journal should be sent to Box 7, Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, New York.

In connection with the centenary celebration of the death of the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini on July 1, 1955, a prize of 500,000 Lira is being offered for the best unpublished essay on Rosmini's philosophy. Professor G. Pusineri, Stresa, Novara, is Secretary of the committee making the award.

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
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